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VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Hailed as one of the "great landmarks"' in humanity's struggle to
make itself civilized, the privilege2 against self-incrimination has also
been disparaged as a "mark of traditional sentimentality."' These dispa-
rate viewpoints, echoing from a different era, remind us that the current
controversy 4 surrounding the issue of self-incrimination is not new. In-
deed, as even a casual glance at history discloses, freedom from self-in-
crimination has been an embattled concept for centuries. Having sprung
from the essential nature of accusatory Anglo-Saxon criminal procedure
in the twelfth century, the privilege fell into eclipse during the religious
persecutions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. With its
restoration at the dawn of the eighteenth century, however, it acquired
increased significance and became an established principle of justice.'
The reason for this historical ebb and flow is not difficult to discern.
Criminal procedure is after all but a reflection of a society's system of
values, and the privilege against self-incrimination stands as an impor-
tant determinant that shapes the moral relationship between the state
and the individual. Although sometimes endangered to the point of ex-
tinction by the inherent tendencies of governmental power, especially
1. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
2. It is important to note at the outset that this Article treats the "privilege" against self-
incrimination as an analytically distinct legal relation, separate and apart from the "right" to free-
dom from compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution. See infra note 8.
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2251, at 317 (3d. ed. 1940). Although Wigmore
is noted for his lack of sympathy for the privilege, he firmly supported its application in circum-
stances where a suspect is questioned before being formally charged. See id. at 307-10.
4. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATroR-
NEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (Feb. 12, 1986) [hereinafter MEESE
REPORT] recommending that the Department seek to have Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
overruled. Endorsed by the former Attorney General, Edwin Meese III, the report has touched off a
storm of protest and a flurry of academic debate. See Dripps, Against Police Interrogation, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988); Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to
Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 174 (1988); Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custo-
dial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda", 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 938 (1987); Ogletree,
Are Confessions Really Good For the Soul?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987); Schulhofer, Reconsider-
ing Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987); Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice, A Reply,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 950 (1987); Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190
(1988); What Hogwashl, L.A. Times, Jan. 23, 1987, Part II, at 8, col. 1; Shenon, Meese Seen as
Ready to Challenge Rule on Telling Suspects of Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 2. This
Article posits that the current debate is being conducted through a veil of ignorance because of our
lack of understanding of the true origins of the privilege against self-incrimination.
5. See infra Part II.
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when left unchecked by an indifferent (or worse, intolerant) political ma-
jority, protection against self-incrimination has nevertheless always re-
emerged as a fundamental part of our system of criminal justice. The
fifth amendment, its stylistic elegance masking its ambiguity, captures
the drama of this turbulent history in its mandate that no person shall be
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."6 As
grand statements often do, however, this phraseology obscures more than
it reveals.
This Article retraces the path of history back to the origins of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and rediscovers a cluster of rights, em-
braced by the historical "privilege," 7 which are today no longer
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Seventy-five years ago, Professor Hohfeld recognized that the term "right" had been used as
a generic concept to indiscriminately depict a wide variety of legal relations. Courts had used the
words "right" and "privilege" as if they were synonymous; one court, for example, defined "privi-
lege" as "the investiture with special or peculiar rights." United States v. Patrick, 54 F. 338, 348
(1893). In an illuminating article published in 1913, Hohfeld developed a system of fundamental
jural relations which greatly facilitated more precise definition. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Under this scheme of con-
trasting jural opposites and reciprocal jural correlatives partially set out in the table below, the term
"right" is narrowly defined to encompass only a legal relation which entails a corresponding duty:
Jural Correlatives Jural Opposites
right : duty right : no-right
privilege: no-right privilege: duty
The term "privilege" on the other hand signifies a relation characterized by the absence of duty.
Thus, if A has a privilege with respect to B concerning the performance of particular conduct, A has
no duty to B to perform the conduct and B has no right to have the conduct performed. While one
can quibble about Hohfeld's use of terminology, and doubt whether the universe of legal relations
can be neatly squeezed into the Hohfeldian concepts, this does not detract from the conceptual
clarity and analytical precision which can be brought to bear by employing them.
If, therefore, "privilege" is the opposite of duty, as Hohfeld posits, then in the present context, the
"privilege" against self-incrimination expresses a legal relationship which may be simply stated as
follows: A suspect has no duty to answer incriminating questions posed by the state, and the state
correspondingly has no right to an answer.
It is important to note that the Hohfeldian concept of "privilege" does not include within its
parameters the right to non-interference, although such a right is often associated with it. Corbin,
Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919). The fifth amendment "right" against
compelled self-incrimination can thus be seen as an important corollary of the "privilege" against
self-incrimination.
In this Article the use of the term "privilege" in its Hohfeldian sense is signified by the use of
quotation marks. The term is used without quotation marks (or alternatively the expression "free-
dom from self-incrimination" is used) when speaking in common parlance of the cluster of rights
historically associated with the "privilege."
For further discussion of Hohfeldian analysis of legal relationships see Radin, A Restatement of
Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1141 (1938). Wilson, Hohfeld: A Reappraisal, 11 U. QUEENSL. L. J. 190
(1980).
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associated with the fifth amendment. The central thesis of this Article is
that, because of our ignorance of history, we have failed to distinguish
analytically between the historical "privilege" against self-incrimination
and the relatively more recent right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion. This failure has led to a one-dimensional analysis of self-incrimina-
tion issues (focusing solely upon compulsion) which has obfuscated
fundamental values underlying once protected by the "privilege," engen-
dered muddled thinking, and given rise to a confused doctrine riddled
with anomalies. Indeed, the confusion of thought created by the entan-
gling of "privilege" and "right" is apparent in the common assertion that
there is a "right to silence." Where does this "right" come from? The
fifth amendment does not by its terms give a suspect a "right" to silence.
If it did, then it logically would follow that a corresponding duty exists
on the part of the police not to ask incriminating questions at all, because
such governmental activity obviously infringes upon that right.8 The
only right which literally emerges from the text of the fifth amendment,
however, is the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself.
Because our understanding of freedom from self-incrimination has been
conceptually limited by the narrow confines of this picturesque language,
the values that gave rise to the ancient privilege have been forced to find
their expression in the concept of "compulsion." While the Supreme
Court broadly defined the term "compelled" in Miranda v. Arizona,9 the
Court nevertheless backed away from the import of its definition and, in
an unabashed compromise, left the scope of the privilege to be deter-
mined by means of an unwieldy and ill-suited tool-the Miranda waiver
doctrine."0 As a result, current practices in our police stations produce
doctrinal absurdities, because the idea that any sane person would volun-
8. A "right" in Hohfeldian analysis implies a duty which is coextensive with the parameters of
the right. Thus, if A has a legal "right" vis a vis B, then B must have a corresponding duty toward
A which is fully congruent with the scope of the right. Otherwise the legal relation empowering a
court to give effect to A's right, by mandating or enjoining B's conduct with regard to A, cannot by
definition exist. Hohfeld, supra note 7, at 31-32. It then follows that if A had a right to maintain
silence before B, a representative of the state, B's duty could not be limited solely to refraining from
the use of compulsion, but must also encompass any conduct that would interfere with A's ability to
maintain silence.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Id. Miranda held that although custodial interrogation created a coercive environment
which would be irrebutably presumed to constitute compulsion for the purposes of the fifth amend-
ment, the right to be free from such compulsion could be waived, if the waiver was voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently made following proper police warnings. Because the waiver normally
occurs in the same police-dominated environment that led the Court to find custodial interrogation
violative of the fifth amendment, this anomaly has been perceived as revealing a fatal flaw in the
1989]
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tarily (much less knowingly and intelligently) waive the right not to be
subjected to compulsion is pure nonsense.
As this Article explains, we owe the present bankruptcy of theory in
part to the careless drafting of the self-incrimination clause. The clause,
in its stylish expression of a "self-evident" principle of justice, fails to
elucidate either the parameters of the "privilege" or the underlying clus-
ter of rights associated with it. As a result, subsequent interpretation has
stood the historical understanding of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion on its head, permitting what was once forbidden.
To trace the development of this flawed interpretation, this Article first
examines how the origins of freedom from self-incrimination arose from
the fundamental nature of the relationship between the individual and
the state during the twelfth century. The essence of that relationship,
still reflected today by our adversary system of criminal justice, was char-
acterized by the inherent right of the citizen to individual dignity, self-
preservation and self-determination. The fundamental guiding principle
was fairness.
In its ancient form,"1 we find that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protected our English ancestors from any interrogation at all in the
absence of a formal charge based upon sufficient cause, manifested by a
complaint sworn to under oath or an indictment of twelve lawful mem-
bers of the community. The "privilege" was therefore accompanied, at
its earliest inception, by two corollary rights: the right to formal notice
of the accusation, and the right to freedom from interrogation unless jus-
tification (probable cause) for the accusation was evidenced either by
oath or indictment. The ancient privilege thus shielded one from interro-
gation in the absence of a reasonable basis for suspecting wrongdoing,
and protected against the unfairness of being ensnared by questioning
that was not limited to the parameters of a formal charge. At this stage
of development, however, the "privilege" provided protection only until
a formal charge had been lodged. After a proper charge was laid, the
state could compel the accused (by force if necessary) to plead to the
charge under oath, and could interrogate the accused upon that answer
under oath.12
logic of Miranda. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Mod-
ern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 662, 671-72 (1986).
11. The original formulation of the privilege was embodied in the expression nemo tenetur
prodere seipsum. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 43 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 63-65. At that time,
[Vol. 67:59
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During the late seventeenth century the privilege entered a second
stage of development. In reaction to the abuse of royal power, the right
to be free from compelled self-incrimination evolved during this stage
and ultimately resulted in a bar on any questioning of an accused at trial.
At the same time, the common law rule of evidence known as the volun-
tariness doctrine,' 3 which had originated more than a century earlier in
connection with the acceptance of guilty pleas, became entangled with
the privilege and underwent a parallel development. The same underly-
ing concern for fairness toward the individual that gave rise to the an-
cient privilege also caused this common law voluntariness test to evolve
into a rule that virtually barred any pre-trial interrogation of a prisoner.
Under this conception of voluntariness the slightest degree of influence
exerted upon the accused to speak gave rise to a presumption of compul-
sion that rendered the confession inadmissible. At the end of the nine-
teenth century the Supreme Court, in Brain v. United States, 4 engrafted
this common law rule onto the fifth amendment, thereby equating the
two. The Court thus enveloped the privilege against self-incrimination
with a rule of evidence, causing the true origins of the privilege to be-
come lost in the shadows of history. Although the twin rights to fair
notice and probable cause ultimately found expression in our fifth
amendment right to a grand jury indictment and our fourth amendment
right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, the intimate connection be-
tween these rights and the "privilege" against self-incrimination is now
forgotten.
As a result of the failure to appreciate this historical connection, the
Rehnquist Court's recent confession decisions represent an unexamined
departure from the values that gave rise to the privilege against self-in-
crimination. This deviation is vividly demonstrated in the Court's incor-
rect assertion in Colorado v. Connelly, 5 that "[t]he sole concern of the
fifth amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coer-
cion."' 6 Indeed, the Court seems to have turned the ancient "privilege"
on its head, holding in Colorado v. Spring 17 that a suspect has no right to
little distinction existed between civil and criminal procedure. See, eg., Hudson, A Treatise of the
Court of Star Chamber (circa 1635), in 2 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 167-68 (1792).
13. See infra notes 232-54 and accompanying text.
14. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
15. 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).
16. Id. As the discussion of Colorado v. Connelly, infra Part IX, reveals, the Court's choice of
the term "coercion" rather than "compulsion" is a matter of some significance.
17. 479 U.S. 564 (1987). Federal agents arrested Spring in Missouri following the agents' un-
1989]
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fair notice that he is suspected of murder when he agrees to submit to
custodial interrogation regarding a separate and less serious offense. By
far the most important development, however, has been Connelly's reno-
vation of the "voluntariness" concept to create a monochromatic test
which now controls the determination of both due process and waiver
issues.18 The central teaching of Connelly is that voluntariness simply
entails the absence of official coercion, and does not otherwise require
ethical conduct or fairness in dealing with the accused. This position
abrogates two centuries of constitutional jurisprudence and ignores the
historical origins of the privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover,
the Court's conception of "coercion"-now defined subjectively as what
is "offensive" to the judge making the call-subverts Miranda's definition
of compulsion 19 and opens the door to a panoply of deceptive police in-
terrogation tactics, which create the potential for unprincipled exploita-
tion of the poor, the uneducated and the mentally disabled. If one
couples the Connelly voluntariness doctrine with the Court's barebones
approach to waiver,2" (which is devoid of any requirement that an ac-
cused appreciate the significance of the situation confronting her, or, af-
ter Spring, even know the charge upon which she is being interrogated) it
becomes apparent that the Rehnquist Court's new voluntariness doctrine
fashions a novel approach to confessions which threatens to sever the
dercover purchase of stolen firearms. The informant who tipped the agents to Spring's illegal fire-
arms dealing had also told them that Spring had killed a man named Walker in the state of
Colorado. After Spring waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to the agents about the fire-
arms charge, the agents, without telling him that they suspected him of murder, indirectly ques-
tioned Spring about the Colorado homicide and obtained an admission that he had "shot another
guy once." Id. at 567. Spring subsequently made a full confession to Colorado authorities. At
Spring's trial in state court for the Walker murder, the court excluded the admission to federal
agents on the ground that it was irrelevant, but admitted the full confession made to state authori-
ties. The defense argued, however, that the full confession was the tainted fruit of the federal inter-
rogation which had been conducted without fair notice of the subjects to be covered. The Supreme
Court held that "a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of inter-
rogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
18. See infra Part IX.
19. See infra Part IX, C.
20. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986):
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that
he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of
the State's intention to use his statement to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete
and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
Id. at 422-23.
[Vol. 67:59
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historical link between the privilege against self-incrimination and the
concept of fundamental fairness as the touchstone of due process of law.
IL REDISCOVERING THE "PRIVILEGE" AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The life of the law has not been logic: It has been experience.... The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it
has been, and what it tends to become. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
21
Perhaps the first recorded exercise of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation occurred in Judea some two thousand years ago:
And Jesus stood before the governor:
and the governor asked him, Saying,
Art thou the King of the Jews?
And Jesus said unto him, Thou sayest
And when he was accused of the chief priests
and elders, he answered nothing.
Then said Pilate unto him, Hearest thou not
how many things they witness against thee?
And he answered him to never a word; insomuch
that the governor marvelled greatly. 2
2
Another biblical example concerning the Apostle Paul demonstrates
that a rudimentary, status-based right to freedom from compulsory self-
incrimination existed during Roman times. Paul was taken into custody
after a riot in Jerusalem, and the authorities commanded that he be
whipped until he confessed. Paul, being a full citizen of Rome, chal-
lenged the centurion who was about to flay him, asserting that it was
21, O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881). To those who with Maitland understand
that the "seamless web" of history is tom by the telling of a piece of it, and that it is thus impossible
for a few selected events to be extracted from that historical fabric without some inevitable distor-
tion, Holmes' exhortation is offered by way of apology.
22. Matthew 27:11-14. The earliest origins of freedom from self-incrimination appear to have
been derived from the ancient Scriptures of Biblical times. Under Talmudic law, which reflected
ancient oral teachings concerning the laws of Moses, an accused had an absolute (and unwaivable)
"right" against self-incrimination. Thus the distinction between voluntary and compelled confes-
sions was irrelevant. No statement from the mouth of the accused could be used against him crimi-
nally. Indeed, the accused was not allowed to confess, or even plead guilty before the Sanhedrin, the
criminal court. According to Maimonides, who codified the rule in the twelfth century, the principle
that an accused could not be convicted upon his own admission was a "divine decree." See L. LEvy,
THE ORIGINS OF THE FiFrn AMENDMENT 43341 (1968).
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unlawful to whip a Roman citizen. The centurion reported this to his
superiors and Paul was later released unharmed.23
According to Sir James Stephen, although the use of torture was a
regular aspect of Roman criminal procedure, it was nevertheless reserved
in most cases for slaves.24 Indeed, when an owner was suspected of an
offense, it was his slaves who were often tortured in an attempt to gain
evidence against him.2" The importance of one's status as a protection
against compulsory self-incrimination also appears in Europe during the
Middle Ages, where high public officials, doctors and lawyers were im-
mune from interrogation by torture.26
A. The First Stage of Development Under English Common Law
The English origins of the freedom from self-incrimination lie in a tan-
gled web of obscure historical events. Wigmore saw the roots of the
modem privilege as developing out of an ongoing jurisdictional power
struggle between the Crown and the Church beginning in the twelfth
century and culminating in the religious and political strife of the seven-
teenth century.27 An undue emphasis upon such an institutional per-
spective, however, obscures the human values underlying this struggle,
and ignores the complexity of the issues involved. As Lenard Levy
points out, a multitude of political, religious and legal struggles shaped
the privilege in England.28 McCormick, building upon the research of
Mary Hume Maguire, likewise suggested that Wigmore's view reflects
too narrow a reading of history, and observed that early opposition to
self-incrimination stemmed from "important policies of individual free-
23. Acts 22:24-30.
24. 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 47-48 (1883).
25. Id. at 48.
26. J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 13 (1977).
27. J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2250, at 278.
28. The English origins, so much more complex, spilled over legal boundaries and reflected
the many-sided religious, political, and constitutional issues that racked England during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the struggles for supremacy between Catholicism
and Protestantism, between Anglicanism and Puritanism, between King and Parliament,
between arbitrary rule and limited or constitutional government, between the suppression
of heresy and sedition and freedom of conscience and press. Even within the more immedi-
ate confines of law itself, the history of the right against self-incrimination is emeshed in
broad issues of great import: the contests for supremacy between the accusatory and the
inquisitorial systems of criminal procedure, between the common law and the royal prerog-
ative, and between the common law and its rivals, canon and civil law.
L. LEvy, supra note 22, at 42.
[Vol. 67:59
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dom and dignity."2 9 These values would lead to the triumph of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the common law courts of England by
1700.30
What were the values, embodied in the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, which our English ancestors struggled for over six centuries to pre-
serve? It is well known that early English resistance to official
interrogations by both the ecclesiastical courts and the King's Council
(and later the Court of High Commission and the Court of Star Cham-
ber) by interrogation focused upon the use of the oath ex officio.3 1 The
commentators' fascination with the compulsory aspect of the oath (tor-
tura spiritualis),32 however, has resulted in insufficient attention being
29. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 114 (Cleary rev. 1984); Maguire, Attack of
the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio, in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN
HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN (1936).
30. J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 298-99; G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 43 (1963).
31. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949). The use of
the oath ex officio originated in canon law in 1206 and became systematized in 1215 by the Fourth
Lateran Council, following the abolition of the ordeals of water and hot iron (apparantly because
they were too easy to pass). The use of the oath was part of a comprehensive system of inquiry
(processus per inquisitionem) for rooting out heritics which included the use of paid informers.
Maguire, supra note 29, at 201; Silving, The Oath, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1345 (1959).
Because the ex officio oath was actually an oath to tell the truth (de veritate dicenda) it presented
an anomaly which initially troubled theologians. Theological doctrine had consistently asserted that
no duty to incriminate oneself existed. Indeed, St. Thomas Aquinas (12252-1274) had drawn a clear
distinction between silence and falsehood, maintaining in the Summa Theologica that one who took
an oath to tell the truth could remain silent in the absence of accusation (infamia) or express evi-
dence of guilt. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. II, qu. 69, art. 2, at 257-58 (Fa-
thers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1918). If there was no duty to incriminate oneself
then whence came the authority for demanding a suspect take the oath and answer questions? The
bootstrapped answer was that the authority derived from the official's power to inquire, thus explain-
ing the suffix ex officio which became attached to the oath. Silving, supra, at 1345.
The oath ex officio was made part of English ecclesiastical procedure in 1236 by Cardinal Otho, a
representative of Pope Gregory IX. The oath (as preserved from a version administered by the
Court of High Commission during the sixteenth century) took the following form: "You shall swear
to answer all such Interrogatories as shall be offered unto you and declare your whole knowledge
therein, so God help you." Maguire, supra note 29, at 200.
32. According to Professor Helen Silving, an oath was originally a self-curse performed by
primitive man as a means for assuring that a promise would be kept. With the advent of Christian-
ity, divine retribution became the instrument of enforcement. Thus, the devout Christian in medie-
val England faced a cruel dilemma when questioned under an oath to tell the truth. Assuming that a
truthful answer would be incriminating, the suspect had the unhappy choice of either facing tempo-
ral punishment, or suffering everlasting damage to his soul by committing the sin of perjury. Given
the devout religious beliefs of that time, the use of the oath was seen as being more cruel than bodily
torture. In 1725, the Council of Rome banned the use of the oath by an accused in a criminal trial,
and under subsequent British practice (which also applied in the American colonies at the time of
the Revolution) a criminal defendant could not testify under oath at his trial. Silving, supra note 31,
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paid to other equally important and well documented objections to such
ex officio interrogations.
L The Right to Fair Notice and Justified Suspicion Before
Interrogation
As the term ex officio signifies, such interrogations were conducted by
virtue of the authority of the interrogator's office. 3 This inquisitorial
procedure was marked by the absence of any known accuser and the
failure to reveal specific charges before the interrogation began.34 One of
the earliest documented objections to such ex officio interrogations con-
cerned the activities of a zealous prelate Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of
Lincoln (1235-1253). In 1246 the Bishop conducted a sweeping inquiry
into the morals and conduct of both clergy and laity, irrespective of their
station in life.35 The resulting public outcry led to a writ of prohibition
issued by Henry III.36 As Maguire points out, no one claimed that the
Bishop lacked jurisdiction over the subjects he investigated. Rather, the
public objected to the Bishop's procedure, a procedure which it consid-
ered "'repugnant to the ancient customs of our Realm' and contrary to
the spirit of the common law."'37
Was this objection merely a reaction to the use of the oath? Morgan,
who made a detailed study of this event, concluded that the "offensive
characteristic" of the Bishop's procedure, of which the oath was only a
part, "was its requirement that a person who had not been charged by a
formal presentment or accusation answer under oath all questions put to
him."38 Thus, the opposition did not focus on the soul-threatening di-
lemma created by the use of the oath, but rather on the omission of pro-
cedural rights which were considered essential prerequisites before one
could be subjected to such a dilemma. As discussed below, events in the
at 1343-1350. Although English judges, in their discretion, permitted defendants to make unsworn
(and uncross-examined) statements from the dock, the right to give sworn testimony was not reinsti-
tuted until the passage of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 45-48.
33. Maguire, supra note 29, at 203.
34. See id. at 204; L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 39. The officer simply instituted the proceeding
based upon his own suspicions, whether they be founded upon the report of a secret informant or
otherwise.
35. Maguire, supra note 29, at 205-206.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Morgan, supra note 31, at 1.
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preceding (twelfth) century that involved similar objections prior to the
introduction of the oath ex officio into England buttress this conclusion.
Scholars have often remarked that the twelfth century was a "lumi-
nous age throwing light both on the past and on the future."3 9 Certainly
that was true of the reign of the great Plantagenet Henry II (1154-1189).
Central to the Anglo-Saxon system of that time was the necessity of a
precise and properly substantiated accusation. A "criminal" proceeding
was initiated either by individual complaint (called an appeal) or by an
accusing jury.' In contrast, under canon law, which followed Roman
civil law, a secret informant or the judge could institute a proceeding in
ecclesiastical courts based upon suspicion.4 In 1164, Henry, who was
keenly interested in the work of justice, sought to force the ecclesiastical
courts to adopt the common law procedure.4' Pollock and Maitland
summarize Henry's position as follows:
Laymen ought not to be put to answer in those courts upon a mere unsworn
suggestion of ill fame. Either someone should stand forth and commit him-
self to a definite accusation, or else the ill fame should be sworn to by twelve
lawful men of the neighborhood summoned for that purpose by the sheriff:
in other words, the ecclesiastical judge ought not to proceed ex officio upon
private suggestions.4 3
It is significant that Henry II made these efforts well before the introduc-
39. R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL
349, (77 Seldon Society 1959); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
672-73 (2d ed. 1951).
40. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 39, at 151-52; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 39, at 466, 642. The complainant who "appealed" of a felony was (with certain excep-
tions) required to offer to prove the truth of his claim "by his body," (i.e. trial by battle) and one who
offered only a bare assertion was not even entitled to an answer from the defendant. Id. at 605-06.
The accusing jury was, of course, the forerunner of our grand jury. See infra note 43. Quotation
marks are used around the word criminal because at this stage there was no formal distinction
between civil and criminal matters. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 39, at 35-36.
41. Maguire, supra note 29, at 203.
42. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 39, at 151-52.
43. Id. One should note that the jury of twelve lawful men did not function like a trial jury, but
rather served in this instance in a manner similar to our grand jury. Bracton (circa 1250) records
that even when one is accused by individual appeal, the defendant may obtain a writ for such an
inquest to determine whether the appeal was lodged because of hate and spite. 2 H. BRACTON, DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIEAE (ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND) 346-47
(S. Thorne trans. 1968).
Bracton's concern for the reliablilty of common suspicion is also noteworthy, in that he particu-
larly cautioned the judge to question the members of the accusing jury to determine that the suspi-
cion against the accused did not come from "some low and worthless fellow, one in whom no trust
must in any way be reposed. Let the judge so inquire into matters of this kind that his glory and the
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tion of the oath ex officio in England, and indeed even before such an
oath had been incorporated into canon law." Thus, at this early stage,
the developing privilege against self-incrimination appears to have been
founded upon ancient conceptions of fundamental fairness that gave rise
to the accusatory system of Anglo-Saxon justice. A suspect was entitled
to the benefit of a definite accusation,45 to know who his accusers were,
and to have recourse to a neutral determination that suspicion against
him was justified, before he was to be put to answer. These ancient cus-
toms formed the cornerstone of the accusatorial system of early English
criminal procedure and effectively precluded interrogation of a suspect in
the absence of a formal charge. Indeed, a suspected thief who confessed
in the absence of any "appeal" being lodged against him was not bound
by that confession.46 On the other hand, once a formal complaint, sub-
stantiated by oath or indictment, was made, the protection of the privi-
lege ended and, at this stage in the development of the privilege, the state
could compel the accused to answer.47
renown of his name may increase and that it not be said 'Jesus is crucified and Barrabus delivered.''
Id. at 404.
Of course, if a felon was caught following the hue and cry with evidence of his crime still upon
him, there was no need for accusation whether by way of appeal or presentment, for the defendant
was not entitled to protest his innocence or even have any form of trial. He simply was brought
before some court and promptly ordered hanged. This form of summary justice, however, gradually
fell into decline during the thirteenth century. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 39, at 579.
44. See supra note 31.
45. In light of the details required to be given in the appeal (for example, the year, place, day
and hour which the crime allegedly occured) it seems clear that the function of a specific accusation
was to give adquate notice to the suspect before he was required to answer. BRACTON, supra note
43, at 388.
46. Id. at 425. The rule was otherwise if the defendant had been caught red-handed in posses-
sion of stolen property. Id.
47. No doubt much of the confusion that has precluded a clear understanding of the original
scope of the "privilege" prior to formal charge has been caused by a misunderstanding of the post-
charge practice known as peine forte et dure by which an accused could be compelled to answer the
charge lodged against him. As Langbein has documented, this practice, which continued into the
eighteenth century, came about as a result of the transition from trial by ordeal to trial by jury.
Because use of the jury was initially seen as a protection to be requested by the defendant, the idea
that a defendant must choose to be tried by a jury persisted when jury trial became the dominant
mode of proceeding. This presented a dilemma for the state, for if the defendant refused to plead to
the charge and accept trial by jury, it could not convict him. Legislation soon authorized the indefi-
nite imprisonment of anyone refusing to plead, and the custom developed (to speed things along) of
feeding the defendant only bread and water, while placing increasingly heavy stones upon his chest,
until he either agreed to plead or was crushed to death. The purpose of this torture, however, was
not, as commonly misunderstood, to obtain a confession prior to trial, but to force the defendant to
answer the charge (i.e. plead guilty or not guilty) so proceedings could commence. The practice
persisted because of the rule that convicted felons forfeited their estates to the sovereign. By suffer-
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2. Eclipse of the Privilege in the Prerogative Courts
Notwithstanding the enlightenment of Henry II and his grandson
Henry III, the commitment to fairness embodied in the accusatorial sys-
tem of criminal justice they promoted was constantly in danger of dis-
solving. Because the powerful inquisitorial method of the canon law was
tremendously efficient in compelling conformity and stiffing dissent, it
tended to come loose from its moorings in the ecclesiastical world and
drift into the political realm. Evidence from the reign of Edward III
(1327-1377) shows that inquisitorial procedures gradually crept into the
practice of the King and his Council. Parliament, in an effort to combat
these procedures, enacted a statute which made reference to Magna
Charta and declared that:
from henceforth none shall be taken by petition or suggestion made to our
lord the King, or to his Council, unless it be by indictment or presentation
of good and lawful people of the same neighborhood where such deeds be
done, in due manner, or by process made by writ original at the common
law.48
The respect paid to the Magna Charta, however, was momentary for
England was soon engulfed in the flames of religious persecution which
reduced such parchment guarantees of individual rights to ashes during
the next several centuries. In the reign of Henry IV (1399-1413) a zeal-
ous Parliament enacted a statute authorizing bishops to arrest and im-
prison anyone "evidently suspected" of heresy and to determine the
matter according to canonical decree. This, of course, reestablished the
use of the oath ex officio.4 9 In 1532 John Lambert, a priest and fellow at
Queens College, Cambridge, was one of the first to resurrect the common
law attack on such inquisitorial procedures. Under interrogation for he-
ing death under peineforte et dure there was no conviction and an accused could thereby preserve
his estate. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 26, at 74-76.
48. 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 319, 321 (25 Edward III, c. 4, 1351-52). The reference to
Magna Charta (1215) was undoubtably to Chapter 39 which provides that "No free man shall be
taken or imprisoned or disseised, outlawed or banished or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." A.
HOWARD, MAGNA CHARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY (1964). As Pollock & Maitland point out,
the phrase "by the lawful judgment of his peers" could not have referred to the right to jury trial
(which did not yet exist in its modem form), but rather referred to the accusing jury. The passage
therefore reflected the requirement that the King could not proceed in any manner against a free
citizen in the absence of a specified accusation either by way of indictiment by an accusing jury or by
private complaint issuing in accordance with the common law. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 39, at 173, n.3.
49. Maguire, supra note 29, at 208; Morgan, supra note 27, at 5.
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retical beliefs, he refused to answer, citing the Latin maxim which was
later made famous by Coke: Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum. ° The fol-
lowing year, after petitions to King Henry VIII (1509-1547) and much
debate, the Parliament repealed the statute of Henry IV. The Parliament
then provided that: "every person and persons being presented or in-
dicted of heresy or duly accused or detected thereof by two lawful wit-
nesses at the least . . . shall and may after every such accusation or
presentment and none otherwise... be committed.., to answer in open
court."51 Like the Edwardian statute before it, this act illustrates that
the right to freedom from interrogation in the absence of a duly substan-
tiated formal accusation was repeatedly confirmed as the law of the land,
even in the face of infringement by royal power. On the other hand,
those attacking the inquisitorial procedures sought protection from self-
incrimination only until a proper charge had been brought. Indeed,
Lambert had refused to answer only incriminating questions regarding
matters as to which he had not been duly accused.52
With the fusion of Church and state by the Act of Supremacy, 53 any
jurisdictional clash between spiritual and temporal worlds became irrele-
vant. Religious matters became political matters. Conformity to the es-
tablished religion became a patriotic duty, and freedom of expression was
stifled, since it was feared that disunity would result if "men may be
tolerated to think as they please and publicly speak what they think."54
Queen Elizabeth I established the Court of High Commission for ec-
clesiastical affairs to enforce religious conformity and maintain the eccle-
siastical supremacy of the Crown.55 The Court of High Commission
quickly adopted inquisitorial procedures. Upon mere rumor of heresy,
the Commission would bring the suspect before it, force him to take the
50. Literally: no one is bound to bring forth (i.e. accuse) himself. Compare L. LEVY, supra
note 18, at 3; Morgan, supra note 31, at 8; and Silving, supra note 31, at 1367.
51. 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 454, 455 (25 Henry VIII, c. 14, 1533) (emphasis added and
spelling modernized). Maguire, supra note 29, at 212.
52. See 5 J. FoxE, THE AcTs AND MONUMENTS OF JoHN FOXE 184-250 (Cattley ed. 1838) for
a detailed description of the Lambert case. Several years later Lambert again was accused of heresy
for disbelieving that the bread and wine used in the sacrament changed into the body of Christ. In a
trial before King Henry VIII himself, Lambert debated the doctrine of transubstantiation with the
bishops, and refused to recant. Lambert was condemned by the King and burned at the stake in
1538.
53. Enacted in the first year of the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), the Act of Supremacy made
the monarch the head of the church of England. Morgan, supra note 31, at 6-7.
54. Maguire, supra note 29, at 212-13.
55. Id. at 213-15.
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oath ex officio and then subject him to interrogation without giving him
any details of the charge or the identity of his accuser.56 Indeed, under
the infamous twenty-four articles, designed by John Whitgift for use
against the Puritans, the Commission would issue a standard general ac-
cusation against the suspected heretic and demand that he confess to the
particulars under oath.5" As Levy points out, the results were devastat-
ing for a Puritan:
The Commission might have only the vaguest suspicions about his religious
convictions and activities .... Yet once summoned, he was ruined. He
could refuse the oath and rot in jail, or having taken it, refuse to answer and
meet the same fate. If he took the oath and lied, he committed the un-
pardonable and cardinal sin of perjury which was simply not an option for a
religious man: he was incapable of foreswearing God and damning his soul.
If he took the oath and told the truth, he foreswore himself, supplying his
enemy with legal proof of his guilt.... The sole route of escape from all
personal punishment was unthinkable: to repudiate one's conscience, apos-
tatize by becoming a conformist, and in earnestness of repentance play Ju-
das by turning state's evidence.... The only honorable choice for a decent
God-fearing Puritan was some form of martyrdom....
It is thus not surprising that the focus of the attack against such proce-
dures fell upon the hated oath ex officio. The High Commission relied on
the oath as a central tool both in investigating and in proving religious
crimes.59 The oath also placed its victims in the intolerable dilemma of
either "cutting one's throat with one's tongue"' or suffering eternal
damnation. Thus, at this point in history attention shifted from the right
to fair notice and justified suspicion associated with the privilege against
self-incrimination, and focused instead upon the compulsion created by
the use of the oath.61 The subsequent blending of the "privilege" with
56. Id.; L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 131-35.
57. One article, for example, stated: "We do object, assert, and declare... [t]hat within the
time aforesaid you have advisedly and of set purpose preached, taught, declared, set down, or pub-
lished by writing, public or private speech, matter against the said Book of Common Prayer, or of
some thing therein contained." L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 134-35 (emphasis added and spelling
modernized).
58, Id. at 133-34.
59. In contrast to the common law, conviction under ecclesiastical law was much more difficult
because it required proof by two witnesses unless the defendant confessed. Id. at 133.
60. Id. at 330.
61. A contributing factor no doubt was the uncertainty at that time as to whether the common
law was applicable to a court created by royal prerogative. Coke, both as an advocate and as Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, subsequently championed the supremacy of the common law. Maguire,
supra note 29, at 220-25. As Maguire notes, however, this presented not merely a problem of legal
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the development of this new corollary "right" against compulsory self-
incrimination has resulted in a tangled confusion of thought ever since.
Toward the middle of the seventeenth century the battleground of the
continuing struggle expanded to include the other prerogative court, the
Court of Star Chamber. This notorious body, holding legislative, execu-
tive and judicial power in one fist, was a powerful instrument for political
oppression. 62 Although the Court of Star Chamber also administered the
oath ex officio, remarkably little opposition to its use existed prior to
1637.63 Refusal to take the oath in Star Chamber was virtually unknown
because, in contrast to High Commission practice, the Court of Star
Chamber normally presented the accused with a written bill of complaint
before interrogating him."r Indeed, Star Chamber ordinarily gave a de-
fendant eight days in which to frame a written answer.6" Defendants
were permitted the advice of counsel in drafting their response and coun-
sel could demurrer on a number of technical legal grounds. 66 After the
defendant filed his answer Star Chamber examined him upon it under
oath.67 However, according to William Hudson (a clerk of the Court of
Star Chamber [circa 1635] and its foremost historian) a defendant was
protected from examination concerning any crime not charged in the bill
of complaint.61 Indeed, one of the grounds for demurring to the com-
interpretation, but an issue of constitutional dimension which ultimately was resolved only by the
Glorious Revolution of 1688. Id.
62. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTrUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 220-21 (H. Fisher ed. 1963).
The membership of the court was defined by statute as the Lord Chancellor, Treasurer, Keeper of
the Privy Seal, a bishop, a member of the King's Council, and the Chief Justice of Common Pleas
and Kings Bench. Id. at 261. However, at the time of James I (1603-1625) its membership included
all members of the Council and the King himself occasionally sat and passed sentence. Id. at 262.
While the statute of 1487 limited the court's jurisdiction to specified offences (e.g. riot, unlawful
assembly, bribery of jurors and misconduct by sheriffs, etc.) Star Chamber exercised broad jurisdic-
tion over the full range of criminal offenses, specializing in political crimes and dealing with mis-
chiefs for which the common law had as yet perfected no means of punishing. Id. at 261-62.
63. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 256.
64. Id. at 275. Levy reports that many, however, had refused to take the High Commission
Oath.
65. Hudson, supra note 12, at 161, 167-68; I.S. LEADAM, SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF
STAR CHAMBER, xxviii (16 Seldon Society 1902).
66. Hudson, supra note 12, at 164.
67. Id. at 168.
68. Id. at 170. Hudson's treatise reveals that during the reign of Henry VIII the examination
was conducted by the Lord Chancellor and generally consisted of only six or seven short questions.
Id. at 168-69. At some point, however, Hudson notes that plaintiff's lawyers began submitting inter-
rogatories and abuses occurred
this advantage of examination was used like a Spanish Inquisition, to rack men's con-
sciences, nay to perplex them by intricate questions, thereby to make contrarieties, which
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plaint was that "the matter in charge tendeth to accuse the defendant of
some crime which may be capital; in which case nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum .. ."9 Thus even Star Chamber recognized that a defendant
was entitled to the protection of the common law rights associated with
the privilege against self-incrimination.
True, an emergency procedure, called ore tenus existed in which a sus-
pect could be orally examined without these safeguards.70 According to
Hudson, however, this "extraordinary" type of proceeding applied only
in cases that threatened "the very fabric of government."71 Even ore
tenus required that probable cause exist to believe that the suspect was
guilty.72 Hudson also states that any confession had to be voluntarily
given.73 Amazingly, under the strict voluntariness test of that time, the
defendant could repudiate his confession thus requiring the court to pro-
ceed as though he had denied his guilt.74
Against this background of general compliance with orderly common
law procedure, established during Coke's tenure as Chief Justice of Com-
mon Pleas and then Kings Bench (1606-1616), one can more fully under-
stand the subsequent reaction to the case of Freeborn John Lilburne.
Certainly no individual did more to launch the right against compulsory
self-incrimination than Lilburne.7" In 1637 Lilburne, a Puritan, was ar-
may easily happen to simple men, and men were examined upon one hundred interrogato-
ries, nay, and examined of the whole course of their lives....
Id. at 169. To prevent such abuse the number of interrogatories was limited by order, and sanctions
imposed upon plaintiffs for asking questions which violated the privilege against self-incrimination
or were otherwise irrelevant. Id. at 170.
69. Id. at 164. (No one is bound to bring forth himself. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text).
70. Id. at 126-27. See also I.S. LEADAM, supra at 65, at lxvii; L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 274.
71. Hudson, supra note 12, at 126-27.
72. Id.
73. Id. One should note that Hudson's reference is to the rule of evidence known as the volun-
tariness doctrine (see infra note 150 and accompanying text) and not to the privilege against self-
incrimination, which had not yet entered its second stage of development. Although Star Chamber's
reputation for torture has been largely overstated-since torture never became a regularized part of
English criminal procedure-it is nevertheless true that defendants were tortured in exceptional
cases involving sedition, treason, or crimes against the established religion. Therefore, an unfruitful
ore tenus proceeding could conceivably have been followed by a respite upon the rack in the Tower
of London.
See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 26, at 73, 82, 94-118; F. MAITLAND, supra note 62, at 221; Morgan,
supra note 31, at 15.
74. Hudson, supra note 12, at 127. See also J.LANGBEIN, supra note 26, at 15-16. Part IV infra
discusses the development of this medieval voluntariness doctrine and its conflation with the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
75. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 272-3. As Levy observes, while his ideas were ahead of his time,
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rested for smuggling certain heretical and seditious books into England
in violation of a Star Chamber decree banning the importation of unli-
censed books.76 The Attorney General examined Lilbume while he was
in prison, and Lilburne denied the charge. When the interrogation pro-
ceeded to other similar offenses, Lilburne refused to answer saying:
I am not willing to answer you to any more of these questions, because I see
you go about by this examination to ensnare me; for, seeing the things for
which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me, you will get other
matter out of my examination; and therefore, if you will not ask me about
the thing laid to my charge, I shall answer no more.77
Two weeks later Lilburne was brought before the Court of Star Cham-
ber, and ordered to take the oath ex officio. The Court did not present a
bill of complaint specifying the charges against him and did not provide
Lilburne an opportunity to consult with counsel or to prepare a written
response.78 Lilburne refused to take the oath, asserting: "before I swear,
I will know to what I must swear."7 9 Returned to prison, Lilburne was
twice more brought before Star Chamber where twice again he refused
the oath, each time reiterating his claim that the Star Chamber was
adopting the practices of the High Commission (recently declared illegal
by Coke) in an attempt to "ensnare" him.8 0 The walls of Star Chamber
echoed with Lambert's argument, made a century earlier, that such inter-
rogations were against the law of the land.
The Court of Star Chamber found Lilburne in contempt for refusing to
he appeared at the right moment in history. With the accession of Charles I (1625-1649) to the
throne and the investiture of the ambitious William Laud as Archbishop of Canterbury, the cam-
paign against the Puritans escalated while the rights of British subjects declined. Charles's contempt
for Parliament, the common law and human rights is well known. Taxes and forced loans were
imposed by royal fiat, dissenters were imprisoned without stated charges, and the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended. Id. at 262.
76. Id. at 273. The basis for the arrest was a sworn affidavit by one of Lilburne's accomplices
who had turned state's evidence. Id.
77. 3 STATE TRIALS 1315, 1318 (1637) (emphasis added). This description of the examination
is based upon Lilburne's own written account.
78. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 274.
79. 3 STATE TRIALS 1320.
80. L. LEvy, supra note 22, at 273-75. Coke, while Chief Justice of the Kings Bench, had
declared in Burrowes and Others v. The High Commission, 81 Eng. Rep. 42 (1616), that the High
Commission could not imprison for the refusal to take its oath. One of the reasons given in support
of this position was the High Commission's failure to furnish the defendants with a copy of the
charges against them. Coke, himself a member of the Court of Star Chamber while Chief Justice,
however, did not oppose the use of the oath in its proceedings which at this time apparently con-
formed to the common law as described by Hudon. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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answer its interrogatories and ordered him imprisoned indefinitely."1 In
addition, the Court fined him 500 pounds and sentenced him to be
whipped and placed in the pillory.82 Lilburne's whipping during the two
mile march from Fleet prison to the pillory was a public spectacle. Al-
most beaten to death by over 200 strokes of the lash, he arrived at the
pillory and gave an impassioned speech condemning the oath ex officio.83
This event helped to spark a public outcry against the oath ex officio that
ultimately led to the prohibition of the oath and the abolition of both the
High Commission and the Court of Star Chamber in 1641.84 Yet as
Lilburne himself wrote: "[I]f I had been proceeded against by a bill, I
would have answered., 85
B. The Second Stage of Development: The Right Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination
The abolition of the High Commission and the Court of Star Chamber
carried with it a momentum that radically changed criminal procedure in
England. By the dawn of the eighteenth century the practice of question-
ing the accused under oath at trial had died out8 6 and a limited right to
counsel at trial developed.87 Wigmore attributes the growth of this pro-
tection from self-incrimination simply to "one indiscriminate and radical
81. L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 276-77.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 281-82.
85. 3 STATE TRIALS 1332. Lilburne was freed in 1640 in response to the maiden speech of the
new member from Cambridge, Oliver Cromwell, shortly after the Long Parliament convened.
Lilburne subsequently became disillusioned by the Puritan-dominated Parliament's religious intoler-
ance, however, and wrote tracts criticizing the government for religious persecution and censorship
of the press. As a result he was twice put on trial for his life, and died in exile in 1657. The
fascinating story of his continuing struggle for the freedom of thought, religion and the press is
eloquently told in L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 284-312.
86. L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 321, 323. It should be noted that for different reasons the rule
also developed that defendants could not take the stand and give evidence under oath in their own
defense. See 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 441.
87. An act of Parliament in 1695 granted full right to counsel in cases of treason. Id. at 416.
With respect to other felonies, the right to counsel at trial developed slowly during the eighteenth
century as judges began permitting counsel for the defense to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.
A full right to counsel at trial was not made uniform by statute until 1836. J. THAYER, A PRELIMI-
NARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 157-61, & 157 n.4 (1898). The right to have counsel conduct the
defense was important in protecting the self-incrimination privilege, because the accused who con-
ducted his own defense was subject to questions and comments from both the prosecutor and the
bench. L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 375-76.
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condemnation" of all Stuart practices.88 Sir James Stephen, somewhat
more philosophically, supports the view that as a result of the oppression
and abuse of power at the hands of the royal prerogative, an enlightened
concept of the law became less positivistic and more deontological. Writ-
ing toward the end of the nineteenth century, Stephen observed, "the line
between what was legal, in the strict sense of the word, and what was
morally just was then far less strongly drawn than it is now."8 9
L Miranda's Heritage: The End of Pre-Trial Examination Under
the Marian Statutes
Although the privilege against self-incrimination established itself rela-
tively quickly at the trial stage, protection from self-incrimination devel-
oped more slowly at the pre-trial stages of the criminal justice process.
Several factors contributed to this delay. First, the Marian statutes
(1554-55) which had authorized the pre-trial examination of complaining
witnesses and the accused by a justice of the peace, remained in effect,
continuing a procedure antithetical to this new stage in the development
of the privilege.9" Second, except in the larger cities and boroughs, the
justices of the peace were part-time, unpaid laymen, with little knowl-
edge of the law, who acted more in a law enforcement than a judicial
capacity.9 Third, the manuals or guidebooks that had been written for
the local justices of the peace advised only that the accused should not be
examined under oath.9 2 Because the magistrate did not conduct the pre-
trial examination under oath, the implication arose that no restrictions
applied to an interrogation pursuant to these statutes. 93
The degeneration of the Marian preliminary examination into an en-
gine of abuse provides a telling example of the need for vigilance in pro-
tecting the privilege against self-incrimination from the pressures which
constantly assault it. Many commentators have assumed or implied that
88. Wigmore, The Privilege Against SeIf-Crimination; Its History, 15 HARV. L. REv. 610, 636
(1902).
89. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 359. A case making this point in eloquent fashion is Attor-
ney General v. Mico, 145 Eng. Rep. 419 (1658) decided less than two decades after the fall of Star
Chamber. There Chief Justice Widdrington declared that the nemo tenetur maxim (see supra note
50 and accompanying text) was based upon the law of God, and the law of nature as well as the law
of the land. Id. at 420-21. Mico is discussed infra at page 537.
90. 1 & 2 Phil. & M. ch. 13 (1554) and 2 & 3 Phil. & M. ch. 10 (1554); 4 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 259, 286.
91. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 228-29.
92. See M. DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 273 (1618).
93. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 325; Maguire supra note 29, at 203.
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the legislative policy behind the enactment of the Marian statutes was to
obtain a confession from the accused for later use at trial.94 Langbein's
detailed historical analysis of this legislation, however, convincingly
demonstrates that this was not so.9" Rather, the legislative purpose was
initially to prevent unscrupulous justices of the peace from corruptly re-
leasing suspected felons on bail, thus permitting them to flee. This pur-
pose was accomplished by requiring the justices of the peace to record
the evidence of the complaining witness against the accused, thereby pro-
viding the trial court with a basis for review. 96 The statutory duty to also
examine the defendant, in addition to the witnesses against him, probably
was based upon the accused's fundamental right to be heard.97 Far from
creating a scheme for preserving evidence of an accused's statements for
later use against him, contemporary accounts following the enactment of
The Marian Statutes indicate that an accused's confession before a justice
of the peace did not constitute sufficient evidence to convict him at
trial.9" That the preliminary examination later came to center upon the
accused, despite the fact that this was not the intent of Parliament nor
94. See, eg., G. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 44 (1963); L. LEvy, supra note 22, at 325. The
Meese Report also seeks to justify present day police interrogation by asserting that the Marian
practice of pre-trial examination "provides the proper historical counterpart to the practice of custo-
dial police interrogation." See MEESE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
95. J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 22 (1974).
96, Id. at 6.
97. This right indeed appears in the full Latin maxim: "Licet nemo tenetur seipsum prodere,
lamen proditus per famam tenetur seipsum ostendere utrum possit suam innocentiam ostendere et
seipsum purgare." (No one is bound to accuse himself, but when exposed by common suspicion
(fama), he is held and permitted to show, if he can, his innocence and purge himself.) I have largely
followed Silving's translation which refutes that of Wigmore. Compare Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur
Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REv. 71, 83 n.2 (1892) with Silving, supra note 32, at 1367. See also
Morgan, supra note 31, at 8-9.
According to Langbein, who examined actual transcripts of pre-trial proceedings held both before
and immediately after the passage of the Marian statutes, the typical procedure was to have wit-
nesses first give their testimony under oath and then take the response of the defendant without oath.
J. LANGBEIN, supra note 94, at 84. The Meese Report not only neglects to mention this fact, but
also fails to even note that the Marian statutes required the taking of testimony of complaining
witnesses. MEESE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-12. The reader thus erroneously receives the dis-
torted impression that the sole purpose of the statute was to authorize the pre-trial examination of
the accused. See MEESE REPORT supra note 4.
98. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at 26-30. Apart from the bail review function, the recorded
notes of the the justice of the peace were used primarily as reminders to organize witnesses and
testimony, and were not regularly preserved as part of the records of the case. Id. at 25, 31. See also
M. Dalton, supra note 92, at 268 who observed in 1618: "[A]nd yet the confession of the offendor,
upon his examination before the Justice of the Peace shall be no conviction of the offendor, except he
shall after confess the'same againe upon his tryall or arraignement, or be found guiltie by verdict of
twelve men, etc."
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the practice when the statutes were passed, demonstrates how easily the
inquisitorial method is spawned when an avenue is left open to it.
From the Elizabethan period through the Restoration, it became com-
mon practice to conduct these examinations in secret.99 Justices of the
peace often withheld from defendants the nature of the evidence against
them. They were bullied and abused to such an extent that Stephen was
compelled to remark: "I do not think any part of the old procedure op-
erated more harshly upon prisoners than the summary and secret way in
which justices of the peace, acting frequently the part of detective of-
ficers, took their examinations."'" Professor Langbein attributes the
sporadic manner in which the Marian preliminary examination devolved
into an interrogation of the accused, and later came to acquire eviden-
tiary value, to "convenience" and also to frustration at seeing offenders
escape punishment should a witness die or become unavailable at trial.1
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the influence of the
common law had gradually transformed proceedings at the local level,
causing magistrates to change their practice to accommodate the privi-
lege against self-incrimination."0 2 Indeed, Bentham (1748-1832) com-
plained against the sympathetic magistrates of his day whom he
considered overly "cautious of extracting from the defendant any testi-
mony the tendency of which may be to his prejudice; and even, lest any
such testimony should escape him unawares, to give him warning to keep
his lips well closed."1"3 Lord- Denman, in laying down "the proper
course of proceeding" in Queen v. Arnold 1o likewise demonstrated the
high degree of respect which the privilege ultimately attained:
A prisoner is not to be entrapped into making any statement; but when a
prisoner is willing to make a statement, it is the duty of Magistrates to
receive it; but Magistrates, before they do so, ought entirely to get rid of any
impression that may have before been on the prisoner's mind, that the state-
99. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 325.
100. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 225. The Meese Report cites this period of inquisitional
aberration as the historical foundation for its justification of custodial interrogation. MEESE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 5. By taking only that slice of history which served its purpose, however, the
report ignored three centuries of prior development of the privilege against self-incrimination.
101. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at 27.
102. As Williams observes: "The exclusion of interrogation at the trial naturally had its effect on
the preliminary inquiry, and by Bentham's day some magistrates were making a habit of nullifying
the enquiry so far as the accused himself was concerned, by telling him that he was not bound to
answer." G. WILLIAMs, supra note 30, at 45.
103. 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 256 (1827).,
104. 173 Eng. Rep. 645, 8 C. & P. 622, (1838).
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ment may be used for his own benefit; and the prisoner ought also to be told
that what he thinks fit to say will be taken down, and may be used against
him on his trial.105
Despite Bentham's criticism, the judicial practice of giving the accused a
warning advising him of his privilege against self-incrimination was for-
malized by statute in 1848 and as Stephen observed, a prisoner was there-
after "absolutely protected against all judicial questioning before or at
trial."" The seed having sprung from the common law, a legislatively
authorized forerunner of the Miranda warning thus existed more than a
century ago.' 0 7 The Meese Report's conclusion that Miranda was "a de-
cision without a past [having].. .no basis in history or precedent" is thus
either a product of unbelievable ignorance or the result of a "willful dis-
regard" of the English heritage from which our accusatory system of
criminal justice arose.°10
2. The Legacy of Star Chamber
In the aftermath of Star Chamber, historians, not surprisingly, pointed
to the oath ex officio and its diabolical compulsion as the chief evil over-
come in 1641. The abolition of the oath and the prerogative courts was
thus viewed as marking the birth of the right against compulsory self-
incrimination. What has remained obscured, however, is that this right
105. Id.
106. 11 & 12 Vict. ch. 42. (1848); 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 441.
107. The practice under the statute, as described by Stephen, was to examine the witnesses in the
presence of the accused and allow the accused an opportunity to cross-examine. When all witnesses
had been examined, the justice then said to the accused, "Having heard the evidence do you wish to
say anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so,
but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence against you at your
trial." 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 220. For a description of current British practice, see Van
Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American
Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 2 (1986).
108. MEESE REPORT, supra note 4, at 114. The full passage reads as follows:
Miranda v. Arizona was a decision without a past. Its rules had no basis in history or
precedent but reflected, rather, a willful disregard of the authoritative sources of law. In
frank terms, it stood on nothing more substantial than Chief Justice Warren's belief that
general use of the FBI warnings and other rules he had devised would be socially beneficial
Id. (emphasis added). The Meese Report purports to comprehensively examine:
the development of the law relating to self-incrimination and pre-trial interrogation from
its origin in the sixteenth [sic] century to the time of the Miranda decision ... includ[ing]
the development of self-incrimination law in England and the American colonies; the un-
derstanding of the right against self-incrimination and the practice of pre-trial interroga-
tion at the time of the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights....
Id. at "i" (Introduction).
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grew out of the struggle to establish a cluster of rights associated with the
"privilege" against self-incrimination long before the oath even existed in
England. As discussed above, the evil that Henry II (and later Parlia-
ment, during the reign of Edward III and Henry VIII) acted against was
interrogation in the absence of a formal charge. The evil that Lilburne
protested against was likewise the unfairness of being "ensnared" by an
interrogation not limited to a precisely known charge. That charge,
moreover, had to be substantiated (i.e. based either upon a sworn com-
plaint supported by an offer of proof, or an indictment sworn to by
twelve reputable members of the community) before one could be held to
answer. These twin rights to formal notice and probable cause before
interrogation involved a conception of fundamental fairness which both
fueled the struggle and formulated the framework for the common law
decisions supporting the privilege against self-incrimination. While not
forgotten (indeed they form the basis for the probable cause and grand
jury indictment requirements of the fourth and fifth amendments) these
rights are today no longer associated with the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination clause. Yet, like the history from which it arose, the fabric
of the Constitution is also a seamless web and a just interpretation of the
fifth amendment, (and our conception of due process in criminal interro-
gations), cannot be formulated in isolation without them.
III. RECEPTION OF THE PRIVILEGE IN AMERICA
A. Early Colonial Evolution
In the 1606 charter of the Virginia Company, establishing the first suc-
cessful British colony in America, King James I granted the colonists the
right to "enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities [sic] ... as if they
had been abiding and borne within this our realm of England."' 1 9
Although the colonists clearly intended English rights and liberties to
cross the ocean with them, the initial reception of the privilege against
self-incrimination is difficult to trace because of the paucity of data from
the early colonial period.110 It is likewise difficult to generalize about the
reception of the privilege because of the vast diversity among the colo-
nies.1I 1 Some colonies, like Virginia and the New England colonies, were
109. The Three Charters of the Virginia Company of London (1957), reprinted in A. HOWARD,
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA app. B,
at 397-98 (1968).
110. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 377.
111. See generally L. LEvY, supra note 22, at chs. l1 & 12.
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established before the fall of Star Chamber. New York was established
by the Dutch. Given the differing political and religious influences, the
rural character of the early settlements, and the absence of lawyers and
law books, it would not be surprising to find initial recognition of the
privilege unevenly established during the seventeenth century. Indeed,
that is precisely what the sparse evidence available indicates. One can
find examples during this early period of colonial development in which
the privilege was honored, and other examples in which it was ig-
nored.11 2 As the colonies matured, however, the unifying influence of
the common law gradually brought about full recognition of the privi-
lege. Thus Levy concludes: "When the Revolution began, colonies and
mother country differed little, if at all, on the right against self-
incrimination.""' 3
The development of the law in Massachusetts illustrates this gradual
progress toward establishing freedom from self-incrimination. Indeed,
the first invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination on Ameri-
can soil was apparently made in that colony by the Reverend John
Wheelwright in 1637-the same year that John Lilburne raised his claim.
Suspected of heresy, Wheelwright was brought before a closed session of
the provincial legislature and questioned concerning Antinomian ideas
expressed in one of his sermons." 4 Wheelwright refused to answer.
When one of the members sympathetic to him claimed that the authori-
ties "went about to ensnare him, and to make him to accuse himself,"
Deputy-Governor John Winthrop vigorously denied any such intent." 5
No attempt was made to compel Wheelwright to incriminate himself af-
ter his refusal. Instead Winthrop proceeded with a public trial. There
Wheelwright freely acknowledged his sermon and defended his beliefs.
He was found in contempt of civil authority and banished." 6
In the better known trial of Anne Hutchinson, which also resulted in
banishment that same year for religious unorthodoxy, the defendant, like
Wheelwright, also did not attempt to invoke the privilege at trial.
Rather, she chose to debate with her judges, and freely answered incrimi-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 404.
114. The colony of Massachusetts Bay was a theocratic commonwealth, and the legislative body,
sitting as the General Court, also exercised judicial authority. The Antinomians rejected the main-
stream Puritan belief that good works were necessary for salvation, believing that faith alone was
sufficient, and Wheelwright's sermon had caused great disturbance in the community. Id. at 340-41.
115. Id. at 342.
116. Id.
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nating questions. 117 The Supreme Court, more than two and one-half
centuries later, erroneously concluded in Twining v. New Jersey, 11 8 that
the record of Hutchinson's trial showed that Deputy-Governor Win-
throp, a lawyer, "was not aware of any privilege against self-incrimina-
tion or conscious of any duty to respect it."'119 The Court failed to
understand, however, that even in England in 1637 the "privilege" only
protected one against self-incrimination until a formal charge had been
made by known accusers or an indictment.120 Wheelwright's privilege,
while tread upon, had nevertheless been honored before trial. Neither
Wheelwright nor Hutchinson claimed any right to protection from self-
incrimination at the trial stage itself.
In 1641, the same year that the High Commission and the Star Cham-
ber were abolished, the Massachusetts legislature adopted the Body of
Liberties. An early predecessor to our Bill of Rights, the Body of Liber-
ties provided a rudimentary guarantee against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. Liberty 45 provided that "[n]o man shall be forced by Torture to
confess any Crime against himself .... "12 In 1642 Winthrop records
that upon asking the magistrates and elders of Plymouth, Massachusetts
Bay, New Haven and Connecticut what means a magistrate could use in
extracting a confession from an accused, the prevailing view was that
although examination by oath or torture was forbidden, the judge could
examine the accused "strictly" in a capital case if the evidence against
him was strong. If there was only "light suspicion," however, the ac-
cused had a right to remain silent. 122 The frailty of this "privilege" was
demonstrated just fifty years later, however, when the Salem witchcraft
trials ran rough shod over any form of freedom from self-incrimination.
There, it will be recalled, the judges resorted to physical torture and
117. Id. at 343.
118. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
119. Id. at 103-04. The Twining majority, indicted by Levy as being "unbelievably ignorant" of
English history, L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 334, also erroneously concluded that the privilege was
not "part of the law of the land of Magna Carta" and thus was not entitled to inclusion within the
concept of due process under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 211 U.S. at 105.
Twining was overrruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
120. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
121. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 345. Following conviction, however, torture that was not
"[b]arbarous and inhumane" was permissible for the purpose of discovering other co-conspirators.
Id.
122. See Id. at 346-47 for a detailed account of this event. Although Levy questions whether
Winthrop's recorded summary is accurate, Id. at 34748, the general theme that the privilege pro-
tected one from self-incrimination in the absence of probable cause (i.e. "strong" suspicion) never-
theless appears even at this early date.
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hung nineteen "witches" who refused to confess.'2 3
Thus, just as the privilege had been eclipsed at times in England, so too
it fell into eclipse in Massachusetts. However, during the eighteenth cen-
tury, several factors operated to promote the establishment of the privi-
lege, not only in Massachusetts, but in all the colonies. As commerce
expanded and became more complex, the demand for lawyers increased
and the legal profession grew in power and prestige.124 As the colonies
looked to England both for legal training and precedent, the common
law gradually became more and more entrenched and so did the privilege
against self-incrimination. English treatises such as the works of Coke
(many of which were republished in the late 1670s), Hawkins' Pleas of
the Crown (1716), Gilbert's Law of Evidence (1754), and Blackstone's
Commentaries (1765) also communicated the principles of the privilege
to bench and bar alike.12 Emblematic of the growing import of the priv-
ilege, in 1754 the Governor of Massachusetts refused to sign a liquor
excise bill on the ground that its provisions violated "natural Rights" by
compelling citizens to disclose to the tax collector, under oath, how
much liquor they had purchased.126 Moreover, when the author of a
pamphlet critical of the legislature for passing the same excise bill was
prosecuted for seditious libel, he refused to confess his authorship, pro-
claiming that: "A Right of Silence was the Privilege of every English-
man."'127 In 1780 both the common law "privilege" not to be subjected
to interrogation prior to a substantiated formal charge, and the common
law right to be free at all times from compulsory self-incrimination,
whether by means of an oath or torture, were firmly established beyond
any dispute by the following provision of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights: "No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence,
until the same is fully and plainly, substantially, and formally, described
to him; or be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against him-
self."' 28 This provision, drafted by John Adams, one of the most learned
123. Id, at 362-63. Fifty others who confessed (one must presume falsely) to being witches were
spared the death penalty. Id.
124. Id. at 368-69.
125. Id. at 368-75.
126. Id. at 386.
127. Id. at 386-87. The phrase no doubt would have amused Professor Hohfeld. See supra notes
7-8.
128. A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(1970), reprinted in A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, app. K, at 458.
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common law lawyers of his day,129 precisely defines the parameters of
both the original historic "privilege" and the later "right" against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. " 0
B. The Text of the Fifth Amendment. The Ambiguity of Elegance
The fifth amendment, however, was not as precise as the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights. James Madison, who proposed the amend-
ment, modeled it after the Virginia Declaration of Rights, a document
drafted in haste when fighting broke out in 1776. Its author, George
Mason, like Madison, was not a lawyer.13 1 Curiously, the Virginia Dec-
laration failed to secure several fundamental rights, among them the
right to counsel-a right that even Star Chamber recognized and which
existed in the colonies as early as 1669.132 It also failed to protect free-
dom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition; and failed
to ensure that criminal defendants retained the right to grand jury indict-
ment and the writ of habeas corpus. The literal text of the Virginia Dec-
laration's wisp of an anti-self-incrimination clause ("nor can he be
compelled to give evidence against himself.. ."), was buried in the midst
of a laundry list of protections for the criminally accused, and expressed
only a "stunted version" of the full panoply of rights associated with the
common law privilege against self-incrimination. 133 Madison's proposed
amendment altered this version only slightly by changing it to read: "nor
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself...
129. Id. at 207-11.
130. Section 14 of the Declaration of Rights secured the right to freedom from unreasonable
seizure of one's person, and provided that "[a]ll warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation ... and no warrant
ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws." Reprinted in id. at
app. K, 458-59. This antecedent to the fourth amendment thus subsumed the right associated with
the privilege against interrogation in the absence of probable cause, under the broader right to be free
from unreasonable seizure. This vital link between the fourth amendment and the privilege against
self-incrimination still exists today. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (reaffirming,
after two centuries, the rule that seizing a person for the purpose of custodial interrogation on less
than probable cause constitutes an unreasonable seizure).
131. Both Virginians, Madison and Mason had served on the committee that was responsible for
drafting the Declaration of Rights. George Mason, however, produced the draft that was adopted.
See C. COLLIER & J.L. COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILIDELPHIA 334 (1986).
132. See supra note 66. Levy records Rhode Island as the first colony to recognize the right to
have the assistance of counsel. L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 356.
133. Id. at 405-07.
134. Speech of James Madison, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (June 8, 1789) (emphasis added).
Madison's version, which would have applied to any proceeding, was subsequently limited in its
application to criminal cases by the Committee of the Whole. The Committee apparantly did this to
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Thus, the privilege against self-incrimination became constitutional-
ized in highly stylistic and picturesque phraseology. This phraseology, in
contrast to John Adam's more practical style, failed to state with any
precision the cluster of rights it encompassed. As Levy has noted, how-
ever, for the founders who drafted and voted for the Bill of Rights, free-
dom from self-incrimination was such an accepted principle that:
[I]ts constitutional expression had the mechanical quality of a ritualistic
gesture in favor of a self-evident truth needing no further explanation. The
clause itself, whether in Virginia's [Declaration of Rights] or the Fifth
Amendment, might have been so imprecisely stated, or misstated, as to
raise vital questions of intent, meaning and purpose. But constitution-mak-
ers, in that day at least, did not regard themselves as framers of detailed
codes. To them the statement of a bare principle was sufficient, and they
were content to put it spaciously, if somewhat ambiguously, in order to
allow for its expansion as the need might arise.13 5
Unfortunately, neither George Mason, who drafted the Virginia Dec-
laration of Rights, nor James Madison, who submitted the proposed Bill
of Rights in 1789, left behind any evidence of their understanding of the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination or its underlying policy
rationale.1 36 Early state and federal cases that dealt with the privilege,
however, indicate that their contemporaries viewed freedom from self-
allow federal courts to compel civil litigants to produce books and papers containing relevant evi-
dence. L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 424.
135. L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 430. One cannot doubt that our revolutionary founders consid-
ered freedom from self-incrimination an important right. Four states (North Carolina, New York,
Rhode Island and Virginia) specifically singled out this freedom during their state ratifying conven-
tions, and called for an amendment to the Constitution to guarantee it from federal encroachment. 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 243 (J. Elot ed. 1836) (N.C.); I id. at 328 (N.Y.);
id. at 334 (R.I.); 3 id. at 658 (Va.). Eight of the twelve states which drafted state constitutions
following the declaration of independence from England included protection against self-incrimina-
tion. These provisions, with some variations, were modeled after § 8 of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights. New York and New Jersey (in what was labeled a terse bill of rights) expressly incorporated
the protection of the common law of England into their constitutions. Thus, only Georgia and South
Carolina drafted new constitutions containing no provision to secure freedom from self-incrimina-
tion. L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 409-10.
136. Perhaps the most extensive discussion of the subject, is found in the records of the Virginia
ratifying convention when Patrick Henry objected to the lack of protection from self-incrimination,
stating:
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common
law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain and Germany-of torturing, to
extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from
those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of
strengthing the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extract
confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 135, at 447-48. Whether Patrick Henry's reference to the common
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incrimination as encompassing much more than just rudimentary protec-
tion from torture.
Two of the most notable of these cases pertaining to the scope of the
privilege involved Chief Justice John Marshall. First, in Marbury v.
Madison 137 it will be recalled that a question arose as to what had be-
come of Marbury's commission as a justice of the peace. The commis-
sion had never been delivered to Marbury, although it had been signed
by the outgoing President John Adams and sealed by John Marshall
himself as Secretary of State. The new Acting Secretary of State under
Jefferson, Levi Lincoln (the Attorney General at the time of the law suit),
was called as a witness. He objected to answering any questions, claim-
ing executive privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination. 138
The Court overruled the first objection, but both Chief Justice Marshall
and Marbury's counsel agreed that Lincoln could refuse to disclose infor-
mation that might incriminate him. The Court then gave Lincoln a day
to answer a list of written questions. He subsequently answered all ques-
tions fully save one; the Court permitted him to decline to answer the
question of what had been done with the commission. 139 No mention of
or reliance upon the fifth amendment appears in the report of the pro-
ceedings. Second, in the trial of Aaron Burr, Marshall again recognized
the right of a witness not to incriminate himself, noting (again without
reference to the fifth amendment) that: "It is a settled maxim of law that
no man is bound to criminate himself."''"
Early state decisions also demonstrate that freedom from self-incrimi-
nation as embodied in English common law was considered part of our
own common law, separate and apart from the more narrowly drawn
provisions of the state constitutions. The trial of Benjamin Gibbs in 1802
provides an excellent case in point. During an election in Philadelphia,
the election judges, on their own initiative, questioned certain voters
whose loyalty had been suspect during the Revolution. The questions,
which were required to be answered under oath or affirmation, were
law suggests a wider concern than simply a ban on the rack and the thumbscrew is mere conjecture;
the object of his speech was to persuade rather than elucidate.
137. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
138. Id. at 143-44.
139. Id. at 145. See also L. LEVY, supra note 22, at 429, who suggests that Lincoln probably
burned the commission.
140. United States v. Burr (In re Willie) 25 F. Cas. 38, 39 (1807) (No. 14692e) To "criminate"
includes exposing oneself to condemnation and censure, as well as criminal guilt. WEBSTER's NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY, 348 (college ed. 1960).
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designed to reveal whether the prospective voter had joined the British
forces, sworn allegiance to the King, or been attainted and pardoned for
treason. Refusal to answer precluded the otherwise qualified elector
from voting. As a result of this inquisitorial procedure, a great tumult
arose and Gibbs, having behaved in a violent and intemperate manner by
cursing and shaking his fist at the election judge, was indicted for ob-
structing the election and assaulting an election official.141
The trial was removed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and elab-
orately argued. The defense contended that the election judges had acted
illegally because they had no right to ask a person questions which, while
not incriminating, would tend to bring them into disgrace.142 The state
constitution's self-incrimination provision, like the fifth amendment,
however, clearly protected only against disclosure of matters that could
result in criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, in his charge to the jury,
Chief Justice Shippen declared that the nemo tenetur maxim was "an
established principle of law ... [which] founded on the best policy...
runs throughout our whole system of jurisprudence." 143 The court then
instructed the jury that irrespective of the potential for criminal punish-
ment, no one was obligated to answer questions that would involve him
in shame or reproach. 1" The Chief Justice, who had studied law in Eng-
land, expressed the rationale for the rule as follows:
It is considered cruel and unjust to propose questions which may tend to
criminate the party. And so jealous have the legislature of this common-
wealth been, of this mode of discovery of facts, that they refused their as-
sent to a bill brought in, to compel persons to disclose on oath, papers as
well as facts, relating to questions of mere property. 145
It thus appears from these contemporary accounts that at the time the
141. Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429, 430 (Pa. 1802).
142. The election judges' questioning could not have resulted in a criminal prosecution of Gibbs
because the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britian stipulated that no prosecu-
tions would be commenced against any person on account of any actions taken during the war. 1
U.S. Law 483.
143. Gibbs, 3 Yeates at 437.
144. Gibbs, 3 Yeates at 437-38. Accord State v. Bailly, 2 N. J. 396 (1807); People v. Herrick, 13
Johns. 82 (N.Y. 1816); Miller v. Crayon, 2 S.C.L. (I Brev.) 108 (1806). This was also the apparent
common law rule in England at that time. Rex v. Lewis, 170 Eng. Rep. 700 (1802); Macbride v.
Macbride, 170 Eng. Rep. 706 (1802); but see T. PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE, 143-44 (4th ed. 1813). In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1892) the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the fifth amendment does not protect against compelled self-infamy.
145. Gibbs, 3 Yeates at 437. Other early state cases also adopted an extremely broad view of the
common law privilege, extending it to disclosure of matters which could prejudice one's interest
civilly. See Simons v. Payne, 2 Root 406 (Conn. 1796); Cook v. Corn, I Tenn. (1 Overt.) 340 (1808).
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Bill of Rights was approved the understanding of freedom from self-in-
crimination was the same whether one stood on English or American
soil. Such was the common bond of the common law.
IV. A RULE OF EVIDENCE SWALLOWS THE PRIVILEGE: THE
COMMON LAW VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
As discussed previously, by the time the Bill of Rights was drafted and
voted upon, the privilege against self-incrimination had experienced two
stages of development. The first stage established the rights to notice and
justification by requiring a formal charge, substantiated by oath or indict-
ment, before one could be held to answer. Until the state satisfied these
prerequisites the "privilege" protected one who was under suspicion, and
no duty to answer ensnaring questions arose. At this first stage, however,
as soon as the state observed the twin rights of notice and justification,
the "privilege" terminated and the court could compel the accused to
answer the charge under oath and could also interrogate him.
During the last half of the seventeenth century, however, the privilege
entered a second stage of development. In this stage the right not to be
"compelled" to incriminate oneself at the trial stage sprang from the
ashes of Star Chamber and the High Commission in response to the uni-
versal condemnation of their use of the hated oath ex officio (requiring
the accused to take an oath to"tell the truth and then answer questions).
The unsworn preliminary examination of an accused, authorized by the
preceding century's Marian statutes, did temporarily continue a practice
antithetical to this new development. Yet the momentum of the common
law increasingly expanded the parameters of the privilege so that ulti-
mately, regardless of the use of the oath, an accused was "absolutely pro-
tected against all judicial questioning before or at the trial. 1 46 This
victory was then codified by legislation which even required the court to
warn an accused of the existence of his or her privilege. This warning
was not given as a prelude to judicial interrogation, but rather to ensure
that defendants clearly understood that while they had a right to speak in
their own defense, they were under no obligation to respond.
How then did the original understanding of the privilege against self-
incrimination become so distorted that some could view Miranda as a
revolutionary decision more than a century later? As discussed below,
the root cause has been the confusion created by the parallel develop-
146. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 441.
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ment of the "voluntariness" doctrine.147 This Part examines how this
common law rule of evidence, which pre-dated the second stage of devel-
opment of the privilege, became entangled with it, and ultimately came
to dominate the jurisprudence of confessions, thus obscuring the true ori-
gins of the privilege altogether. As a result, fifth amendment theory has
failed to encompass the totality of values that gave birth to the privilege
against self-incrimination. Instead, it has been obsessed with "compul-
sion" and the problem of its definition.
A. The Medieval Origins of the "Voluntariness" Concept
The earliest origins of the "voluntariness" concept are found in both
Roman-canon law and the German code of criminal procedure, the Con-
stitutio Criminalis Carolina of 1532. Both of these Continental systems
relied heavily upon confessions as proof of guilt and used torture to ob-
tain them.14 While the Carolina, which promulgated elaborate rules
governing the use of torture, did have a probable cause requirement, 149
neither system respected any other semblance of a right against self-in-
crimination. Rather, the concern with "voluntariness" stemmed from the
recognition that a tortured confession might be false.1 50 The Carolina
provided, for example, that the admissions of a tortured suspect should
not be recorded while he was being tortured. Instead, his statement was
made and recorded only after release from torture.1 51  The distrust of
confessions produced by torture was so great that the Carolina provided
an additional precaution; two days after such a statement was tran-
147. One must distinguish between the common law voluntariness doctrine, which is a rule of
evidence governing the admissibility of a confession at trial, and the due process voluntariness test,
which was initially developed by the Supreme Court as a substitute for the fifth amendement in state
criminal prosecutions prior to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). As the Supreme Court recently
acknowledged in the due process context, the use of the term "voluntariness" has been condemned
as "useless," "perplexing" and "legal doubletalk." Miller v Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4. The
same could also be said regarding the misapplication of this term to issues which properly should be
analyzed in terms of the cluster of rights associated with the privilege against self-incrimination.
148. The necessity of relying upon the confession arose because of difficulty in meeting the strict
burden of proof requirement. Based upon scripture, canon law required the testimony of at least two
eye-witnesses in order to convict a defendant who denied his guilt. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at
187. See also L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 435; Deuteronomy 17:6.
149. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at 179. Article 20 of the Carolina provided: "When legally
sufficient indication of the crime which it is desired to investigate has not been produced and proven
beforehand, then no one shall be examined; and should, however, the crime be confessed under
torture, it shall not be believed nor shall anyone be condemned upon that basis." Id. at app. B, 273.
150. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at 183-86.
151. Id. at 185.
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scribed, the prisoner was brought before a judge, the statement read, and
the prisoner again asked whether it was true. 2
The earliest origins of the English version of the voluntariness rule
appear in connection with the court's acceptance of defendant's plea at
arraignment. One of the earliest statements of the rule appears in
Staunford's Pleas of the Crown, published in 1607:
If one is indicted or appealed of felony, and on his arraignment he confesses
it, this is the best and surest answer that can be in our law for quieting the
conscience of the judge and for making it a good and firm condemnation;
provided, however, that the said confession did not proceed from fear, men-
ace, or duress; which if it was the case, and the judge has become aware of
it, he ought not to receive or record this confession, but cause him to plead
not guilty and take an inquest to try the matter.1 53
At this time the accused unquestionably could be compelled to plead his
answer to the indictment under oath. Thus the rule that the confession
of guilt must not be the product of duress was not concerned with self-
incrimination. Rather, like the Carolina and canon law, it reflected a
concern with the reliability of such a confession.' 54
William Hudson recorded that Star Chamber also observed the
voluntarines rule. Even in the extraordinary ore tenus proceeding, in
which the accused, in matters of state emergency, could be examined
privately without a formal charge, any confession obtained still had to be
voluntary.1 55 Thus, while the Star Chamber could ignore the privilege
on the ground of necessity, the law of evidence ensured that a confession
was trustworthy.
152. Id. Of course as Langbein points out, if the defendant recanted, he could again be ushered
to the torture chamber, so he soon learned that only a "voluntary" confession would save him from
future suffering. See also J. LANGBEIN, supra note 26, at 12-16.
153. 2 W. STAUNFORD, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 51 (1607) (emphasis added),
154. One should not assume, however, that there was necessarily an English "reception" of the
Continental voluntariness rule. As Langbein has demonstrated with respect to the Marian statutes,
see supra note 95 and accompanying text, English criminal procedure was an indigenous develop-
ment. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at 187.
155. If [the prisoner] shall deny the accusation, then cannot the court proceed against him
ore tenus; but if he confess the offence freely and voluntarily, without constraint, then may
he be brought to the bar; at which time his confession is shewed him; and if he acknowl-
edge it, then who can doubt but that the court may justly proceed ex ore suo and give
judgment against him.
Hudson, supra note 12, at 127.
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B. The Conflation of Voluntariness and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
How this "trustworthiness" rationale came to be confused with the
privilege against self-incrimination and transmitted to America can be
traced back to a popular treatise on the law of evidence by Sir Geoffrey
Gilbert. Gilbert's treatise contained the following passage:
The voluntary confession of the party in interest is reckoned the best evi-
dence ... but then this confession must be voluntary and without compul-
sion; for our law in this differs from the civil law, that it will not force any
man to accuse himself; and in this we do certainly follow the law of nature,
which commands every man to endeavour his own preservation; and there-
fore pain and force may compel men to confess what is not the truth offacts,
and consequently such extorted confessions are not to be depended on.' 56
In this passage Gilbert conflates the nemo tenetur maxim with the ration-
ale for the common law evidentiary rule which requires that confessions
be voluntary in order to be admissable. The merger of these two distinct
concepts was to work a subtle yet profound change in the rationale un-
derlying the privilege against self-incrimination. From a concern for in-
dividual dignity and fairness (which focused upon procedural rights
encompassing notice and justification) attention shifted to the reliability
of the confession.
The sole authority Gilbert cited for this proposition of law was Attor-
ney General v. Mico 157, decided in 1658, seventeen years after the aboli-
tion of the oath ex officio and the fall of Star Chamber. In that case the
Attorney General suspected Mico, a merchant, of bribing customs of-
ficers and importing goods without paying duty. The Attorney General
brought a bill in equity "for relief and discovery of the truth." Appar-
ently, the evidence was insufficient to obtain an indictment because the
Attorney General stressed in argument that without the requested dis-
covery the truth of the matter could not be determined. Therefore, he
urged that the court order the defendant to answer as a matter of public
policy, in order to preserve the revenue from frauds and deceits. The
defendant, however, successfully demurred on the ground that because
the bill concerned criminal offenses, the court could not compel him to
answer it because "it is against law and reason to oblige any man to
156. G. GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 99 (1754) (emphasis added). The treatise was writ-
ten some time prior to 1726 and published posthumously.
157. 145 Eng. Rep. 419 (1658).
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accuse himself."1 58
In granting judgment for the defendant, Chief Justice Widdrington de-
clared the demurrer consistent with the law of God, the law of Nature
and the law of the land. He devoted much of the opinion to establishing
that because the wrongs alleged in the bill constituted common law
crimes, they should be proceeded against by way of information or in-
dictment. The opinion also stated that this "very incongruous way of
proceeding" violated Magna Charta. Gilbert's treatise, however, refers
only to the following portion of the opinion where the Chief Justice de-
clared that the nemo tenetur maxim reflected the law of both God and
Nature:
1. For the law of God. That not only allows but rather commands every
man to preserve himself from hurt or damage; as appears by the case of
St. Paul.. .[a]nd when Pontius Pilate asked our Savior some questions,
he answered nothing; whence it appears what the law of God and the
God of law allows of in such cases of crime.
2. For the law of Nature. That is of the same stamp; hence the rule nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere, vel accusare and upon that rule it is, that if a
man will prefer a bill to compel me to answer what trespasses I have
committed upon his land, or what other injury I have done him; I shall
not be compelled to answer to such a bill [as this] because it is matter of
crime and tort; for which I am finable and punishable in another court,
over and above what damages the party is to recover against me. Upon
this ground, though the party's own confession of a crime be the clearest
proof in the law, yet if such confession proceed from dread, or be ex-
torted by any compulsion, it ought not to be received against him.. .If a
prisoner disclose any thing to the court which makes him a felon, yet the
court will not take advantage of it but suffer him to plead not guilty; and
these cases depend upon the formed rule, viz. that a man is not obliged
to condemn himself. Now if this be the law and choice of Nature, then
is it superior to all positive laws, and is called lex aeterna, or the moral
law. It is the law that was infused into the heart of man at his first
creation; and whatever positive laws are contrary to this law of Nature
and reason, they are void in themselves. 159
In this passage the Chief Justice was responding to the Attorney Gen-
eral's argument that, notwithstanding the nemo tenetur maxim, since a
statute of Henry VIII gave the court jurisdiction to determine the matter
in the bill, the court had power to order the defendant to answer it. By
158. 145 Eng. Rep. at 419-20.
159. Id. at 420-21.
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establishing that the nemo tenetur maxim was part of the law of Nature,
the Chief Justice was able to hold such an interpretation void under Cal-
vin's case1" and Dr. Bonham's case.161 It is therefore clear that this
rambling passage simply meant that it was against the law of God and
Nature for a man to be the means of his own punishment.' 62 Despite the
inclusion of a phrase depicting the voluntariness rule,'63 the remarks
were directed at the fact that compelling the defendant to answer the bill
under oath resulted in the defendant's self-destruction through self-in-
crimination. This compulsion thus violated the law of nature. The Chief
Justice did not suggest that such a confession might be false. Indeed, the
implication was just the opposite.
Gilbert, writing almost three-quarters of a century later, thus distorted
Chief Justice Widdrington's natural law rationale for the nemo tenetur
maxim. By taking the phrase "extorted by any compulsion" out of con-
text and applying it to the use of physical torture, however, one can eas-
ily see how Gilbert logically deduced his new rationale: a desire for self-
preservation from the "pain and force" of such torture quite naturally
could lead one to incriminate oneself falsely in order to avoid such suffer-
ing. Indeed, it was precisely such distrust of tortured confessions that led
Roman-canon law and the Carolina to exclude them unless they were
voluntarily repeated in court at a later time. However logical Gilbert's
deduction, it nevertheless ignored English history and the moral origins
of the rule against self-incrimination." 6
The next accretion to the voluntariness doctrine appears in King v.
Warickshall, I" an opinion of two justices arising out of a trial in the Old
Bailey in 1783, where it was said:
160. 77 Eng. Rep 377 (1608). Calvin's case held that the law of Nature was part of the law of
England. Id. at 392.
161. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1612).
162. See L. LEvY, supra note 22, at 328 n.41.
163. "[I]f such confession proceed from dread, or be extorted by any compulsion, it ought not to
be received", 145 Eng. Rep. at 420.
164. See also M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 225-26 (1847) (published posthumously). Lord
Hale observed that while an indicted defendant could confess to the indictment at arraignment, (i.e.
plead guilty) the usual practice of the judges (circa 1676, the date of Lord Hale's death) was to
"advise the party to plead and put himself upon his trial, and not presently to record his confession."
Moreover, this was the practice even "where the prisoner freely tells the fact, and demands the
opinion of the court whether it be felony (for) tho upon the fact thus shown it appear to be felony,
the court will not record his confession, but admit him to plead to the felony not guilty." Id. The
rationale for this practice obviously was not one concerned with the reliability of the confession.
165. 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
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A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it
is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is
admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so
questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt,
that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected. 166
In Warickshall an accessory after the fact confessed when given promises
of leniency, and revealed the location of stolen property concealed in her
bed. There was apparently no dispute that the promise rendered the con-
fession itself inadmissable. 167 The issue was whether the prosecutor
could use as evidence the fact that the stolen property had been found in
her bed, since that information was the fruit of an improperly obtained
confession. Relying upon the trustworthiness rationale, the trial court
ruled that the voluntariness rule did not apply to "facts" which existed
independently of whether or not a confession was true or false, and the
evidence was admitted. 168
In 1787 the sixth edition of Hawkins' well-known treatise, Pleas of the
Crown, cited both Gilbert's Law of Evidence and Warrickshall for the
following rule of evidence:
The human mind under the pressure of calamity is easily seduced; and is
liable, in the alarm of danger, to acknowledge indiscriminately a falsehood
or a truth, as different adjitations may prevail A confession, therefore
whether made upon an official examination or in discourse with private per-
sons, which is obtained from a defendant either by the flattery of hope, or
by the impressions of fear, however slightly the emotions may be implanted,
... is not admissible evidence; for the law will not suffer a prisoner to be
made the deluded instrument of his own conviction.1 69
This statement of the rule thus contained both the Gilbert rule (confes-
sions extorted by pain and force are not dependable) and the Warickshall
166. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
167. Id. The court cited no authority for this conclusion, but a note following the above-quoted
passage referred to a trial in which the court had refused to admit a confession to murder obtained
by promise of pardon. The note indicates that although the defendant had confessed to murdering a
missing man, the "deceased" later turned up alive and well. Id. at 235 n.l. See also King v. Rudd,
168 Eng. Rep. 160, 168 (1775) where Lord Mansfield, C.J. commented that the exclusion of confes-
sions obtained by threats and promises was a frequent practice.
168. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. at 235. This remains the rule in England today. See Van Kes-
sel, supra note 107, at 29.
169. 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 46, § 3 (Leach ed. 1787). Leach, the editor of
this edition, was also the reporter of the Warickshall case. Ironically, the last sentence of the above-
quoted section was actually lifted from defense counsel's eloquent but unsuccessful argument in that
case.
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rule (confessions induced by promises are not dependable) and from this
point forward the discussion of self-incrimination issues increasingly re-
volved around these two prongs as the touchstones of "voluntariness." 17
In reliance upon such British authorities, the voluntariness test quickly
came to dominate the landscape in America. In 1813, in United States v.
Charles,17' the defendant was indicted for arson and brought before a
magistrate. The magistrate told him that there was enough evidence to
commit him and that he would probably be better off if he told the whole
truth. The defendant thereupon confessed. At trial, however, the court
refused to allow admission of the confession into evidence, citing the fol-
lowing passage from a treatise on the law of evidence by Thomas Peake,
Esq., a Barrister of Lincoln's Inn: "[B]ut if any threats or promises have
been made to induce [the defendant] to confess, no evidence of such con-
fession is admitted."' 72 This statement accurately expresses the core of
the common law voluntariness rule which came to control the admis-
sability of confessions and thus shape the parameters of freedom from
self-incrimination for the next century.
17 3
By the mid-1850s, ignorance of both history and the original rationale
underlying the privilege against self-incrimination was apparent. People
v. McMahon,174 a leading New York confession case still cited today,
175
170. Logically, it is unclear why voluntariness should be limited to consideration of only these
two prongs. The absence of pain (or threats thereof) and the absence of inducement by promise are
but two examples of a general rule, not the rule itself. Surely a confession induced by deceit, false-
hood or trickery is not more voluntarily given than one induced by a promise of favor. See Queen v.
Johnson, 15 Ir. R. C. L. 60, 130 (1864) (discussion by Lefroy, C.J.).
171. 25 F. Cas. 409, (C.C.D.C. 1813) (No. 14,786).
172. T. PEAKE, supra note 144, at 13. The trial court in Charles did allow subsequent admis-
sions, made the day following the confession to the magistrate, and the defendant was convicted.
However, the court granted a motion for a new trial after defense counsel argued that where a
prisoner had been induced to confess by threat or promise, it was common practice to reject any
subsequent confession to the same or like facts, though made at a subsequent time. Charles, 25 F.
Cas. at 410 (citing 2 E. EAsT, CRowN LAW, C. 16, § 94 (1806), a treatise by a Barrister of the Inner
Temple). But see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (establishing the opposite rule with respect
to subsequent admissions made following a confession which was improperly obtained in violation of
Miranda).
173. The common law voluntariness rule, of course, is distinct from due process "voluntariness"
which is a legal, rather than a factual, question. See supra note 147; Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
115 (1985).
174. 15 N.Y. 384 (1857).
175. See In re Simpson, 481 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Faro. Ct. 1984) (holding that the common law volun-
tariness test was available in a civil proceeding to challenge the admissability of statements made
during custodial interrogation concerning infant's death).
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provides a striking example of such ignorance. In McMahon, Judge Sel-
don opined:
It may well be doubted whether that celebrated maxim nemo tenetur
prodere se ipsum [sic], has itself any other substantial foundation than the
uncertainty and doubt which must ever attend all extorted confessions,...
But whatever may be the truth on this subject, I hold it to be clear, that
when the law rejects a disclosure made under oath by a person charged with
crime, it does so, not because any right or privilege of the prisoner has been
violated, but because it is deemed unsafe to rely upon it as evidence of
guilt.
1 7 6
In 1897, the United States Supreme Court, in Bram v. United States 177
placed its imprimatur upon this veil of ignorance, by engrafting the com-
mon law voluntariness rule onto the fifth amendment and virtually
equating the two. 178 Citing the above-noted passages from Gilbert and
Hawkins, the Court declared that it was "certain that the rule as stated
by Hawkins, Gilbert and Hale was considered in the English courts...
as one of the fundamental principles of the common law." 179 As if apolo-
gizing for the fifth amendment's lack of detail and the Court's reliance
upon evidence textbooks for its meaning, the Court commented:
The well settled nature of the rule in England at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and of the 5th amendment, and the intimate knowledge
had by the framers of the principles of civil liberty which had become a part
of the common law, aptly explain the conciseness of the language of that
Amendment.180
The Court stated that the language of the fifth amendment "was but a
crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions ... and hence.., the
statements on the subject by the text writers and adjudications but for-
176. McMahon, 15 N.Y. at 390. The court cited Warickshall as evidence of "a strong test of this
doctrine." Id. at 386.
177. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
178. Several earlier Supreme Court decisions had addressed the voluntariness of confessions
under the common law test, but none had tied the common law rule to the fifth amendment or
addressed the confession issue as one of constitutional dimension. See Wilson v. United States 162
U.S. 613 (1896) (admission of statements resulting from questioning by magistrate upheld because
there was no evidence of any threat or promise); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (custody
does not by itself render confession involuntary); Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884)
(government not required to call custodian of defendant, there being no allegation that custodian
made any threat or promise which induced confession). All of these cases appear to embrace the
trustworthiness rationale as the basis for the voluntariness rule.
179. 168 U.S. at 547.
180. Id. at 548.
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mulate the conceptions and commands of the amendment itself." '
Thus did a mere evidentiary rule usurp the dimly perceived common
law roots of the privilege against self-incrimination. Because it was a
"self-evident" and "well settled" principle of law, the nemo tenetur
maxim had needed no elaboration of its underlying rationale in 1789. By
the nineteenth century, however, memory of the historical origins of the
privilege had faded from view. As discussed in the next section, follow-
ing the engrafting of the voluntariness doctrine onto the fifth amend-
ment, the rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination underwent
a subtle metamorphosis. During this transformation the rationale shifted
from a deontological basis grounded in the nature of the relationship be-
tween the individual and the state, to a more narrow, utilitarian basis
concerned only with the trustworthiness of the incriminating statement.
The eventual dominance of this new rationale cast the privilege against
self-incrimination adrift from its historical heritage, and separated it
from the cluster of rights with which it had been so closely associated.
V. VOLUNTARINESS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE BRAM
TEST FOR COMPULSION
In order to understand more fully the actual holding in Bram, and the
test it established for defining "compulsion" for purposes of the fifth
amendment, it is necessary to explore the continuing development of the
common law voluntariness test in England following Warickshall.
A. The Definition of Voluntariness Prior to Brain
In 1848, the reader will recall, Parliament sanctioned and made uni-
form the evolving judicial practice of advising a defendant at her prelimi-
nary examination that she need not make any statement. 18 2 This
legislative act thus formally rendered extinct the sixteenth century prac-
tice of judicial interrogation. The enlightened attitude of the English ju-
diciary by the mid-nineteenth century is succinctly captured in the
following statement of Chief Justice Wilde:
[M]agistrates have no right to put questions to a prisoner with reference to
any matters having a bearing upon the charge upon which he is brought
before them. The law is so extremely cautious in guarding against anything
like torture, that it extends a similar principle to every case where a man is
181. Id. at 543.
182. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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not a free agent in meeting an inquiry. If this sort of examination be admit-
ted in evidence, it is hard to say where it might stop. A person in custody,
or in other imprisonment, questioned by a magistrate, who has power to
commit him and power to release him, might think himself bound to answer
for fear of being sent to gaol The mind in such a case would be likely to be
affected by the very influences which render the statements of accused per-
sons inadmissible.8
3
This expression represented the full flowering of the second stage of de-
velopment of the privilege and demonstrates that custodial interrogation
was deemed to violate the privilege more than a century before Miranda.
At about the same time, however, a new development was taking place-
the growth of an organized police force.
B. Early Prohibition of Police Interrogation: The British Experience
Law enforcement in early times was a function of the citizenry. The
rural constable, whose nominal duties primarily consisted of making ar-
rests and serving notices, was a part time, unsalaried member of the com-
munity who probably spent his days working in the fields.184 Paid
watchmen guarded the towns at night, but the pay was so low that often
only superannuated men would accept such employment. By the end of
the eighteenth century small groups of constables directed by a magis-
trate began to appear in various parts of London. In 1796, for example,
there were eight constables at Bow Street (called the Bow Street run-
ners).1 5 That the function of this traditional constable, was extremely
limited and did not encompass investigation by interrogating an accused
is vividly revealed in one reported instance where a constable, asked at
trial whether the defendant had said anything when arrested, replied:
"No, he was beginning to do so; but I know my duty better, and I pre-
vented him. 18
6
In 1829 an act of Parliament created a Metropolitan Police District for
the London area and similar legislation established organized police con-
stabulary units for all parts of England by 1856.187 With the advent of
the new "police-constable" who was devoted to law enforcement full
time, confessions in response to police questioning increasingly began to
183. Regina v. Pettit, 4 Cox C.C. 164, 165 (1850) (emphasis added). The Chief Justice excluded
admissions made after a magistrate had put only one or two questions to defendant.
184. See I J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 194-200.
185. Id. at 195-96.
186. W. FoRSYTH, HoRTENSlUS THE ADVOCATE 292 (3d ed. 1879).
187. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 194-200.
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appear in the trial courts. The judiciary immediately perceived these
confessions as being inconsistent with the principle that a defendant
could not be interrogated before the court. Moreover because the law
required a magistrate at a preliminary examination to caution the ac-
cused before receiving any statement from him (even one in his own de-
fense) the judiciary thought it anomalous to suggest that a policeman,
being an inferior officer of justice, could avoid such a requirement. Thus
as early as 1854, the trial court in Regina v. Berriman 188 refused to admit
an uncautioned statement made to a policeman. In Berriman, a police-
man went to the defendant's house and questioned her, without any cau-
tion, on the basis of mere rumors afloat in the neighborhood that she had
murdered her newborn infant. Apparently, the defendant was not even
in custody. Nevertheless, the officer's conduct brought strong condem-
nation from the court, which laid down the following guidelines for the
police:
If there is evidence of an offence, a police officer is justified, after a proper
caution, in putting to a suspected person interrogatories with a view to as-
certaining whether or not there are fair and reasonable grounds for appre-
hending him. Even this course should be very sparingly resorted to. But
here there was nothing whatever to show that any offence had been com-
mitted by any one-no finding of any body-no sign of delivery-no marks
of blood-not the slightest indication in fact to point to crime, and then it is
sought, by questioning the prisoner on the subject, to establish from her
own lips, the crime itself, as well as her guilty connection with it. What has
been done here I have every reason to believe was done from no improper
motive. It was, doubtless an error of judgment, but I wish it to go forth
amongst those who are inferior officers in the administration of justice, that
such a practice is entirely opposed to the spirit of our law. 189
In Regina v. Mick,1" almost a decade later, the trial court reproved the
police for the practice of questioning defendants in custody even though
the police gave a caution prior to hearing the defendant's response.19'
188. 6 Cox C.C. 388 (1854).
189. Id. at 389.
190. 176 Eng. Rep. 376 (1863).
191. Id. at 376. In Mick, following the defendant's arrest for felonious assault, the super-
intendant at the police station said to him: "At the time when you were taken into custody you
stated that you had done no harm to any one. I am now told you have made a different statement."
When the defendant then said "Yes sir, I will tell the truth," the superintendant said, "Stop, you
must understand you need not say anything unless you like, and it may be given in evidence against
you." The defendant thereupon confessed to stabbing a man during a disturbance in a public house.
Id.
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The trial court admitted the confession made following a caution, but
stated to the policeman who had just testified:
I think the course you pursued in questioning the prisoner was exceedingly
improper. I have considered the matter very much: many Judges would
not receive such evidence. The law does not intend you, as a policeman, to
investigate cases in that way. I entirely disapprove of the system of police
officers examining prisoners.1 92
Such expressions from individual justices (who also made up
the Court of Criminal Appeal) continued to cast doubt upon the validity
of custodial interrogation by the police even with an appropriate
caution. Apart from a split decision by the Irish Court of Criminal
Appeal, 193 however, no British appellate decision had authoritatively
ruled on the issue of custodial interrogation prior to Bram.194
192. Id. See also Regina v. Reason, 12 Cox C.C. 228, 229 (1872) ("after the prisoner is taken
into custody it is not the duty of the police-constable to ask questions").
193. The Queen v. Johnston, 15 Ir. R.-C.L. 60 (1864). In Johnston a divided Irish Court of
Criminal Appeal upheld the admission into evidence of a statement made in response to brief on the
street questioning of a suspect before she was formally arrested. The court held that even though a
police-constable elicted the statement without a caution, this did not render the statement per se
involuntary. One justice opined that the statement was admissible because the defendant was not in
custody at the time he made it. Curiously , if the case were to arise today under Miranda, the
resolution of that issue would not be entirely free of doubt.
194. But see Wigmore who erroneously assumed the contrary, asserting: "It was for a long time
the clear unquestioned law in England that the mere circumstance of arrest, even when combined
with the circumstance that the confession was made in answer to questions put by the custodian, did
not exclude the confession." 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 847, at 965. This statement remains
unchanged in the current edition, 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 847, at 502 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Wigmore cited four cases as authority for this statement. In the first, Rex v. Lambe, 168 Eng. Rep.
379 (1791), there was no claim that the confession was involuntary. The question reserved for deci-
sion was simply whether a voluntary confession made to a magistrate, and transcribed by a clerk,
was inadmissible because it had not been signed by either the defendant or the magistrate. In
Gilham's Case, 168 Eng.Rep. 1235 (1828), the second authority relied upon, the issue was whether a
chaplain's urging the defendant to confess in order to be reconciled with God tainted the defendant's
subsequent confession to his gaoler and the mayor. No evidence of any interrogation by either the
gaoler or the mayor existed, and indeed, the mayor cautioned the defendant before receiving his
statement. The third decision, Wild's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 1341 (1835) involved a confession which
the defendant made to a neighbor following a direct question. Only Thornton's Case, 168 Eng. Rep
955 (1824) involved actual questioning by a police officer. In Thornton a fourteen year old boy,
charged with arson, was illegally detained, kept without food for six hours, and called a liar by the
officer. The judges split seven to three in favor of admissibility.
One must note, however, that no opinion was delivered giving the reasons for the judges' views in
Gilham's, Wild's and Thornton's cases. In the latter two cases the issue was not even argued by
counsel. This departure from the normal judicial decision-making process is emblematic of the fact
that these cases (which occurred before the creation of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved and its
successor the Court of Criminal Appeal) were not decisions by a regularly constituted tribunal. As
Stephen has explained, because there was no automatic right of appeal in criminal cases during this
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In Regina v. Baldry,95 it is true, the court had upheld the admission of a
confession to a police-constable, made after a caution. In that case, how-
ever, there was no evidence of any interrogation.1 96
Thus, at the time of the Bram decision, while it was common practice
for the police to caution suspects in England, the validity of custodial
interrogation by police (i.e. going beyond merely asking the defendant if
he wished to say anything in his defense) was itself in doubt under con-
temporary voluntariness standards.1 97  In addition, when the Brain
period, an informal practice developed among the judges for handling issues in areas where the law
remained uncertain. In such cases the judges heard arguments in the informal atmosphere of Ser-
jeant's Inn, and if they believed that the prisoner had been convicted unjustly, they recommended a
pardon. No formal opinion or statement of reasons was given, nor any judgment delivered. 1 J.
STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 311. Wigmore's reference to two of these "decisions" (Thornton's and
Gilham's Cases) as "two landmarks" of a "clear" rule that custodial questioning was permissible
without a caution is thus unjustified. None of the four cases cited by Wigmore specifically addressed
the question whether a police officer could question an accused in custody (with or without a cau-
tion). The issue was ultimately resolved by adoption of the Judges Rules which provided that a
defendant in custody was to be cautioned prior to making any statement, and that police were not to
interrogate a defendant even when he elected to make a statement. See infra note 197.
195. 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (1852).
196. The defendant in Baldry was charged with murdering his wife by poison. The police-con-
stable who received his confession testified:
I went to the prisoners's house .... I told him what he was charged with. He made no
reply, and sat with his face buried in his handkerchief. I believe he was crying. I said he
need not say anything to criminate himself, what he did say would be taken down and used
as evidence against him. Id.
The defendant's confession occurred immediately thereafter and does not appear to have been made
in response to any questioning on the part of the officer. Indeed, during the argument of that case
Lord Campbell, C.J. had let fall the dictum: "Prisoners are not to be interrogated. By the law of
Scotland they may be; but by the law of England they cannot." Id. at 573.
The sole issue in Baldry, as incredible as it may seem today, was whether the above-described
caution itself constituted an inducement to confess because, contrary to the statutory warning re-
quired of magistrates, this caution had said, in effect, that any statement the defendant made
"would" be used as evidence rather than "may" be used as evidence. The court found that this
discrepancy did not transform the caution into a promise of benefit, and overruled prior cases which
had so held, noting that the rule had been "extended quite too far," resulting in justice and common
sense being "sacrificed at the shrine of mercy." Id. at 574.
197. In 1912, fifteen years after Brain, the judges of the King's Bench Division of the High Court
adopted what came to be known as the "Judges Rules." These unofficial guidelines, amended in
1918 and clarified in 1930 by a Home Office Circular, provided inter alia that police must caution a
person in custody before receiving any statement from him, and that a person who elected to make a
statement could not be questioned or cross-examined except for the purpose of clarifying an ambigu-
ity in what he said. These rules were amended again in 1964 and finally replaced by an elaborate
Code of Practice in 1986, which sets down detailed requirements for cautioning suspects, providing
access to counsel and limiting the circumstances in which an accused can be questioned after arrest.
The new Code also requires that the police caution a person upon whom suspicion has focused, even
though that person is not in custody. See 1 G. VAN KESSEL, THE SUSPECT AS A SOURCE OF TasTi-
MONIAL EVIDENCE: A COMPARISON OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES 36 (1986) for
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Court looked back to the era immediately preceding the adoption of the
fifth amendment, it found the English common law voluntariness test of
the late eighteenth century provided an extremely high degree of protec-
tion against self-incrimination. As the commentators of that period as-
serted, even the slightest influence of hope or fear operated to render a
confession inadmissable.1 98 Indeed, as Baron Hotham observed in Rex v.
Thompson ,199 just seven years before the adoption of the Bill of Rights:
"Too great a chastity cannot be preserved on this subject.... . 2 o In
Thompson, the Receiver-General for the county, traced a stolen bank
note to the defendant, confronted him and after hearing his rather dubi-
ous explanation stated: "[U]nless you give me a more satisfactory ac-
count I shall take you before a Magistrate." 0 1 The defendant then made
a full confession. The trial court ruled the confession inadmissable, stat-
ing: "It is almost impossible to be too careful upon this subject: This
scarcely amounts to a threat, but it is certainly a strong invitation to him
to confess .... The prisoner was hardly a free agent at the time." 02
American cases decided just two years before Madison submitted the
fifth amendment to Congress were of similar stamp. In State v. Phelps 203
a Connecticut court refused to permit the state's attorney to testify re-
garding disclosures made to him by the prisoner, and in State v. Thom-
son z" the court precluded unidentified witnesses from testifying
concerning anything the prisoner had said to them when he attempted to
improve his position by agreeing to testify against his accomplices. 205
a discussion of the historical evolution of the "Judges Rules" and a comparative analysis of the new
Code with the Miranda rules. The text of the original rules and circular can be found in Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 596 n.41 (1961).
198. For an example, see the previously quoted statement in Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown de-
claring that a confession "obtained from a defendant, either by the flattery of hope, or by the impres-
sions of fear, however slightly the emotions may be implanted is not admissable evidence." See supra
note 169 and accompanying text.
199. 168 Eng. Rep. 248 (1783).
200. Id. at 249.
201. Id. at 248.
202. Id. at 249. See also Cass's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 249 (1784) (reported in a note appended to
Thompson, 168 Eng. Rep. 248 (1783)). In Cass's case the defendant stole iron bars from a pub. The
bars were used to secure the pub's windows and the publican, anxious to recover the bars, told the
defendant, who was under arrest, that he would "be favorable" to him if he told him where the bars
were hidden. Justice Gould held the resulting confession inadmissible, stating that "the slightest
hopes of mercy held out to a prisoner to induce him to disclose the fact, was sufficient to invalidate a
confession." Id.
203. 1 Kirby 282 (1787).
204. 1 Kirby 345 (1787).
205. The court stated: "When disclosures of that kind have been made to the authority examin-
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C. The Bram Holding
In equating the "compulsion" proscribed by the fifth amendment with
the English common law voluntariness test, the United States Supreme
Court in Brain v. United States therefore established a strict standard for
the admissibility of confessions. Acknowledging that the decided cases
had created great perplexity and confusion in determining the admissibil-
ity of confessions, the Supreme Court set forth a detailed description of
how the fifth amendment voluntariness test should operate. The Court
observed first that the determination of voluntariness was primarily a
question of fact."06 Because the facts by which compulsion might mani-
fest itself would invariably be different in each case, the Court sought to
achieve uniformity by focusing, not upon whether the conduct producing
the compulsion was improper, but rather upon whether the conduct's
"resultant effect upon the mind" produced "hope or fear."2"7 The test,
moreover, was not whether such hope or fear actually existed, but
whether the conduct "ordinarily operated" to create this condition of the
mind.20 8 Finally, the Court held, because "the law cannot measure the
force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the
prisoner" a confession must be deemed involuntary "if any degree of in-
fluence has been exerted."20 9
Thus, under the Brain test, any interrogation tactic which ordinarily
would have the effect of producing either hope or fear in the mind of the
suspect rendered the confession involuntary without regard to the degree
of influence exerted or whether that influence was sufficient to overcome
the suspect's "will." This test, the Court declared, was in harmony with
the common law doctrine as expressed by the various commentators and
a multitude of English and American cases.21 0
The facts of Bram did not involve any overt threat or promise. A
brutal triple murder had been committed aboard an American vessel
abroad upon the high seas. The victims were the captain, his wife and
ing, or to the state's attorney, under such circumstances, that the person disclosing considered him-
self as a witness, the court have never allowed it to be given in evidence against him.... ." Id. at 345.
206. 168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897).
207. Id. at 548.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 565 (quoting 3 W. RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AN t MISDEMEANORS 479 (6th
ed. 1896)). 1 am indebted to Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer for bringing the significance of this
passage to light in his thoughtful article, Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
435, 446 (1987).
210. Brain, 168 U.S. at 543.
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
108 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the second mate. No evidence linked anyone to the crimes, but the crew,
suspecting Bram and another seaman, had placed them in irons and re-
turned to Halifax, Nova Scotia. While the Halifax police detained the
two men pending action by U.S. authorities, a Halifax police detective
interviewed Brain in his office.211 According to the detective's testimony:
When Mr. Bram came into my office I said to him: "Bram, we are trying to
unravel this horrible mystery." I said: "Your position is rather an awk-
ward one. I have had Brown [the other suspect] in this office, and he made
a statement that he saw you do the murder." [Bram] said: "He could not
have seen me. Where was he?" I said: "He states he was at the wheel."
"Well" he said, "he could not see me from there." 212
The prosecution offered Bram's statement in evidence as an implied ad-
mission of guilt and Brain was convicted. The Court, however, held that
this brief interrogation rendered the statement involuntary, stating:
[T]he situation of the accused, and the nature of the communication made
to him by the detective, necessarily overthrows any possible implication
that his reply to the detective could have been the result of a purely volun-
tary mental action ... It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in
which the accused was when the statement was made to him that the other
suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to produce
upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an
admission of guilt, and it cannot be conceived that the converse impression
would not also have naturally arisen, that by denying, there was hope of
removing the suspicion from himself. If this must have been the state of
mind of one situated as was the prisoner when the confession was made,
how in reason can it be said that the answer which he gave and which was
required by the situation was wholly voluntary and in no manner influenced
by the force of hope or fear? To so conclude would be to deny the neces-
sary relation of cause and effect.213
One could thus view Bram as holding that the act of questioning itself
creates compulsion violative of the fifth amendment. However, such a
211. The fifth amendment by itself limits only the powers of the federal government. The Court
made no determination and did not discuss whether this foreign official was somehow acting as an
agent of the United States government. Indeed, the Halifax detective appears to have been acting
totally on his own even though Canadian authorities had no jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore,
implicit in the Brain holding is the underlying premise that the reception of compelled evidence by a
federal court constitutes a violation of the fifth amendment regardless of the source of the compul-
sion. This analysis is of course consistent with the Brain approach to voluntariness, which focuses
upon the mind of the suspect rather than the cause of the compulsion. But see Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986) discussed infra in part IX at note 311, which repudiates this position.
212. 168 U.S. at 562.
213. Id. at 562-63.
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view misperceives the entire thrust of Bram's methodology, for the Court
declined to employ a conduct-based categorical approach. The focus of
Bram's analysis was upon the mind of the defendant, rather than the
conduct of the interrogator. The Brain test nevertheless was heavily
weighted in favor of the accused. As the Court candidly admitted, it was
beyond its competence to gage the effect of the influence of hope or fear
upon the mind of an accused. Therefore the Court concluded a confes-
sion must be deemed involuntary if "any degree of influence" was
exerted.
Bram thus established a presumption of compulsion. The presumption
applied if an objective assessment of the attendant circumstances sur-
rounding the making of a confession revealed the existence of pressure
upon the accused to speak. If an interrogation tactic, objectively viewed,
was sufficient to engender hope or fear in the mind of the accused and
thus exert influence, however slight, upon his decision to speak, then it
violated the fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. This presumption lay at the heart of the Brain test, yet it became
obscured by the subsequent misreading of Brain. In part this occurred
because such a presumption was fundamentally inconsistent with the
trustworthiness rationale, which, like unwanted baggage, had quietly ac-
companied the common law voluntariness doctrine when it became inter-
woven with the fabric of the fifth amendment.
D. The Subsequent Interpretation of Brain
In Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,214 the Supreme Court adopted a
broad reading of Brain regarding the types of pressure sufficient to render
a confession involuntary. In that case the defendant, ill and in pain, con-
fessed after "persistent, lengthy and repeated" questioning over a seven
day period. Although the police did not use physical force, or make
threats or promises, Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous court,
found that this continued interrogation, over defendant's repeated re-
quests to be left alone constituted compulsion. The Court refused to
limit Bram to a mere "threats and promises" test, and held that "a con-
fession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have
been the character of the compulsion. 215
214. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
215. Id. at 14-15. The Court mentioned, without elaboration, that the defendant was held in-
comunicado in a hotel room without formal arrest during this lengthy period of time. Id. at 11.
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For a quarter of a century following Brain, lower federal courts scru-
pulously followed its carefully crafted methodology for determining com-
pulsion under the fifth amendment. 216 In Sorenson v United States,217
for example, the mere assertion by a postal inspector that he had a "good
case" against the defendant rendered the ensuing admissions involuntary
because it had the effect of producing "hope or fear" in "the mind of the
accused. 2
18
Chaffing under the severity of the Bram test, and perhaps encouraged
by Wigmore's criticism of the decision,219 the federal judiciary neverthe-
less began diluting Brain. 220 By the 1930s jurists such as Learned Hand
openly ignored the decision. In United States v. Lonardo,221 Hand was
216. See Davis v. United States, 32 F. 2d 860 (9th Cir. 1929); Perrygo v. United States, 2 F.2d
181 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Purpura v. United States, 262 F. 473 (4th Cir. 1919); Sorenson v. United
States, 143 F. 820 (8th Cir. 1906).
217. 143 F. 820 (8th Cir. 1906).
218. Id. at 824. The court stated:
The confessions in the case before this court were made to an inspector while the defend-
ants were prisoners under his control. He stated to one of them that he had an absolutely
good case against him, and to both that the thing for them to do was to plead guilty and to
throw themselves on the mercy of the [federal] court, and the matter would probably be
over-looked in the state court. Tried by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bram's Case,
either of these statements was legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused hope
or fear in respect of the crime charged, and each of them rendered the subsequent confes-
sion involuntary and inadmissible in evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
219. Wigmore scathingly attacked Brain for merging the common law confession rule on volun-
tariness with the privilege against self-incrimination, declaring: "That the two rules should be sup-
posed to have something of a common principle or spirit is a not unnatural error. But that history
should be rashly tampered with by asserting any common origin is inexcusable." 3 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 3, at § 823 (3d ed. 1940).
220. See Brown v. United States, 13 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir.1926); Murphy v. United States, 285 F.
801 (7th Cir.1923); Pass v. United States, 256 F. 731 (9th Cir. 1919). After suppressing the confes-
sion the trial judge in Murphy complained:
"I don't know what a post office inspector is going to do in the enforcement of law in
dealing with criminals .... It is not with any particular enthusiasm that I sustain this
objection, but I do sustain it; there being no discretion left to me from the decision in the
Bram Case.
285 F. at 807. The court of appeals, however, restricted Brain to its facts and reversed the trial
court. The court distinguished Bram on the ground that in Bram the Canadian detective had
stripped Brain of his clothing thus intimating that "a flogging would be inflicted if the statement was
not satisfactory." Id. at 813. Nothing in the Bram opinion, however, even remotely justifies such an
inference; the officer's stated purpose was to search Brain's clothing. Moreover, a careful reading of
the opinion shows that the reason the Court emphasized this factor was to underscore its argument
that Brain perceived himself to be under the complete control and authority of the Canadian officer,
and thus felt compelled to respond when the officer told him that a co-defendant had accused him of
being the murderer. See Bram, 168 U.S. at 563.
221. 67 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1933).
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presented with a case that appears to have been on all fours with Brain.
The defendant in Lonardo had persisted in denying any involvement in a
conspiracy to pass counterfeit notes. During interrogation, however, an
assistant district attorney told him that a co-defendant had already impli-
cated him and that courts took into consideration the fact that a defend-
ant pied guilty when imposing sentence. Ignoring the pressure created
by the co-defendant's accusation (which was of critical importance in
Brain) Judge Hand treated the case as involving only an implied promise
of leniency. Hand acknowledged that under the English cases relied
upon in Brain, "the inducement here used would have thrown out the
confession." '222 Nevertheless, the learned judge concluded:
[W]e do not believe that [the Bram Court] meant to commit itself to the
doctrine that the mere hope of a lighter punishment would exclude a con-
fession .... Our conclusion is that we are free to decide that the induce-
ment of a possibly lighter punishment is not ordinarily enough to impugn
the verity of a confession, and that there were here no added circumstances
to make a difference.223
The issue under the Brain test, however, was not whether the influence
exerted was sufficient to impugn the statement's trustworthiness. On the
contrary, the issue was whether "any degree" of influence had been ex-
erted upon the accused to speak.224 True, a concern for trustworthiness
had given rise to the common law voluntariness rule which Brain en-
grafted onto the fifth amendment, but Brain had virtually ignored this
evidentiary rationale in formulating its test. Moreover, to transform
"trustworthiness" into the standard for voluntariness is to confuse one
reason for the rule with the rule itself. Nevertheless, by such sleight of
hand did the Brain test for compulsion become distorted.
In Lisenba v. California 225 the Supreme Court put its own imprimatur
upon this distortion of its Bram holding, declaring:
The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was volunta-
rily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine
whether the inducement to speak was such that there is a fair risk the con-
fession is false .... This Court has formulated those which are to govern in
222. Id. at 885.
223. Id. (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that Lonardo had been formally admonished before
making any statement "that he need not speak, but that if he did what he said would be used against
him." Id. at 884.
224. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
225. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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trials in the federal courts.226
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court shifted its entire ap-
proach to the confession problem in McNabb v. United States.227 Exer-
cising its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in
federal courts, the Court moved toward a bright line rule, later known as
the McNabb-Mallory rule. This rule excluded confessions regardless of
their trustworthiness if they were obtained during a period of unneces-
sary delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate following arrest.
The Court founded this new rule upon congressional legislation that re-
quired prompt arraignment.228 Clearly the underlying purpose for judi-
cial enforcement of this procedural requirement by means of the
exclusionary rule, however, was to stop custodial interrogations con-
ducted by police behind closed doors.229  This attempt at a bright line
solution ultimately faded, however, when its foundation, built upon the
shifting sands of mere legislation, was swept away upon the tide of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.23 o Under that
Act, Congress purported to eliminate the McNabb per se exclusionary
rule, and relegated unlawful delay to the status of a mere factor in deter-
226. Id. at 236 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. 532). The Bram test, however, did not depend upon the
Court's determination that the statement was likely to be false. In fact, the Brain Court eschewed
the very attempt to make such a determination because "the law cannot measure the force of the
influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner." 168 U.S. at 565. This
honest and straightforward recognition of the Court's limited ability to determine psychological facts
formed the heart of Brain 's approach to determining voluntariness. Because the Brain Court con-
cluded that "any doubt as to whether the confession was voluntary must be determined in favor of
the accused," it had thus perforce established a rule of exclusion if "any degree" of influence was
exerted. Id. Ironically, Judge Hand recognized the anomoly between this strict standard and the
trustworthiness rationale when he observed in Lonardo "unless we are to clutch at straws, we cannot
reconcile much of the law with the theory which it professes to follow." United States v. Lonardo,
67 F.2d 883, 884-85 (1933). The failure of theory was of course traceable directly back to Bram and
its use of a mere rule of evidence to attempt to resolve constitutional issues involving fundamental
fairness in the relationship between the individual and the state.
227. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
228. Id. at 342. The relevant provision is currently Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that a person arrested is to be taken "without unnecessary delay" before
the nearest available commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with fed-
eral offenses. The McNabb-Mallory rule was never made applicable to state criminal prosecutions
because it was not constitutionally required. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
229. The Court stated that, "this procedural requirement [of prompt arraignment] checks resort
to those reprehensible practices known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as
indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interroga-
tions of persons accused of crime." McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
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mining the "voluntariness" of any confession obtained after arrest.2 3 1
VI. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
"VOLUNTARINESS" TEST
This Article now addresses the adjudication of confession issues in
state criminal cases. This Part discusses the distinct and separate "vol-
untariness" doctrine developed under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment and shows how this form of "voluntariness" also
became intertwined with the privilege against self-incrimination.
In McNabb, Justice Frankfurter declared that the Supreme Court's
power of superintending control over the administration of criminal jus-
tice in federal courts implied a duty to maintain "civilized standards of
procedure and evidence," and asserted "[s]uch standards are not satisfied
merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing
trial by reason which are summarized as 'due process of law' and below
which we reach what is really trial by force."' 232 This less "civilized"
standard to which Frankfurter referred was the nascent version of proce-
dural due process with which the Court had begun its attempt to control
the blatant brutality of state law enforcement officials in extracting con-
fessions.2"' Having initially held, in 1908, that the fifth amendment did
not apply to the states,234 the Court had turned to the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment in 1936 when confronted with the spectre
of capital murder convictions based solely upon confessions obtained by
the savage beating and torture of three black suspects.235
Under this early conception of due process, the Court did not view the
231. See 1 W. LAFAVE & ]. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6.3 (1984). But cfi. United States v.
Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (indicating that the per se exclusionary rule has
only been restricted). Singer and Hartman suggest that congressional modification of the McNabb-
Mallory rule may be an impermissible infringement upon a judicial prerogative. See S. SINGER & M.
HARTMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK, 12.11 (1986).
232. 318 U.S. at 340.
233. See IV NAT'L COMM. ON L. OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REP. No. 11, LAWLESS-
NESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) (known popularly as the Wickersham Commission Report).
234. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
235. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). The Court in Brown held: "The due process
clause requires 'that state action... shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' It would be difficult to conceive
of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these
petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was
a clear denial of due process." Id. at 286 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) discussed infra at Part XA..L(b), holding that the use of a confession
made under the "compulsion" of mental illness does not constitute state action.
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fourteenth amendment as "incorporating" the fifth amendment's protec-
tion against compelled self-incrimination.236 Rather, the due process in-
quiry focused upon whether the defendant had been subjected to "a
hardship so acute and shocking" that it violated "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice" rooted in the traditions and conscience of the
American people.23 7 Over the next three decades, however, the Court
gradually moved beyond this primitive "shocks the conscience" stan-
dard. In twenty-nine confession decisions in state cases from 1936 to
1964, the Court progressively civilized the meaning of due process until
the clause forbade not only physical force, but also psychological
2381coercion.
Under this evolving standard, which became known as the due process
"voluntariness" test,239 the Court indeed tilted so far toward the compul-
sion standard under the fifth amendment that the two sometimes ap-
peared virtually indistinguishable. 24° Thus, in 1964, when the Court
overruled Twining in Malloy v. Hogan 24 1 and applied the fifth amend-
ment directly to the states nothing seemed incongruous in the Court's
assertion that it was simply recognizing what implicitly had already
occurred:
[T]oday the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is
tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions since 1897,
236. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) where Justice Cardozo explained that
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which held that states must provide effective assistance of
counsel to illiterate defendants accused of capital offenses, "did not turn upon the fact that the
benefit of counsel would have been guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment if they had been prosecuted in a federal court" but rather turned upon the "particular
situation" which disclosed special circumstances making counsel essential to a fair trial. See also
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (reflecting an
apparant return to this view).
237. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-28 (citations omitted).
238. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963)( barring use of mother's confession obtained
after threats that her children would be taken away from her if she failed to cooperate); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)(barring confession obtained by threats to continue incommunicado
detention and promises to allow communication with spouse). For a compilation of cases see D.
NISSMAN, E. HAGAN & P. BROOKS, LAW OF CONFESSIONS (1985) app. B.
239. See generally Kamisar, Fhat is an "Involuntary" Confession? 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728
(1963); Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1981); Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
240. See for example, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) where Justice Frankfurter,
in an elaborate exposition attempting to define "voluntariness" stated that "[t]he line of distinction
[between voluntary and involuntary] is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion,
of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession." Id. at 602.
241. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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when in Brain v. United States ... the Court held that "the issue is con-
trolled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment ... commanding that no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.'" Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the con-
duct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether
the confession was "free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be exacted by
any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence. .... "'42
The due process "voluntariness" test, however, had not been synony-
mous with the Brain test for compulsion. Under the due process test, the
Court actually made the attempt to determine, as a matter of 'psycho-
logical' fact," whether the defendant's will had been overcome. 243 Bram
had rejected such an attempt, and had instead established a presumption
of compulsion if any degree of influence had been exerted upon the sus-
pect's decision to speak.2 4
Due process "voluntariness" also represented a broader "complex of
values" than just a concern over mental freedom. As Chief Justice War-
ren observed in Blackburn v. Alabama:
But neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the preservation
of the individual's freedom of will is the sole interest at stake... The abhor-
rence of society to the use of involuntary confessions... also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
242. Id. at 7 (citing Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).
243. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602-03, which stated the test as follows:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?
If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confes-
sion offends due process.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10. Significantly, Malloy omitted the following pas-
sage establishing this presumption when it quoted from the Brain opinion:
A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by
any threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide
upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any
degree of influence has been exerted. 168 U.S. at 542-43.
By omitting this passage, Malloy and subsequent decisions purporting to reaffirm Brain have silently
ignored the methodology for determining compulsion which lay at the heart of the Brain test. See,
eg., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S 28, 30 (1976); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). Mi-
randa, however, remained faithful to the original test for compulsion established by Brain, holding
that the pressures inherent in the incommunicado detention and interrogation of an arrested suspect
establish a presumption of compulsion. See Schulhofer, supra note 208 at 446.
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criminals themselves.... Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture
against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient short-
hand, this Court terms involuntary, and the role played by each in any
situation varies according to the particular circumstances of the case.245
Because due process voluntariness represented a "complex of values" the
trustworthiness rationale never attained a position of dominance in state
confession cases. Indeed, at an early date in its development, the Court
distinguished the due process test from the fifth amendment voluntari-
ness test, stating: "The aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfair-
ness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."'246 Although the mat-
ter was placed in doubt by a contrary assertion in Stein v. New York,247
the Court in Rodgers v. Richmond again expressly rejected trustworthi-
ness as the exclusive standard for determining due process violations. 248
Two years later, in Shotwell v. United States 24 9 the Court stated in dicta:
"We agree that the rule of [Rodgers v. Richmond] involving a state trial,
is equally applicable in a federal prosecution."25 Thus the long reign of
the trustworthiness rationale as the exclusive test for determining the ad-
missibility of confessions in federal courts finally came to an end.251
While the due process "voluntariness" test thus dethroned the trust-
worthiness rationale, it also obscured the issue of "compulsion" by sub-
merging it within an ad hoc balancing test based upon the totality of the
circumstances. Professors Kamisar and Schulhofer have exhaustively
detailed the defects of this ad hoc approach.252 Its Alice in Wonderland
journey into the metaphysical realm of broken human "wills" defied both
scientific views of human behavior and common sense. Its most serious
flaw, however, lay in the fact that it was a value-laden method of consti-
tutional adjudication that created vague, unpredictable standards which
failed to provide clear guidance to police and made judicial review a mo-
rass of subjectivity. 253 The Court itself openly complained of the difficul-
245. 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)).
246. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
247. 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
248. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
249. 371 U.S. 341 (1963).
250. Id. at 350 n.10.
251. For evidence that the influence of the trustworthiness rationale still lingers on, however, see
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S 742, 758 (1970); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S 649, 672-73 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
252. See Kamisar, supra note 239; Schulhofer, supra note 239.
253. See Schulhofer, supra note 239 at 869-72.
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ties in drawing the line between an acceptable police tactic and a
violation of due process particularly when the Court must make "fine
judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and in-
ducements on the mind and will of the accused. '254
VII. TOWARD A BRIGHT-LINE SOLUTION: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The problem of determining where the line should be drawn between
society's interest in efficient law enforcement and the constitutional man-
date to protect the individual's privilege against self-incrimination be-
came increasingly intractable as police interrogation techniques became
more sophisticated in employing deception and psychological pres-
sure.255 Dissatisfied with the difficulties inherent in the ad hoc due pro-
cess voluntariness approach, the Court in 1964 boldly experimented
with the emerging sixth amendment right to counsel, hoping it could be
used as a tool to fashion a bright-line solution.256 In Massiah v. United
States 257 the Court held that the government violated an indicted defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to counsel when it arranged for his co-de-
fendant (turned informant) to surreptitiously elicit incriminating
statements from him while defendant was free on bond. Testimony of a
federal agent who had listened in on the incriminating conversation by
means of a hidden radio transmitter was therefore held inadmissable
under the sixth amendment exclusionary rule.258
254. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
Brain had of course avoided this problem by establishing a presumption of compulsion if any
degree of influence on the decision to speak had operated upon the accused.
255. See F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d
ed., 1986) for detailed instruction in such techniques. Originally published in 1962, this work be-
came the leading police manual on methods of interrogation and contributed significantly in influ-
encing law enforcement to eschew the more brutal "third degree" tactics of an earlier era.
256. Just one year earlier, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Warren Court had
held that the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel applied to state court proceedings. A "right to
counsel" approach had previously been stated by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan,
and Douglas dissenting in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958). Justice Stewart, concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) would
have made the necessary fifth vote supporting a right to counsel solution in that case, but Chief
Justice Warren, who wrote the majority opinion, struck down the confession on traditional due
process voluntariness grounds.
257. 377 US. 201 (1964).
258. Id. Massiah held that the confrontation between the defendant and his co-defendant was a
critical stage of the proceedings against him at which he was entitled to the assistance of counsel.
The government's implication in the deception of the defendant and exploitation of his ignorance of
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In Escobedo v. Illinois, 259 also decided in 1964, the Court extended the
sixth amendment right to counsel to the police station interrogation
room. In Escobedo the police arrested the defendant and were question-
ing him prior to the initiation of formal charges while defendant's attor-
ney stood outside demanding to see him. Acknowledging that access to
counsel during the period between arrest and indictment would diminish
significantly the number of confessions produced, the Court nevertheless
concluded that "the right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began
at a time when few confessions were obtained." 2" Although its opinion
portended a sweeping right to counsel during interrogation, the court
circumspectly declared: "We hold only that when the process shifts
from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to oper-
ate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer." '261 The "circumstances" in Escobedo included
the fact that the defendant, while under custodial interrogation, had
asked to see his retained counsel. The police, however, prevented him
from having access to his counsel and continued his interrogation with-
out advising him of his right to remain silent.262 Escobedo thus left state
the true status of his co-defendant as a government informer thus violated defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights. Massiah was recently reaffirmed in Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) where the
Court explained:
The Sixth Amendment protects the right of the accused not to be confronted by an agent of
the State regarding matters as to which the right to counsel has attached without counsel
being present. This right was violated as soon as the State's agent engaged [defendant] in
conversation about the charges pending against him.
474 U.S. at 178 n.14. See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S 625 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977).
259. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The substance of Escobedo's sixth amendment analysis has subse-
quently been disavowed by the Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
260. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89. The Court in justifying this conclusion stated:
There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in
their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for
legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right
of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination .... If
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforce.
ment, then there is something very wrong with that system.
we have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law
enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less
reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation.
Id.
261. Id. at 492.
262. Id. at 480.
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courts in a quandary as to which of these circumstances were controlling.
Did an accused have to request counsel? If not, and police gave warnings
regarding the right to silence, must counsel nevertheless be provided to
give advice before any interrogation? Did the accused have to waive this
new right to counsel before any interrogation could take place? Did the
rule extend to suspects who were not in custody?
The decision attracted intense scrutiny.263 It was attacked by those
who, echoing Justice White's dissent, feared that the Court had created
an "impenetrable barrier" to any interrogation once the accused became
a suspect. At the same time the decision was derided as "satanic" by so
prominent a jurist as the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court,
Roger Traynor, who queried: "When does an investigation cease to be a
'general inquiry into an unsolved crime' [and] begin 'to focus on a partic-
ular suspect'? There is more of Lucifer than of luciferousness in a rule
that compels a police officer, even under emergency conditions, to make
so finespun a determination." 2"
VIII. THE COMPROMISE
Just two months after Chief Justice Traynor delivered these remarks,
the Court acknowledged the "spirited legal debate" that had arisen re-
garding the scope and desirability of the Escobedo rule, and retreated
from the path it had taken.265 First, the Court limited the Escobedo
"right to counsel" to custodial interrogations. 266 Then, capitulating to
the demands of law enforcement, the Court declared that it was estab-
lishing "concrete constitutional guidelines" that would permit waiver of
both this newly created "right to counsel" and the fifth amendment right
to freedom from the compulsion inherent in such interrogations.267 That
263. See, eg., Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935, 999 (1966). For a
compilation of articles see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 n.2 (1966).
264. HON. R. TRAYNOR, THE DEVILS OF DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL DETECTION, DETEN-
TION, AND TRIAL 21 (1966) (the twenty-third annual Benjamin N. Cardozo lecture delivered before
the association of the bar of the city of New York, April 19, 1966).
265. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-442 (1966) (Chief Justice Warren's introductory
remarks). See also Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 87-88 (1980) (char-
acterizing Miranda as a compromise).
266. Id. at 444. After defining the term "custodial interrogation" the Court dropped an explana-
tory footnote declaring: "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation
which had focused on an accused." Id. at 444 n.4.
267. Id. at 442. The current Court does not perceive the Escobedo "right" to counsel as a full
fledged constitutional right emanating from the sixth amendment. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 429 (1986).
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landmark decision of course was Miranda v. Arizona.268
With the advent of Miranda's waiver approach to self-incrimination,
both the Brain fifth amendment voluntariness test and the due process
voluntariness test fell into the shadows.2 69 The jurisprudence of confes-
sions began instead to focus upon working out the mechanics of applying
the Miranda rules, defining "custody" and "interrogation" and carving
out exceptions to Miranda's exclusionary rule.270 More recently, how-
ever, litigation has centered upon the standards for determining the
validity of an accused's waiver of his or her Miranda "rights." The Mi-
randa Court held that when a statement is taken in the absence of coun-
sel, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." '271 The
Court also declared that "any evidence that the accused was threatened,
tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant
did not voluntarily waive his privilege. '272  In Michigan v. Tucker,2 73
however, then Justice Rehnquist signaled the demise of these high stan-
dards for determining waiver, declaring that the "rights" referred to in
the Miranda warnings were only "procedural safeguards [that] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead meas-
268. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda the Court held that prior to custodial interrogation, the
police must first inform suspects that they have a right to remain silent, that any statement they
make may be used as evidence against them, and that they have a right to have an attorney, retained
or appointed free of charge, present to advise them before and during any interrogation. Id. at 444,
269. While the Court.acknowledged the continuing existence of the Brain voluntariness test in
Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976) (per curiam), the opinion's cryptic restatement of the rule seems to
have relegated it to a mere threats and promises test reminiscent of Peake's abridged version of the
common law voluntariness test cited in United States v. Charles over a century ago. See supra note
171 and accompanying text. For a confused attempt to marry the Brain test and the due process
voluntariness doctrine, see Miller v. Fenton, 796 F. 2d. 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that "despite the
seemingly plain meaning of the Brain rule," a course of conduct by the interrogator that engendered
a false hope of leniency (including a promise to help the accused get psychiatric help because he was
"not a criminal") did not render the confession involuntary because, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the defendant's will was not overborn. Id. at 608-13.).
270. See Inbau & Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost?, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 185
(1988); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Cr. REv. 99.
271. 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490 n. 14). The Court applied that standard in
two of the cases decided in Miranda. See id. at 494-99.
272. Id. at 476 (emphasis added). The three pronged test requiring that waiver be made "volun-
tarily, knowingly and intelligently" was established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). John-
son dealt with waiver of the right to counsel at trial. Id. But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (establishing voluntary consent as the sole standard for determining waiver of fourth
amendment rights).
273. 417 U. S. 433 (1974).
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ures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was
protected.'
274
Dean Geoffrey R. Stone was one of the first to recognize the "poten-
tially devastating" implications of Rehnquist's view upon the continuing
viability of Miranda. He predicted over a decade ago that although the
Court would not overrule the decision because of sensitivity to the polit-
ical overtones of a direct attack, it would nevertheless "gradually dis-
mantle Miranda piecemeal." '275 The notoriety surrounding former
Attorney General Edwin Meese's assault upon Miranda,276 while con-
firming Dean Stone's astute political analysis, has all but obscured the
accuracy of his prediction with respect to the silent burial of the decision
by the Rehnquist Court. Just as Brain became distorted and its method-
ology discarded, so too Miranda has seen the subversion of its rationale
and the dismantling of its carefully crafted methodology for determining
valid waivers. In a trilogy of waiver decisions, two of which were au-
thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has lowered the burden of
proof for waiver,27 7 held that the invocation of the right to counsel with
respect to written statements does not invoke the right for purposes of
oral statements,278 and upheld the waiver of Miranda rights even though
police deceived the accused about the subject matter of the interroga-
tion.279 These decisions have drastically altered the parameters of the
compromise struck in Miranda.
Clearly the most significant of these developments, however, has been
the Rehnquist Court's renovation in Colorado v. Connelly 280, of the old
due process "voluntariness" test utilized prior to Miranda for determin-
ing the validity of confessions.281
274. Id. at 444.
275. Stone, supra note 270 at 123, 169.
276. MEEsE REPORT, supra note 5.
277. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 423 (1987).
279. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
280. 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissening).
281. The reader will recall that due process voluntariness is distinct from the common law vol-
untariness test engrafted onto the fifth amendment by Brain. The due process voluntariness test was
developed as an alternative mechanism for protecting the privilege (through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment) after Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) held that the fifth
amendment did not apply to state criminal prosecutions. Twining was subsequently overruled in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See supra Part VI.
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IX. COLORADO V CONNELLY AND THE NEW
VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
In Colorado v. Connelly the Court held that a psychotic defendant suf-
fering from hallucinations which created an overpowering compulsion to
confess could nevertheless voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and
make a voluntary confession.282 The practical effect of the Court's vol-
untariness holding was to establish that custodial interrogation of a per-
son known to be a mental patient and use of his delusionally induced
confession to secure a conviction did not offend due process. The unique
facts in Connelly involved two different statements: an unsolicited ad-
mission made prior to custody and a full confession obtained during cus-
todial interrogation. The first statement occurred when Connelly walked
up to a uniformed police officer in downtown Denver and stated that he
had killed someone. The officer initially thought that Connelly was
"some sort of a crackpot." '283 Because Connelly did not appear to be
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, however, the officer dutifully
advised him of his Miranda rights and placed him in handcuffs. Having
a "feeling" that Connelly had been in a mental institution before, the
officer asked him if he had ever been treated for any mental disorders.2"4
Connelly, who suffered from a longstanding severe mental disorder, re-
plied that he had been in five different mental hospitals. 285 The officer
then transported Connelly to Denver Police Headquarters where he
again was given his Miranda rights, waived them, and submitted to inter-
rogation. He thereupon confessed to having killed a female travelling
companion some eight months earlier and then led officers to the spot
where a young woman's unidentified body had previously been
discovered.286
282. 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
283. Joint Appendix, 4.
284. Id. at 8.
285. Id. at 9.
286. 479 U.S. at 160-61. The record disclosed no motive for the killing and no evidence linked
Connelly to the crime other than his confession. Id. at 183 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Although his
knowledge of the body's location might seem at first glance to implicate him in the crime, that
knowledge alone does not establish that he was the killer. Someone with Connelly's mental
problems, might, for example, have witnessed the killing by another, been overcome by feelings of
guilt for having failed to prevent it, and through the distortion of reality created by his mental
illness, have fantasized that he was responsible for her death and thus deserved to be punished.
Compare the apparent fantasy confession of subway vigilante Bernard Goetz who, having no history
of psychosis or mental illness, nevertheless "confessed" that he fired an additional, unnecessary shot
at a seated black youth, saying: "You seem to be doing all right, here's another." The jury doubted
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The Colorado state court initially found Connelly incompetent to
stand trial on second degree murder charges. Following six months of
hospitalization and treatment with antipsychotic medications, he was
deemed sufficiently recovered to be able to understand the nature of the
proceedings against him. At his preliminary hearing Dr. Metzner, an
expert in forensic psychiatry appointed by the court, testified that Con-
nelly suffered from "chronic paranoid schizophrenia" and "command
auditory hallucinations."2 7 The psychiatrist then disclosed the bizarre
story of Connelly's confessional pilgrimage to Denver. While living in
Boston, Connelly had experienced psychotic delusions in which the
"voice of God" commanded him to go to Denver and confess. If he did
not, the voice commanded, he must commit suicide with a razor blade.288
According to Dr. Metzner, Connelly's behavior in taking a plane from
Boston to Denver, walking up to the first policeman he saw and confess-
ing was the result of his mental illness. He testified further that because
Connelly was in a psychotic state at that time, he lacked the capacity to
make a free and intelligent decision to waive his Miranda rights.28 9 The
prosecution offered no evidence to dispute this testimony.
The court excluded, on traditional due process grounds, the initial
statement made to the officer. The court found that the statement was
not "voluntary" because: "He was compelled by his illness to do that
which he did and he did so in a manner which is not unusual for people
who suffer schizophrenia." 29° The court also excluded all subsequent
the accuracy of Goetz's purported admission because it was inconsistent with the physical evidence
and the testimony of other witnesses. See G. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 116-25, 196-97 (1988).
287. Dr. Metzner's testimony described Connelly's illness in the following terms:
Schizophrenia is a chronic illness that often is manifested by psychoses .... Psychoses is a
form of a mental disorder that's characterized frequently by significant personality disor-
ganization, often bizarre behavior, withdrawn behavior, difficulty being in contact with
reality, and also frequently is associated with auditory or visual hallucinations .... Mr.
Connelly ... has experienced intermittently on a fairly chronic basis auditory hallucina-
tions; that is hearing voices that are not really there... [A] command hallucination is, it's
a type of hallucination in which the person experiencing it feels as if they have to act on
whatever the voice is telling them.., that really affects his volitional abilities; that is, his
ability to make free and rational choices.
Joint Appendix, 24-5.
288. Joint Appendix, 18-19.
289. Dr. Metzer testified with respect to the defendant's signing a written waiver form: "It's my
opinion that Mr. Connelly felt that he didn't have a choice about making a confession .... it was
that his command from God was that, you go tell the police .... and if you have to sign things, you
sign things, but you have to tell them .... " Joint Appendix, 29.
290. Joint Appendix, 46-47. In the court's view:
The essence of the admission of [a] confession is based upon ... the fact that there is an
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statements Connelly made during custodial interrogation, finding that
the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of showing a voluntary,
knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.291
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld both rulings.292 The
prosecution sought certiorari only with respect to the due process issue
concerning Connelly's initial spontaneous and unsolicited statement
made when he first approached the Denver police officer on the street.
However, in an unprecedented action, the Supreme Court requested the
parties to also brief and argue the Miranda waiver issue. The Court
broadly phrased the question for review as follows: "Did respondent's
mental condition render his waiver of Miranda rights ineffective? '293
Connelly was thus specifically tailored to permit the Court to chart a new
course for "voluntariness" in a sweeping decision that would cut across
both fourteenth amendment due process and fifth amendment waiver
issues.
A. The Due Process "Voluntariness" Claim
Throughout the state court proceedings, counsel for Connelly had re-
element of self-direction in the giving of the statements. I believe this is an overflow of the
basic Judeo-Christian ethic of self-determination and free will .... The Defendant at the
time of the confession had absolutely in the Court's estimation no volition or choice to
make.
Id.
291. Id. at 48.
292. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985). Regarding the waiver issue, the Colorado
Supreme Court specifically found that the defendant's mental condition "was such that he was inca-
pable of making an intelligent and free decision with respect to his constitutional right of silence
while in custody and his constitutional right to confer with a lawyer before talking to the police."
Id. at 729.
293. 474 U.S. 1050 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This prompted a bitter dissent from Justices
Brennan and Stevens who accused the Court of having lost sight of itg primary role as the protector
of the citizen rather than the prosecutor:
In asking the parties to address issues that the State chose not to present in the petition of
certiorari, the Court goes beyond a mere philosophic inclination to facilitate criminal pros-
ecution: the Court gives the appearance of being not merely the champion, but actually an
arm of the prosecution.
I realize that, in itself, this order is not a matter of great significance. But even matters of
small effect can cloak issues of great moment. In making the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights a part of our fundamental law, the Framers recognized that limitless state power
afflicts the innocent as well as the guilty, even a crime-free world is not worth the fear and
oppression that inevitably follow unrestricted police power, and that a truly free society is
one in which every citizen-guilty or innocent-is treated fairly and accorded dignity and
respect by the State .... Ours is the duty to prevent encroachment on these principles ....
This Court has, sadly, lost sight of this role, to the detriment of the rights of each of us.
Id. at 1052-53.
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lied upon established Warren Court precedents in which the lack of free
will alone appeared to render a confession inadmissible under the due
process voluntariness test. In Blackburn v. Alabama 2 94 the defendant,
like Mr. Connelly, suffered from schizophrenia. His confession was held
involuntary because it "most probably was not the product of any mean-
ingful act of volition." '29 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court,
concluded:
Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of justice is
affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of
a statement he made while insane; and this judgment can without difficulty
be articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of
rational choice of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our sys-
tem of law enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a
person in this fashion.29 6
In Townsend v. Sain 2 97 the defendant alleged in a habeas corpus peti-
tion that immediately prior to his confession he was suffering from nar-
cotic withdrawal symptoms and had been given a drug by a police
physician which allegedly had the effect of a truth serum. The Court
held that this allegation alone was sufficient to entitle the defendant to an
evidentiary hearing. If established, the drug's effect upon the mind of the
accused was deemed sufficient to render the confession involuntary even
though the police were unaware of the drug's side effects. Thus, while
the drug's alleged properties were seen by the Court as "vital to whether
his confession was the product of a free will and therefore admissible,"
the Court viewed the lack of evidence of police wrongdoing as irrelevant.
It is not significant that the drug may have been administered and the ques-
tions asked by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's properties as a "truth
serum" if these properties exist. Any questioning by police officers which in
fact produces a confession which is not the product of a free intellect ren-
ders that confession inadmissible .... 298
1. Due Process and Deterrence: The Legacy of Leon
In rejecting Connelly's identical claim that the decision to confess
294. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
295. Id. at 211.
296. Id. at 207. This statement represented the view of eight members of the Court. Justice
Clark concurred in the result without opinion.
297. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
298. Id. at 308-09. The Court cited Blackburn noting that it also "held irrelevant the absence of
evidence of improper purpose on the part of the questioning officers." Id.
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must be made with a sane mind, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the majority discloses the extent to which the present Court's preoccupa-
tion with deterrence as the singular justification for the exclusionary rule
has allowed its "sense of justice" to atrophy in the quarter of a century
since Blackburn. The Chief Justice began his analysis by observing that
coercive government misconduct had been the catalyst for the Court's
first use of the due process clause in Brown v. Mississippi299 in 1936. As-
serting that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter viola-
tions of the Constitution, the Chief Justice then limited the due process
voluntariness test accordingly, holding that: "coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary'
within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. ' 3 °
Because Connelly's confession did not result from any coercive police
misconduct, the Chief Justice then logically concluded that no deterrent
purpose could possibly be served by suppression of Connelly's confes-
sion. According to the logic of the Court's new definition of voluntari-
ness, compulsion flowing from mental illness became "a matter to which
the United States Constitution does not speak."' 301 The Court also sum-
marily concluded that the admission of Connelly's confession would not
violate due process. Apparently, the fact that the police deliberately in-
terrogated Connelly, in the face of clear evidence that he had been re-
peatedly hospitalized for mental illness, did not offend due process
because they employed no official coercion. Similarly, the trial court's
use of Connelly's delusionally induced confession to convict him could
not offend due process, because the "essential link" between coercive po-
lice activity and the resulting confession was absent.3 °2
Connelly therefore, has charted a new course in a direction 180 degrees
from Brain. This new tack eliminates any consideration of the defend-
ant's mental state, and reduces voluntariness to a single cipher: the ab-
sence of official coercion. This Article submits, however, that Connelly's
central premise-that the absence of coercive police conduct is synony-
mous with due process-ignores history, is contrary to precedent, and
cannot be justified by the deterrence rationale upon which it is founded.
299. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See supra note 235.
300. Id. at 167.
301. 479 U.S. at 170-71.
302. Id. at 165.
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a. The Lost Right to Self-Determination: History Revisited
"[T]he law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the
deluded instrument of his own conviction. 30 3
Perhaps the first thing one recognizes about Connelly's new test is that
it repudiates the concept of "free will" as an independent element of vol-
untariness.30 " In justifying this redaction, Chief Justice Rehnquist made
the remarkable claim that such a requirement would force the Court to
create "a brand new constitutional right. ' 305 As we have seen in Part II,
however, the citizen's right to individual self-determination when con-
fronted by the state in an adversary relationship has ancient roots which
were fully developed in English common law by the seventeenth cen-
tury. 3° In the context of Connelly, this right finds apt expression in the
above-quoted passage from Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown. That passage,
written just two years prior to Madison's submission of the Bill of
Rights, manifests the traditional fairness and respect for human dignity
which, until Connelly, had characterized the relationship between State
and citizen. Just three decades after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, this passage was cited by the Court in Brain as expressing
"one of the fundamental principles of the common law."' 30 7 Its impres-
sive historical pedigree finds further support in an unbroken line of pre-
cedent supporting the right to self-determination in the due process
voluntariness cases from 1936 to 1966. Justice Frankfurter concisely ex-
pressed the distillation of those decisions in Culombe v. Connecticut:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established
test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntari-
ness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker: .. .The line of distinction is that at which governing
303. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966) (citing 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, 595 (8th ed. 1824)). The same statement appeared in the 6th edition published in 1787.
304. See Perlin, Colorado v. Connelly, Farewell to Freewill? 14 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP.
121 (1987).
305. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166. "Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-
the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly
motivated--could respondent's present claim be sustained." Id. The frightening reach of Connelly
appears in the logical inverse of this statement, which can be stated as follows: Irrational confessions
and confessions induced by admittedly improper methods are constitutionally admissible so long as
the police conduct involved in obtaining them does not rise to the level of coercion.
306. See Attorney Gen. v. Mico, 145 Eng. Rep. 419 (1658), discussed supra note 157.
307. 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897). Although Brain was not decided as a fourteenth amendment
case, its determination regarding the parameters of the common law voluntariness doctrine was
essential to its holding. See supra text accompanying note 210.
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self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature, or however infused,
propels or helps to propel the confession. 30 8
As Justice Brennan observed in his eloquent dissent in Connelly, the
Rehnquist Court's refusal to consider self-determination as a "value of
constitutional consequence" ffies in the face of two centuries of constitu-
tional jurisprudence.30 9 By redefining voluntariness solely in terms of po-
lice conduct, the Court has thus drained much of the traditional meaning
from the conception of due process as fundamental fairness.
b. Redefining the Concept of State Action
It is of course elementary that some form of state action is necessary to
sustain a due process claim under the fourteenth amendment.3 10 A sec-
ond aspect of Connelly's new voluntariness test lies in its reshaping of the
parameters of this requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court found the
state action requirement satisfied when a state court permits the prosecu-
tion to use an insane person's statement as evidence of his guilt. In so
holding, the Colorado court relied upon Blackburn v. Alabama, which
held that ".... the use of [such] evidence.., transgressed the imperatives
of fundamental justice which find their expression in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment .... ,311
Distinguishing Blackburn, on the tenuous, if not disingenuous, ground
that "police overreaching" had been an "integral element" in that
case,312 the Chief Justice declared that the difficulty with the Colorado
Supreme Court's approach to state action was its failure to "recognize
the essential link between coercive activity of the State... and a resulting
confession. ' 313 Under this double-pronged test, it appears that to consti-
tute state action, official misconduct must be both a coercive31 4 and a
causal agent responsible for producing the confession.
L The Causal Nexus Requirement
One may readily agree that a causal relationship must exist between
state action and fundamental unfairness to the defendant. Why, how-
308. 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)(emphasis added).
309. 479 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310. "No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
311. 361 U.S. 199, 211 (1961).
312. 479 U.S. at 164. See text at note 329 refuting this interpretation ofBllackburn.
313. 479 U.S. at 165.
314. See Part I X(c) for further discussion of the meaning of "coercive" police conduct.
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ever, must this causative link be to the defendant's act of confessing?
The essence of the unfairness (as the Court correctly perceived in Black-
burn) lies in "incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a statement
he made while insane." Does not the prosecutor's use of such a statement
to obtain a conviction therefore involve sufficient state action? Why in-
deed does not a judge's sentence of imprisonment, empowered by a guilty
verdict resting in whole or in part upon a confession induced by insanity,
suffice as causally related state action? The Court's opinion fails to pro-
vide satisfactory answers to these questions. Indeed, it ignores them.
ii. The Requirement that State Action be Coercive
Even if one concedes that a causal connection must exist between offi-
cial conduct and the making of a confession before the due process pro-
tections of the fourteenth amendment will apply, this threshold
requirement still disposes of only the initial, unsolicited admission by
Connelly. It does not rule out fourteenth amendment application to
Connelly's statements made during custodial interrogation. In Townsend
v. Sain 315, the Court observed that police questioning alone constituted
sufficient causal nexus, declaring that "[a]ny questioning by police of-
ficers which in fact produces a confession which is not the product of a
free intellect renders that confession inadmissible." '316 Connelly, how-
ever, adds an additional requirement: the causal nexus must also be co-
ercive. The Chief Justice advanced no theoretical foundation to explain
why state action must be "coercive" in order to violate the fourteenth
amendment. Perhaps this is because any effort at theoretical justification
would have produced a less than satisfactory result. The following anal-
ysis of two possible approaches makes this evident.
The first approach follows Justice Black's position, articulated in his
dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California. 317 It asserts that because
only the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, due process in state criminal
interrogations is governed solely by the text of the fifth amendment. Be-
cause (in the current Court's view) the sole concern of the fifth amend-
ment is coercive governmental misconduct, it therefore follows that the
reach of due process must likewise be so limited. However, this so-called
"reverse incorporation" theory has never commanded a majority of the
315. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
316, Id. at 308-09. (emphasis by the Court).
317. 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947).
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Court, and was clearly rejected in Griswold v. Connecticut.318 In addi-
tion, this limited conception of due process seems inconsistent with the
Founders' view of the Constitution and its relationship to fundamental
law. As Professor Tribe has pointed out:
The ninth amendment, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people," . . . at least states a rule of construction
pointing away from the reverse incorporation view that only the interests
secured by the Bill of Rights are encompassed within the fourteenth amend-
ment, and at most provides a positive source of law for fundamental but
unmentioned rights.3 19
Justice Black's view thus presents theoretical difficulties as a basis for
restricting the definition of due process in criminal interrogations to the
literal text of the fifth amendment. In addition, as discussed above, the
ambiguous imagery of the fifth amendment's textual language hardly
presents a convincing showing that the Framers intended to restrict the
fifth amendment only to the prohibition of coercion. 320 Assuming that
this strict literalist position was taken, however, would it not follow that
the concept of "coercion" would then necessarily be governed by the
chaste voluntariness test of the 1780s which predominated when the
Framers drafted the Bill of Rights? Yet this historical view of voluntari-
ness, which focused upon the mind of the accused and rendered a confes-
sion inadmissible if the slightest degree of influence had been exerted
upon her decision to speak,32 1 is completely at odds with the Rehnquist
Court's new version of voluntariness. Moreover, as Part II of this article
has explained, a proper understanding of the historical forces that gave
rise to the privilege against self-incrimination reveals that the essence of
freedom from self-incrimination lies in its conception of the relationship
between the state and the individual as one characterized by fairness.
The absence of coercion is therefore a necessary, but never a sufficient,
basis for that relationship.
318. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold held that a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives by married couples violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Only
Justices Black and Stewart dissented, arguing that although the law was "silly," it violated no spe-
cific provision of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.
319. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIO AL LAW 11-3, at 774-75 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in
original). See also Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987); B.
PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955).
320. Compare John Adam's self-incrimination provision in the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, discussed supra note 128.
321. See supra Part V.
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A second approach to providing a foundation for a coercive state ac-
tion requirement follows Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Rochin v. Cali-
fornia.322 This approach makes the more familiar argument that only
state action that is coercive "shocks the conscience" and is therefore
"fundamentally" unfair under the fourteenth amendment. The Court ex-
pressly followed this approach in Moran v. Burbine 323 holding that po-
lice deception of the defendant's attorney regarding whether the
defendant would be interrogated did not offend due process. The Court
stated that it would intervene under the due process clause only when
police misconduct "so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to
warrant federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States." '324
The problem with this approach, however, lies in its inability to provide a
theoretical framework capable of generating neutral principles that tran-
scend the result in the immediate case at hand.325 Even when a proper
concern for federal-state relations is added, it cannot mask the fact that
the "shocks the conscience" approach ransoms due process to the per-
sonal values of five members of the Court.3 26
The lack of uniformity that would inevitably attend the results of such
judicial subjectivity would create unpredictable constitutional standards
in an area that demands clarity. As Professor Tribe has admonished, it is
an "illusion" to suppose that such an approach "can yield answers, much
less absolve judges of responsibility for developing and defending a the-
ory of what rights are . . . 'fundamental' under our Constitution and
why. '3 27 Although ultimately one suspects that the conscience of the
Connelly majority simply was not sufficiently pricked by the prospect of
convicting a mental patient upon the basis of a confession made with a
delusional mind, the Court eschewed any attempt to justify its holding
along this line. Instead, it obscured what, if any, theoretical approach to
322. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
323, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
324. Id. at 434.
325. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961).
326. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which held that the use of the stomach
pump to retrieve swallowed narcotics violated due process, with Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957), which upheld the withdrawal of blood to be tested for the presence of intoxicants. The dis-
senters in Breithaupt accused the majority of building upon the "shifting sands" of personal value
judgments, arguing that only one's personal reaction to the stomach pump and the hypodermic
needle could serve to distinguish the two cases.
327. L. TRIBE, supra note 319, at 77-78.
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due process it may have had in mind and purported to justify its conclu-
sion regarding coercive state action on the basis of precedent.
2. Precedent Revisited
Admittedly, the vast majority of the due process voluntariness cases
since 1936 involved some form of coercive police misconduct. However,
this coincidence is hardly surprising because the Court had been forced
to employ the due process clause as a vehicle for controlling such mis-
conduct.328 The explicitly stated rationale underlying both Blackburn
and Townsend, on the other hand, clearly established, quite apart from
the issue of police misconduct, that our system of law enforcement
should not operate so as to take advantage of a person who lacked the
capacity for self-determination.329 The Court in Connelly, however, mis-
characterized these precedents, and then obfuscated the central issue of
fundamental fairness by transforming the discussion into a simple cost-
benefit analysis focused upon the exclusionary rule. Taking language
from the Blackburn opinion out of context, the Court purported to dis-
tinguish that decision on the ground that police in that case had ex-
ploited the defendant's insanity by using coercive tactics:
Blackburn had a history of mental problems. The police exploited this
weakness with coercive tactics: "the eight to nine hour sustained interroga-
tion in a tiny room which was on occasion literally filled with police of-
ficers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; [and]
the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by
Blackburn." 361 U.S. at 207-208. These tactics supported a finding that
the confession was involuntary.330
When the quoted language from Blackburn is read in context, however, a
totally different understanding of the case is revealed:
In the case at bar, the evidence indisputably establishes the strongest
probability that Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the time he alleg-
edly confessed. Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic
sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being
upon the basis of a statement he made while insane; and this judgment can
without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confes-
sion, the lack of rational choice of the accused, or simply a strong convic-
tion that our system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take
advantage of a person in this fashion. And when the other pertinent cir-
328. See supra text accompanying note 235.
329. See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying text.
330. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65.
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cumstances are considered-the eight-to nine hour sustained interrogation
in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers;
the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; the composi-
tion of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn-the
chances of the confession's having been the product of a rational intellect
and a free will become even more remote and the denial of due process even
more egregious. 33 1
As the full passage demonstrates, the issue in Blackburn was not
whether there had been "coercive" police misconduct, but rather,
whether Blackburn had the capacity for free and rational choice in light
of his insanity. Indeed, in Townsend, decided just three years after
Blackburn, Chief Justice Warren, the author of both opinions, expressly
stated that Blackburn did not rely on police coercion. 3 2
Having established the "strongest probability" that Blackburn was in-
sane, the Court's reference to the circumstances surrounding his interro-
gation therefore simply served to bolster its conclusion that Blackburn
lacked the capacity for self-determination. These additional comments
thus only demonstrated that "the chances of the confession's having been
the product of a rational intellect and a free will [were] even more re-
mote." The Connelly opinion, however, deletes this concluding clause
from its quotation of Blackburn.3 33
As a final note to Blackburn, it is interesting to compare the "tactics"
employed by the police in that case with the tactics upheld in Moran v.
Burbine,3 34 decided the same year as Connelly. The factors that the Con-
nelly Court expressly found to be "coercive tactics" in Blackburn can be
summarized as follows: (1) The interrogation began at about one o'clock
in the afternoon and continued, after an hour's break for dinner, until ten
or eleven o'clock in the evening; (2) most of the interrogation was con-
ducted in a small room, occasionally with as many as three officers pres-
ent; (3) the interrogation was conducted in the absence of friends,
331. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207-08 (emphasis added).
332. [I]n Blackburn v. Alabama... we held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper
purpose on the part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that the inter-
rogating officers thought the defendant sane when he confessed, but we judged the confes-
sion inadmissible because the probability was that the defendant was in fact insane at the
time.
372 U.S. at 309 (Warren, C.J.).
333. The Court also fails to explain why it is correct in placing a construction upon Blackburn
which is precisely the opposite of the construction placed upon it by Chief Justice Warren, in his
subsequent opinion in Townsend. See supra note 332.
334. 475 U.S. 412 (1985).
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relatives or counsel; (4) the confession was composed by the Deputy
Sheriff rather than by Blackburn.33 5
The facts surrounding the interrogation of Burbine, on the other hand,
reveal: (1) Defendant was interrogated off and on over a twenty-one
hour period and given no food until after his first confession, approxi-
mately seven hours after being taken into custody;336 (2) the interroga-
tion occurred in both an interrogation room and a larger room in which
five officers from two police departments were present; (3) defendant,
who had only a fifth grade education, was not only isolated from friends
and relatives, but police deception prevented his attorney from contact-
ing him; (4) the written confession was produced by the interrogating
detective typing his questions as he asked them and then typing
Burbine's answers.33 7
During his questioning Blackburn was described as being "clear eyed,"
and giving "sensible answers, '  but officers present at Burbine's confes-
sion described Burbine as being "shaky, in tears" '339 and at times "inco-
herent."'"' If the tactics in Blackburn were "coercive," why then were
similar tactics in Burbine not equally offensive?
The Connelly opinion's attempt to distinguish Townsend v. Sain 341 is
likewise unconvincing. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the police
in Townsend were guilty of "wrongdoing" because they questioned the
defendant after they "knew that [he] had been given drugs.""342 This ar-
gument does not serve to distinguish Connelly. If police knowledge of a
defendant's susceptible condition makes interrogation wrongful, it fol-
lows that the police in Connelly were similarly guilty of wrongdoing.
335. 361 U.S. at 204.
336. The defendant was arrested around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon. He signed a first confession
at 10:20 p.m. He signed a second confession at 11:20 p.m. and made further admissions the following
morning. 475 U.S. 412, 445-449 (1986).
337. 475 U.S. 445-449 and 753 F.2d 178, 179-181 (1985). The specific misconduct complained
of in Burbine was that a detective falsely told a public defender (contacted by Burbine's sister) that
Burbine would not be questioned. Officers then proceeded to interrogate Burbine while concealing
from him that an attorney was immediately available and had offered to come to the station to
provide advice and assistance. A violation of due process is, of course, determined under the totality
of the circumstances, Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), and the Court, having previously can-
vassed the facts in its discussion of the defendant's waiver claim, held that "on these facts" there was
no violation. 475 U.S. at 433.
338. 361 U.S. 199, 204 (1960).
339. 753 F.2d at 181.
340. 475 U.S. at 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
341. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
342. 479 U.S. at 165.
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They interrogated Connelly after they knew he was a mental patient who
had been hospitalized at least five times. 43 The cryptic statement that
the police knew Townsend had been given "drugs," moreover, distorts
the facts and completely obfuscates the issue decided in Townsend.
There was no evidence that the questioning officers in that case "knew"
that the medication given to the defendant to relieve narcotics with-
drawal symptoms might affect his will to resist questioning.3" Further-
more the Townsend Court held this lack of improper motive
irrelevant.345
As the state Supreme Court in Connelly correctly perceived, both
Townsend and Blackburn stand for the proposition that even when no
police misconduct is evident, the use of a confession as evidence offends
due process if it has been obtained from a defendant whose capacity for
self-determination is substantially impaired. The Connelly opinion's at-
tempt to manufacture police misconduct in those cases and to further
find that such "wrongdoing" was the basis for those decisions therefore
is, to say the least, less than candid. Furthermore, the Court's claim that
the police involvement in those cases constituted improper coercive tac-
tics is inconsistent with the fact that it upheld similar if not more egre-
gious tactics in Burbine. When one recognizes that the Court offers no
theoretical justification for its requirement that state action be coercive,
its attempt to ground its decision upon a distortion of past precedent
reveals that the Court has erected an edifice with feet of clay.
3. The Deterrence Rationale: Wagging the Dog by its Tail
With such maneuvering the Court side-stepped the central issue of
fundamental fairness upon which both Blackburn and Townsend had
been premised, and substituted in its place a convenient whipping boy,
the exclusionary rule, which it predictably sacrificed upon the alter of
deterrence. Drawing upon its recent decision in United States v. Leon,3 46
343. Joint Appendix 9. The Connelly opinion glosses over this fact, referring to the number of
hospitalizations as "several." 479 U.S. at 160.
344. Indeed the inference drawn by the Court was just the opposite. 372 U.S. at 308. There was
never any suggestion that the police acted improperly in giving the defendant medication to relieve
the pain of narcotics withdrawal. Yet the Court's truncated statement of facts in Connelly entirely
omits the reason for the medication and leaves the reader with the false impression that the police
deliberately plied the defendant with drugs so they could extract a confession from him. 479 U.S. at
165.
345. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text; supra note 332.
346. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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which created a "good faith" exception to the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule, the Court reaffirmed its view that the mission of the exclu-
sionary rule was concerned only with deterring future violations of the
Constitution.
In Leon, the Court found that no deterrent purpose would be served
by excluding evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant
where police had reasonably relied upon the warrant's validity. The
Court therefore concluded that because the cost entailed in excluding
relevant evidence outweighed any benefit, the exclusionary rule should
not apply even though defendant's fourth amendment rights were vio-
lated.347 In Connelly the Court similarly concluded that in the absence
of coercive police misconduct "suppressing [Connelly's] statements
would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guaran-
tees."34 From this narrow premise, the Court then leaped to the broad
conclusion that the use of Connelly's deranged statements as evidence
against him did not violate the due process clause.
But surely this is the (exclusionary) tail wagging the (due process) dog,
for the upshot of the Court's position is that unless exclusion will deter
someone in an official capacity, there can be no due process violation no
matter how unjust the result.349 By allowing the deterrence rationale for
the exclusionary rule to control the nature of the due process inquiry, the
347. Id. at 906-13.
348. 479 U.S. at 166.
349. Indeed, the Court cites Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), for the proposition that
"[t]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant
does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause." 479 U.S. at 166. But
Burdeau, which involved the federal government's receipt of private papers stolen from the defend-
ant by his employer, was decided under the fourth amendment, not the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Burdeau the defendant sought the return of his property, arguing un-
sucessfully that the federal government's posession was tainted by the illegal seizure. The case there-
fore did not involve a trial at which such evidence had been admitted. The other two cases cited by
the Court, Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1970) are neither on point nor do they involve outrageous conduct. In Walter, obscene films
were mistakenly delivered to the wrong address, opened and turned over to the FBI. The Court held
that the FBI could not view the films without a warrant. In Coolidge, the defendant's wife simply
cooperated with the police by turning over her husband's belongings, and no fourth amendment
violation was found. These cases, therefore, provide no authority for the Court's position. More-
over, they involve the seizure of physical evidence, not the extraction of a confession. Does the
Court mean to imply that if private parties beat and tortured a defendant suspected of crime, that the
court could admit the resulting confession and not offend due process? As Justices Brandeis and
Holmes, dissenting in Burdeau observed: "Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its
enforcement, to means which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play." Burdeau,
256 U.S. at 477.
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Court thus permits the logic of deterrence to shape the actual content of
due process itself. Under this formula any concern for justice is excluded
from the equation. Indeed, any attempt to develop a coherent theory of
justice under the due process clause is precluded.
Connelly justifies its refusal to extend constitutional doctrine beyond
the limited confines of the deterrence rationale on the ground that the
effort involved would be too time consuming and costly. According to
the Court, such an endeavour would "deflect a criminal trial from its
basic purpose" and "require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a
criminal defendant."3 ° The Court does not explain why this "sweeping"
inquiry would be more burdensome than similar constitutionally re-
quired inquiries into a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial,
351
to waive her right to counsel,35 2 or to be executed.353 In Dusky v. United
States, 35 4 the Court held that a defendant who is tried must have the
capacity to have a "rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him." This standard is also the prevailing view with
respect to a defendant who pleads guilty.355 Connelly was found incom-
petent to stand trial immediately following the making of his custodial
confession. Indeed, the trial court found that at the time of his confes-
sion he was experiencing a psychotic break with reality and suffering
from hallucinations. Does it not therefore appear incongruous that Con-
nelly could not have pled guilty in open Court, on the same day he sealed
his fate with a confession obtained within the precincts of the Denver
police headquarters?
350. 479 U.S. at 166-67. Again, the Court exaggerates and mischaracterizes the nature of the
inquiry. The Court asserts that it would entail "a far-ranging requirement that courts must divine a
defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did even though there be no claim that goven-
ment conduct coerced his decision." Id. at 165-66. One commentator has agreed with this conclu-
sion, adding: "Without police coercion, a court would have to engage in the hairsplitting task of
finding the exact reason why a defendant confessed." Comment, Defining the Protections of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments Against Self-incrimination for the Mentally Impaired, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 877, 908 (1988). But this is simply not so. The task is not to determine why a defend-
ant confessed, but rather whether he or she had the capacity to exercise a "free and rational choice."
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978). In this regard, the inquiry is essentially no different
from that of determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, or his capacity to waive his right
to counsel.
351. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
352. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966). See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975).
353. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
354. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
355. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.4(b) (1984).
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The extension of the Court's fourth amendment exclusionary rule doc-
trine to the due process clause is also flawed in its application to Con-
nelly. Leon is premised upon the good faith conduct of the police. Even
in cases where a magistrate has issued a warrant, if the police acted with
reckless disregard for the truth in preparing their affidavit, or otherwise
failed to harbor "an objectively reasonable belief" in the existence of
probable cause, exclusion is still appropriate.356 In Connelly, the Court
stressed that the state court found that the police had "committed no
wrongful acts," 357 -a statement analogous to finding "good faith". As
previously noted, however, the record reveals that the police who ini-
tially encountered Connelly testified that he thought Connelly was a
"crackpot" and had a "feeling" that he had been in a mental institution
before."' Furthermore, the officer immediately confirmed these suspi-
cions, when Connelly admitted his prior hospitalizations for mental ill-
ness.359 Connelly was thus subjected to custodial interrogation by police
who were, at a minimum, reckless in disregarding the probability that he
suffered from severe mental illness. The Leon "good faith" exception
should therefore be inapplicable. 3 ° If the police in Townsend were guilty
of "wrongdoing" simply because they questioned a suspect after they
knew he had been given medication for narcotics withdrawal symptoms
(even though there was no evidence that the police knew of the medica-
tion's alleged side effects) then, the police in Connelly were likewise
guilty for clearly they were put on notice that Connelly was not mentally
competent.361
356. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
357. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165. While the trial court found no wrongdoing ( i.e. coercion) by the
officers, the issue of "good faith" in the sense contemplated by Leon was of course never litigated.
358. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
359. See supra text at note 285.
360. The good faith exception could of course apply to the initial, unsolicited statement "I killed
someone" which Connelly uttered upon approaching the officer on the street. The Court's failure to
deal with the spontaneous statement and the confession resulting from custodial interrogation as
analytically separate and distinct entities has obscured this important difference between them.
361. Note that the forgoing discussion does not mean that the police are necessarily precluded
from questioning those they have reason to believe are mentally ill. The fifth amendment is not
violated by the act which compells an answer to a question. It is the use of compelled statements as
evidence in a criminal proceeding (thus causing the maker to "be a witness against himself" ) that is
the object of protection. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956) (reaffirming Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896)). Similiarly, the Court
should view the use of statements made by the mentally impaired as violative of due process. As the
Court said in a slightly different context in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964):
We do not question that.., it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the
suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the
[Vol. 67:59
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/5
VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
Not only did Connelly present a situation in which the good faith re-
quirement of Leon was lacking, but the purported "costs" of exclusion in
Connelly also were clearly insufficient to justify application of the Leon
rationale. The exclusionary rule is costly in direct proportion to the ex-
tent that it deprives the jury of "truthful and probative" evidence.362 In
Leon the cost was high because the evidence sought to be excluded was a
large quantity of narcotics. Such physical evidence cannot fabricate or
distort the truth and is indisputably relevant. In Connelly, however, the
Court conceded that a confession rendered by one in Connelly's mental
condition "might be proved to be quite unreliable." '363 In light of this
admission, where then is the "substantial cost" incurred by excluding
such doubtful evidence?364
Careful analysis of the Court's attempt to import the logic of its fourth
amendment jurisprudence into the realm of due process in criminal inter-
rogations thus discloses fundamental defects in the premises necessary to
support its deterrence-based argument. Not only is good faith reliance,
the cornerstone of Leon, missing in Connelly, but the cost of exclusion is
negligible, given the lack of reliability inherent in confessions made by
the mentally ill. These flaws in the logic of its argument, however, seem
insignificant when one realizes that the Court has removed the issue of
reliability altogether from the constitutional agenda, leaving the trust-
worthiness of a confession "to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the
forum.
36 5
4. The Demise of Trustworthiness
It will be recalled that the paramount concern of the English common
law voluntariness doctrine was trustworthiness.366 If the confession was
defendant had already been indicted. All we hold is that the defendant's own incriminat-
ing statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could
not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.
(emphasis in original).
362. 479 U.S. at 166 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972)).
363. Id. at 167. The court-appointed psychiatrist who found Connelly initially incompetent to
stand trial testified that at the time of his first examination, shortly after Connelly's arrest, "he was
coming in and out of psychoses, so I wasn't very confident that he could consistently relate accurate
information." Joint Appendix 35.
364. "[T]he exclusionary rule imposes a subtantial cost on the societal interest in law enforce-
ment by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence." 479 U.S. at 166 (quoting United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976)) (emphasis added).
365. Id. at 167.
366. See supra Part IV A.
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made under the influence of either fear of reprisal or hope of leniency,
there was no guarantee of its truthfulness. Such involuntary confessions
were therefore inadmissible at common law because they provided an
unsafe basis for conviction. This "fundamental principle of the common
law" was engrafted onto the fifth amendment in Brain v. United States.3 67
Despite Brain's strict (no psychological influence) standard for admissi-
bility, the logic of the trustworthiness rationale subsequently reasserted
itself and reliability alone became the touchstone for admitting confes-
sions in federal courts.3 68
Until the fifth amendment was made applicable to state criminal pro-
ceedings in 1964, the admissibility of confessions in state courts was gov-
erned by a parallel voluntariness doctrine developed under the fourteenth
amendment.3 69 It is significant that physical evidence, illegally seized in
violation of a suspect's constitutional rights, was not excluded during this
period.370 Confessions found to be involuntary, however, were excluded.
This exclusionary rule was not employed because the Court saw its role
as deterring constitutional illegality by punishing errant policemen, but
rather because fundamental fairness required that guilt be reliably deter-
mined.371 The fourteenth amendment's voluntainess doctrine, therefore,
did not develop as a "rigid exclusionary rule of evidence" but rather as
"a guarantee against conviction on inherently untrustworthy
evidence."372
In Rogers v. Richmond373 the Court rejected the view that the trust-
367. See supra text at note 178.
368. See supra text at note 224.
369. See supra text at note 233.
370. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which had held "that in a prosecution in a State
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33. Wo/fwas overruled by Mapp v. Ohio 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
371. As Justice Jackson explained in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953):
Coerced confessions are not more stained with illegality than other evidence obtained in
violation of law. But reliance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a
confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial expe-
rience shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a false founda-
tion for any conviction....
Id. at 192 (subsequently overruled in Rodgers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)).
372. Id. It is curious that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who clerked for Justice Jackson in the same
year that Stein was argued has championed the first proposition while apparantly forgetting the
latter.
373. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Rodgers involved a confession obtained as a result of police deception.
Police engaged in the pretense of ordering that the suspect's wife be arrested and brought in for
questioning. The suspect then agreed to confess to prevent this from happening. The trial court had
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worthiness rationale was the sole determinate of the due process volunta-
riness test in state cases.374 The thrust of this position, however, was not
that the reliability of a confession was no longer a concern of due pro-
cess, but rather that police misconduct was now an additional, independ-
ent concern. 375 Thus, after Rodgers it was no longer necessary to
establish untrustworthiness in order to show a due process violation.
Even though the confession might be demonstrably true, the Court still
excluded it under the due process clause if the methods used to obtain
the confession were improper. Viewed from the perspective provided by
the historical development of the due process voluntariness doctrine, a
lack of trustworthiness should therefore remain a sufficient, but not a
necessary condition precedent to a due process violation. 76
admitted the confession on the ground that the deception "had no tendency to produce a confession
that was not in accord with the truth." Id. at 541-42. In his charge to the jury the trial court had
also declared: "The object of evidence is to get at the truth, and a trick or device which has no
tendency to produce a confession except one in accordance with the truth does not render the confes-
sion inadmissible ...." Id. at 542. Although this jury instruction was not at issue, the Supreme
Court quoted it because it "enunciated the reasoning which had guided [the trial court] in admitting
the confessions .. " The Court then expressly held: "This is not a permissible standard under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 543-44. Thus Rodgers expressly rejected
the premise that unfair interrogation tactics are permissible unless they are "apt to make an innocent
person confess." See F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 255 at xvii.
374. See also supra note 243 and accompaning text (contrasting fifth and fourteenth amendment
approaches).
375. See supra note 245 and accompaning text. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960),
decided one year before Rogers, the Court held that the exclusion of confessions under the due
process voluntariness doctrine was based upon a "complex of values" which now included abhorence
of illegal police methods. Therefore, "neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the
preservation of the individual's freedom of will is the sole interest at stake." Id. at 207 (emphasis
added).
376. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, (1964) where Justice White, writing for the Court
declared:
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of involuntary
confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of confessions that are obtained
in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the 'strongly felt attitude of our society
that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the
course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will'
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-207, and because of "the deep rooted feeling that
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be
as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the actual criminals themselves." Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321.
Id. at 385-86 (emphasis added). As the italicized portions demonstrate, the danger of convicting the
innocent on the basis of unreliable evidence was still very much a concern of the due process clause.
Justice White apparantly forgot these words, however, when authoring the plurality opinion in Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). In Lego, he wrote: "[Tihe purpose of a voluntariness hearing is
designed to serve has nothing whatever to do with improving the reliability of jury verdicts.... ." Id.
at 486 (emphasis added). Lego, a 4 to 3 decision, upheld the admission of a confession based only
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In Connelly, however, the Court obliterated trustworthiness alto-
gether, holding that the reliability of a confession was no longer a matter
of constitutional concern, and should therefore be left to the vagaries of
state law governing the admission of evidence. 377 Thus, the long-reign-
ing trustworthiness rationale, which Rogers dethroned, was now exiled as
well by Connelly. Having obscured the true origins of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and dominated the jurisprudence of confes-
sions for centuries, trustworthiness today is no longer even a factor in the
totality of the circumstances under the Court's new due process analysis.
In its place the deterrence rationale reigns supreme and the right to a
reliable determination of guilt is left to the states to guarantee rather than
the Constitution.
Can the Court seriously mean that there is no due process right to a
reliable determination of guilt? Yet, this is the clear import of the hold-
ing in Connelly. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent:
There is not a shred of competent evidence in this record linking the de-
fendant to the charged homicide. There is only Mr. Connelly's confession.
Minimum standards of due process should require that the trial court find
substantial indicia of reliability, on the basis of evidence extrinsic to the
confession itself, before admitting the confession of a mentally ill person
into evidence .... To hold otherwise allows the State to imprison and
possibly to execute a mentally ill defendant based solely upon an inherently
unreliable confession.378
The majority's easy reliance upon state law to ensure that untrustworthy
confessions are not admitted is disturbing. Controversial cases which
upon a preponderance of the evidence that it was voluntary, and was reaffirmed in Connelly, 479
U.S. at 168.
377. 479 U.S. at 167.
378. Id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As an evidentiary matter, the general rule states that
a defendant "may not be convicted upon his uncorroborated confession." Smith v. United States,
348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954). 145 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1984). Although Smith was not
decided on constitutional grounds, the Court noted that the purpose of the corroboration require-
ment was to prevent erroneous convictions based solely on confessions that may be untrue or admis-
sions that are inaccurate. Id. at 153. Significantly, the Court in Smith noted that although a
statement may not be "involuntary" within the meaning of the due process voluntariness test: "Still
it's reliability may be suspect if it is extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police investi-
gation whose words may reflect the strain and confusion attending his predicament rather than a
clear reflection of the past." Id.
In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954) the Court held, as a matter of federal law, that
the corroborative evidence does not have to independently establish the corpus delicti. The corrobo-
rative evidence is sufficient if it "supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury
inference of their truth." This "reasonable inference" standard is of course much lower than the
preponderance standard required for admission under the due process voluntariness test.
[Vol. 67:59
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/5
19891 VOLUNTARINESS DOCTRINE
whip up public emotions can bring substantial pressure to bear upon a
mere rule of evidence-a transitory law that can be changed at the whim
of the legislature.3 79 As Justice Jackson wrote, with respect to the first
eight amendments to the Constitution: "The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles .... "3 o Certainly those words
are equally applicable to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
B. The Miranda Waiver Issue
In addition to eroding constitutional standards for the admission of
confessions, the Connelly decision also lowered standards for determin-
ing the validity of a suspect's waiver of his right to remain silent and his
right to have the advise and assistance of counsel under the Miranda
doctrine. The reader will recall that the Court specially tailored the
prosecutor's petition for certiorari by adding the following issue: "Did
respondent's mental condition render his waiver of Miranda rights inef-
fective?" 38 This broadly phrased question thus encompassed all three
379. See for example the recent amendment to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which
restricted the use of expert testimony in presenting an insanity defense. This amendment followed in
the wake of the attempted assassination of President Reagan and the verdict finding John Hinckley
not guilty by reason of insanity.
That the Connelly case itself generated hostile public pressure was graphically illustrated by a
newspaper clipping (incredibly attached as an appendix to the prosecutor's petition for certiorari)
which demonstrated the depth of intolerance, misunderstanding and prejudice that exists toward the
mentally ill. Attacking the Colorado Supreme Court for "judicial eccentricity" and implying that
Connelly was faking insanity, the article, by Vincent Carroll, assistant editorial page editor, sarcasti-
cally observed:
When God talked to Joan of Arc in the 15th century, all she got for the privilege was death
at the stake. But the future has brightened. After God talked to Francis Connelly, current
resident of the Denver County Jail, Connelly found the visitation far more useful. Why it
may even help him to beat a murder charge. And they say miracles don't happen any
more .... You might well wonder how the Supreme Court can be sure Connelly lacked
free will .... Silly you. The court knows because a psychiatrist says so, and the psychia-
trist knows because Connelly says so .... Perhaps next time the Supreme Court should find
an expert who will go the distance-someone who will contend that no confession is ever
the product of free will .... Surely the court should find that notion appealing: It's simple
but abstract, and it's a bold departure in legal theory. Best of all, though, it helps the guilty
go free.
Petition for Certiorari, Exhibit "E", Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
380. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
381. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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prongs of the Johnson v. Zerbst 3 2 waiver standard which requires that
waiver of Miranda rights be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
made. The Court in Connelly, however, only addressed the voluntariness
aspect of Connelly's waiver, therefore giving only a partial answer to its
own question. The Court treated the issue of voluntainess as being the
same whether it arose in the context of a waiver or a due process analy-
sis. Applying its newly formulated standard for due process voluntari-
ness-the absence of official coercion-the Court superimposed its due
process test upon the voluntariness prong of the Johnson waiver stan-
dard. Thus, despite the fact the Connelly's behavior was being com-
pelled by internal psychological forces resulting from mental illness, the
Court nevertheless found that Connelly's waiver of his right to remain
silent and right to have the advise and presence of a lawyer during inter-
rogation were voluntary because the compulsion did not emanate from
any official source. Connelly thus appears to be the capstone to the reno-
vation of the Miranda waiver standard which was begun in Moran v.
Burbine. 383
382. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson held that a waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made in order to be valid. Miranda expressly en-
dorsed Johnson as the standard to be applied to determine the validity of waivers of fifth amendment
rights. 384 U.S. at 475.
383. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See supra note 20. The Court also took advantage of this opportunity
to declare that the burden of proving waiver need only be met by a preponderance, although this
issue was neither raised nor briefed. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168. But see Justice Blackmon's
concurring opinion for the view that this portion of the Court's opinion was "not necessary to the
decision." Id. at 171. Prior to Connelly, Johnson v. Zerbst had noted that "'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." 304 U.S. at 464, and
Miranda had declared that the government shouldered a "heavy burden" in establishing waiver, 384
U.S. at 475. The Connelly majority, however, relied upon the deterrance rationale to justify its
lowering of the standard of proof, declaring:
'[E]xclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and pros-
ecution and it is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof in ...
supression hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect to outweigh the public
interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful
decisions about guilt or innocence.' 479 U.S. at 169 (quoting Lego v. Twomey 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972)).
Apart from the fact that the same logical flaws in its due process argument, see supra text following
note 365, reappear here, this represents an amazing extention of the deterrance rationale. Given the
Court's treatment of voluntariness, one can see the connection between deterrance and proof of a
voluntary waiver. However, no connection whatsoever exists between deterrance and a suspect's
capacity or lack of capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights.
Furthermore, the Court broadly phrased its purported holding, stating: "Whenever the State
bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained
in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the state need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the
evidence." 479 U.S. at 168. As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized in Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d
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The Colorado Supreme Court had held that Connelly's mental condi-
tion rendered him "incapable of making an intelligent and free decision"
with respect to waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to coun-
sel.384 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, however, that the Colorado
court "erred in importing into this area of constitutional law notions of
'free will' that have no place there."3 5 In the Court's eyes, Connelly's
deranged mind was capable of voluntarily waiving the auxiliary protec-
tions established in Miranda because there was "obviously no reason to
require more in the way of a 'voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda
waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession con-
text. ' 386 What should be obvious, however, is that waiver does require
more because waiver (unlike the Court's new conception of voluntari-
ness) requires rationale choice. Even those who advocate streamlining
the concept of waiver, such as Professor George Dix, have recognized
1530 (1Ith Cir.) cerL denied, 108 S.Ct. 2832 (1988), however, Connelly dealt only with the voluntari-
ness prong of the waiver standard. The Court remanded the case to the Colorado Supreme Court for
reconsideration of other waiver issues. Therefore it did not address the question of whether Con-
nelly had made a knowing and intelligent waiver. Connelly's implicit application of the preponder-
ance standard to these issues is thus clearly dicta. Nevertheless, as Professor Kamisar has observed
in remarking on Connelly: "[W]hen all is said and done, the high standard and heavy burden of
proving waiver by Miranda rights turns out to be the lighest heavy burden and the lowest high
standard to be found." Y. Kamisar, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law
Conference, 17, Septemeber 12, 1987, Washington D.C. on file at the law libraries of CWSL and the
University of Michigan.
384. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
385. 479 U.S. at 169. As Professor Michael Perlin has noted, this statement appears to reflect
the unacknowledged influence of the amicus brief filed by the American Psychological Association
(A.P.A.) which argued that the voluntariness test should be overhauled because it did not conform
to "scientific" views of human behavior. From the behavioral science point of view, according to the
A.P.A., all behavior is determined by genetic, physiological and environmental antecedents, and
there is no place for concepts such as "free will." Brief of Amicus Curiae A.P.A in Support of
Petitioner at 6, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (No. 85-660). Because the behavioral scientist
looks at human behavior in terms of stimulus and response, the A.P.A. urged the Court to abandon
the legal fiction of "voluntariness" and focus only on whether the police conduct in question was a
"stimulus" which should be condoned or condemned. This is precisely what the Court did. As Pro-
fessor Perlin has pointed out, the view of the A.P.A. is "clearly not unanimous" and it is curious that
the Court makes the unabashed conclusion that "free will" (and therefore the right to self-determi-
nation) has no place in the administration of criminal justice, without stating its reasons. See Perlin,
Colorado v. Connelly, Farewell to Free Will?, 14 SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW REPORT 121, 126
(1987). For an excellent analysis of the Supreme Court's pre-Connelly treatment of the interplay
between Miranda and mental disability see Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Crimi-
nal Defendant, and Symbolic Values Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or Doctrinal Abyss? 29
ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 22 (1987).
386. 479 U.S. at 169-70.
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that its essential nature involves "conscious choice. '11 7 Professor Dix
explains that "[t]he definition of waiver as conscious choice implies that a
person waiving a right must have consciously perceived that he had a
choice among different courses of action." '388 In Connelly, however, Dr.
Metzner's undisputed expert testimony disclosed that Connelly's mental
illness rendered him incapable of perceiving that he had a choice.38 9 Dr.
Metzner also testified that although Connelly "probably had the capacity
to know that he was being read his Miranda rights, and [that] he had
certain ights... he wasn't able to use that information because of the
command hallucinations. 390
If the state can place a citizen in a situation in which he must exercise
a choice affecting life and liberty, then surely any civilized system of jus-
tice must presuppose that he have the "capacity to appreciate his position
and make a rational choice. '391 As Professor Dix has thoughtfully ob-
served: "Minimal respect for a defendant's interest in self-determination
requires no less."1392 Furthermore, if the Constitution requires that a citi-
zen be given certain information before making that choice, it follows
that the Constitution must also presuppose a reasonable capacity to util-
ize that information.393 To suggest otherwise is to exalt form over sub-
stance, and blind the administration of criminal justice to the human
reality that exists outside of intellectual constructs created by the judicial
mind.
387. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More CarefulAnalysis, 55 TEX. L. REv.
193, 205 (1977) (defining waiver as, and only as, conscious contemporaneous choice).
388. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
389. See Dr. Metzner's testimony supra note 289.
390. Joint Appendix 26.
391. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966). Rees, decided just two weeks before Miranda,
involved a unique situation in which a defendant, convicted of murder, moved to withdraw his
petition for certiorari. On the suggestion of counsel that the defendant was mentally ill, the Court
directed the district court to determine: "Whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and
make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other
hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect
his capacity in the premises." Id. For a discussion of Rees, see Dix, supra note 387, at 261.
392. Dix, supra note 387, at 263-64.
393. See Dix, supra note 387, at 260-268. Justice Stevens, dissenting from the Court's treatment
of the waiver issue in Connelly, found the Court's position "incomprehensible" and concluded that
"[s]ince it is undisputed that respondent was not then competent to stand trial, I would also con-
clude that he was not competent to waive his constitutional right to remain silent." 479 U.S. at 173
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Although this conclusion seems undoubtedly correct on the facts of Con-
nelly, it does not automatically follow that competency to stand trial and competency to waive are
the same. See Dix, supra note 387, at 263-64 (suggesting that the standard for competency to waive
constitutional rights may be higher).
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If Connelly had been indicted, and had thereafter waived counsel and
pled guilty as a result of compulsion produced by the same hallucina-
tions, had waived counsel and pled guilty, would the result be the same?
If not, how do we justify the disparity between the standards applied to
the interrogation rooms of the "gatehouse" and those employed within
the courtrooms of the "mansion"?3 94
C. The Final Assault Upon Miranda: Coercion Versus Compulsion
The ultimate impact of the Rehnquist Court's new voluntariness test
upon the proceedings at the "gatehouse" will depend upon how the
Court develops the contours of its coercion requirement as the "neces-
sary predicate" for a finding of involuntariness. Under Brain, the early
test for voluntariness employed a presumption whereby a confession was
deemed involuntary if the interrogator had exerted "any degree" of influ-
ence because "the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or
decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner." '395 Under Con-
nelly, however, the focus of attention is upon the offensiveness of the
police conduct involved, rather than the impact of that conduct upon the
mind of the accused. The Court candidly acknowledged that "[e]ven
where there is causal connection between police misconduct and a de-
fendant's confession, it does not automatically follow that there has been
394. See Y. KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Pro-
cedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME, I (A. Howard ed. 1965). It goes without saying that
anyone writing in the field of confessions merely tills the soil that was first broken by Professor
Kamisar, as evidenced by the continuing vitality of the following passage written over two decades
ago;
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow and strut and prose-
cuting attorneys are hemmed in at many turns. But what happens before an accused
reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort of this veritable mansion? Ah there's the rub.
Typically he must first pass through a much less pretentious edifice, a police station with
bare back rooms and locked doors.
In this "gatehouse" of American criminal procedure ... the enemy of the state is a
depersonalized 'subject' to be 'sized up' and subjected to 'interrogation tactics and tech-
niques most appropriate for the occasion', he is game to be stalked and cornered. Here
ideas are checked at the door 'realities' faced and the prestige of law enforcement vindi-
cated. Once he leaves the 'gatehouse' and enters the 'mansion'-if he evers gets there-the
enemy of the state is repersonalized, even dignified, the public invited, and a stirring cere-
mony in honor of individual freedom from law enforcement celebrated .... Society doesn't
want to know about criminals, but it does want them put away, and it is incurious how this
can be done provided it is done. Thus society, in giving the policeman power, and wishing
to ignore what his techniques must be, has made over to him part of its own consicence.
Id. at 19-20; (quoting MACINNES, The Criminal Society, in THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 101 (C.H.
Ralph ed. 1962)).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
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a violation of the due process clause." '39 6 Although the Court did not
attempt to define the meaning of "coercion" in Connelly, it clearly sig-
naled that only interrogation techniques that are "so offensive to a civi-
lized system of justice that they must be condemned" would constitute
"coercive government misconduct. 397
Because the Court equated "voluntariness" for the purpose of a waiver
of Miranda rights with due process "voluntariness," the test for coercion
is thus presumably the same in each context. This parallel raises several
significant problems. The standards for determining waiver of fifth
amendment rights have always been high.39 The standards for setting a
minimum due process threshold, however, have gravitated toward the
other end of the spectrum.399 This lower standard, in large part reflects
the federal judiciary's understandable reluctance to impose its policy
choices upon the states by means of such an open-textured provision as
the due process clause. The Court's holding in Burbine that police de-
ception of the defendant's attorney did not violate due process illustrates
this point, the Court there declaring that: "[T]he challenged conduct
falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of
civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal
processes of the States."'
But the determination of whether a federal constitutional right has
been waived is a proper federal function which can hardly be called an
intrusion upon the processes of the states. By importing the due process
"shocks the sensibilities" test to define "coercion" (the new measuring
rod for determining the voluntariness of fifth amendment waivers) the
Court will bring along the unnecessary baggage of federal/state relations.
Such concerns over federalism have no place in the analysis of waiver
issues, and will only serve to further confuse doctrinal development and
396. 479 U.S. at 164 n.2.
397. Id. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Fenton 474 U.S 104, 109 (1985)). Although Miller implies that
a technique may be offensive because it has been applied to a particularly susceptible suspect, its test
is still clearly one involving a value judgment in which the suspect's capacity to withstand the tech-
nique is only a factor for subjective assessment rather than a standard upon which to base the deter-
mination of voluntariness.
398. At least this was true until Connelly. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
399. Justice Frankfurter once characterized the due process standards as only "those minimal
historic safeguards for securing trial by reason ... below which we reach what is really trial by
force." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
400. 475 U.S. 412, 433-34 (1986).
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precipitate an unnecessary lowering of standards for determining when a
suspect has validily surrendered a constitutional right.
In addition, by infecting the voluntariness prong of the waiver stan-
dard with the problems of its due process counterpart, the test for vali-
dating waivers becomes undeniably subjective. By what standard is the
offensiveness of an interrogation technique to be judged? By what neu-
tral principle will it be determined that a civilized system of justice re-
quires the condemnation of a particular technique? What is the measure
of a "civilized" system of justice? Judge Robert Bork has written:
[T]he Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in
reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution
.... If it does not have such a theory but merely imposes its own value
choices, or worse if it pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own
predilections, the Court violates the postulates... that alone justi[fy] its
power.4°1
Writing more than a century earlier, in what has been described as "one
of the great masterpieces of constitutional opinion-writing"'"' 2 Justice
Benjamin Robbins Curtis similarly admonished in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford: "[W]hen ...opinions of individuals are allowed to control its
meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government
of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the
Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to
mean."
403
Personal value judgments concerning what is "offensive" police con-
duct should not be allowed to determine the scope of the fifth amend-
ment right to be free from compulsion. Neither should they control the
validity of waivers of that right under the guise of determining voluntari-
ness. For when a citizen claims the protection of a constitutional right
which the state asserts he has waived, there can be no question that the
judicial resolution of the waiver controversy determines the scope of pro-
tection, and thus the meaning of that constitutional provision.
In holding that Connelly made a voluntary waiver of his fifth amend-
401. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 3 (1971).
The Chief Justice himself has also written condemning such methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion. See Rehnquist, A Living Constitution, 54 Tax. L. REv., 693, 699 (1976) (The court cannot act
as the "conscience" of society, because "however socially desirable the goals sought to be advanced
.. advancing them through a freewheeling, non-elected judiciary is quite unacceptable in a demo-
cratic society.").
402. D. CURRiE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 273 (1985).
403. 60 U.S. 393, 621 (1857).
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ment rights, the Court necessarily determined that the police conduct in
the case was not coercive. The facts of Connelly hardly conjure up the
image of the type of coercive police misconduct condemned by the old
due process voluntariness cases as the "third degree"'  and perhaps the
Court thought the answer obvious. In any event, the Court did not
clearly address and determine the issue of coercion and thus gave no
reasoned explanation for its implicit holding.4"5 Past decisions, however,
clearly show that the degree of coercion acceptable under the due process
voluntariness standard is substantially higher than the degree of pressure
permitted under the definition of compulsion in Miranda.4"6 This creates
404. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
405. The majority opinion does mention in its due process discussion that the Colorado trial
court had found that "the police committed no wrongful acts and that finding has been neither
challenged by the respondent nor disturbed by the Supreme Court of Colorado." 479 U.S. at 165.
But, as Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, (1985) clearly holds, due process voluntariness is not a
factual question, but a "legal question" requiring "independent" federal determination. Id. at 115
(emphasis added). Connelly did not address the issue of whether voluntariness in the waiver context
is a legal or a factual question. The Court's passing reference to the trial court's factual "finding"
therefore adds a new layer of confusion to the analysis, if that finding was intended to serve as the
ground for the Court's implicit holding that there was no coercion. Because the concept of coercion
plays a central role in the Court's new voluntariness test, one would have expected explicit treatment
of the determination of this issue. The failure to do so suggests that the Court simply made a subjec-
tive assessment that no coercion was present.
406. Miranda held that "[u]nless adquate protective devices are employed to dispel the compul-
sion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice." 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court believed
that custodial surroundings created an atmosphere that "carri[ed] its own badge of intimidation."
Id. at 457. Based upon this premise, the posing of a single question under such circumstances there-
fore violated the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
By contrast, the Court has always permitted extended custodial interrogation under the due pro-
cess voluntariness test unless in combination with other factors it operated to overbear the suspect's
will. See Lisemba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (confession of experienced, educated business-
man held voluntary despite repeated and persistent interrogation over a period of several days). See
also Schulhofer, Confessions and The Court, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 865, 871 (1981). The concept of
coercion under due process voluntariness also permits a wide variety of deceptive police practices.
See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (custodial interrogation for over an hour, by means of lies
and false plays to sympathy, did not make the ensuing confession involuntary). See also Miller v.
Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986). In Miller the defendant confessed after almost an hour of
continual pressure and then collapsed into a catatonic state and had to be hospitalized. The confes-
sion was held voluntary despite false statements of fact, devious psychological ploys, and implied
promises that the defendant would be given proper psychiatric help rather than punishment.
For an example of what Chief Justice Rehnquist may find as an acceptable level of pressure, see
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Mincey the defendant
was in an intensive care unit after being shot by police. "Tubes were inserted into his throat to help
him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from vomiting; a catheter was
inserted into his bladder. He received various drugs, and a device was attached to his arm so that he
could be fed intravenously." Id. at 396. Despite the defendant's repeated requests that he be left
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a final anomaly which, upon reflection, reveals that Connelly has dealt a
devastating blow to Miranda's central holding regarding compulsion.
Because the fifth amendment right to be free from compulsion can now
be waived under a standard permitting greater pressure than Miranda
itself would allow, Miranda's definition of compulsion has thus been un-
done by an end run.
The following illustration easily demonstrates this undermining of Mi-
randa. Suppose that one could measure the pressure upon an arrested
suspect in degrees from one to one hundred. Assume that the law cre-
ated a right to be free from pressure greater than ten degrees. Assume
also that the law provided that the suspect could waive that right. If the
amount of pressure that police could exert upon the suspect to waive this
right was less than ten degrees, there would be no anomaly. But suppose
the law permitted the police to exert thirty degrees of pressure upon a
suspect in order to persuade him to waive his right. The result is nullifi-
cation of the original right not to be subjected to more than ten degrees
of pressure, and a substitution of a new thirty degree limit.
In a like manner the core holding of Miranda-that the pressure cre-
ated by custodial interrogation, no matter how brief, constitutes compul-
sion prohibited under the fifth amendment-has now been overridden by
the new voluntariness test established in Connelly. Stripped of any re-
quirement that focuses upon the mind of the accused, this new stream-
lined version of voluntariness (characterized as simply the absence of
police misconduct which offends the Court's sensibilities) opens the door
to a wide variety of police interrogation techniques which, through de-
ception, trickery and surprise, can produce compelling pressure upon a
person in custody to speak. The Court, moreover, has put forward no
principled basis for deciding which, if any, of these tactics should be
prohibited.
Arizona v. Mauro,"7 which ostensibly deals only with the definition of
"interrogation" under Miranda and its progeny, provides a case in point.
In addition to illustrating how the Court has subverted Miranda's under-
standing of the level of pressure sufficient to constitute compulsion,
alone, a detective interrogated him from 8:00 p.m. until midnight, ceasing his interrogation only
when the defendant lost consciousness or received medical treatment. Eight members of the Court
agreed that admissions made by the defendant under these circumstances were involuntary. Dissent-
ing, then Justice Rehnquist observed that none of the "gross abuses" that had led the Court to find
confessions involuntary in prior cases were present in this case. Therefore he concluded that not
withstanding Mincey's medical condition his statements should have been admissible. Id. at 410.
407. 107 S. Ct. 1931 (1987).
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Mauro also provides telling insight into how the Court will define "coer-
cion" and shows how quickly the Court has already moved beyond the
confines of Connelly to infect other aspects of the Miranda doctrine with
its new understanding of compulsion as coercion.
In Mauro the defendant, in custody for killing his son, requested a
lawyer after receiving the Miranda warnings. Under the rule established
in Edwards v. Arizona 48 after a defendant has invoked his right to coun-
sel under Miranda, the police cannot subject him to further "interroga-
tion."'" 9 When the defendant's distraught wife (who was also being
subjected to custodial interrogation as a suspected accomplice) asked to
see him, police exploited the situation by bringing her, without warning,
into the room where the defendant was being held. The officer then
stated that they could speak together only if he were present. When his
wife began to speak, the defendant twice told her to "shut up." The
officer then intervened to reopen the conversation by asking the defend-
ant's wife whether she knew a priest who could conduct religious rites for
their murdered child 41 -- a question calculated to play upon her already
obvious feelings of guilt. The defendant then told his wife not to answer
any questions without an attorney.411 At trial a tape recording of this
confrontation was admitted in evidence against the defendant to rebut his
insanity defense. Mauro was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
Had this case been decided under the Brain voluntariness test there is
no question that a court would have found Mauro's statements involun-
tary because this confrontation was (to use the dissent's characterization)
a "powerful psychological ploy" to induce the defendant to speak.
Clearly, this custodial confrontation likewise produced more pressure
upon the defendant than is permitted by Miranda's understanding of
compulsion.41 2 Instead of grappling with this issue head on, however,
the Court resolved the case under the Edwards rule, holding that the
defendant had not been "interrogated." By framing the issue in this
408. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
409. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court defined "interrogation" to encom-
pass not only direct questioning, but also its "functional equivalent" including "any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
The concept of "incriminating response" of course includes any statement which can be used in
evidence against the suspect, regardless of the nature of the statement or its content. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966).
410. Mauro, 107 S. Ct. at 1933 n.1.
411. Id.
412. See supra note 406.
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manner the Court was therefore able to decide Mauro within the frame-
work of the deterrence rationale which, under Rhode Island v. Innis,4
13
focuses upon whether the police conduct was objectively reasonable.
Although the Arizona Supreme Court and four Justices of the United
States Supreme Court found that Mauro had been subjected to the func-
tional equivalent of interrogation, a bare majority of the Court found that
he had not. The majority took pains to note that the purpose of the
Edwards rule was to prevent the police from using the "coercive nature of
confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unre-
strained environment" and summarily concluded that the officer's con-
duct in Mauro did "not implicate this purpose in any way." '414 This is an
incredible statement when viewed in light of Miranda's understanding of
compulsion. Had the officer asked Mauro a single question his response
would have been deemed compelled. Mauro, trapped in a room from
which he was not free to leave, was certainly subjected to much greater
pressure through the surprise confrontation with his distracted wife. The
Court, however, did not view this tactic as being "in any way" coercive.
Mauro thus provides a glimpse of the type of tactics the Rehnquist Court
does not consider to be "coercive" and more importantly, demonstrates
how the Court has silently and without fanfare used its subjective con-
ception of "coercion" to replace Miranda's understanding of compulsion.
In Michigan v. Mosley,415 Justice White predicted that in the final anal-
ysis, the Court would depart from the rule-like character of the Miranda
approach and return to voluntariness as the sole standard by which to
determine whether a ptoperly informed defendant had waived his fifth
amendment "right to silence".416 As Mauro illustrates, the impact of the
Court's new understanding of voluntariness upon the definition of "inter-
rogation" suggests that Justice White's prophecy is in the process of be-
ing realized. As shown below, moreover, it is a return to "voluntariness
413. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). See supra note 409.
414. 107 S. Ct. at 1936-37 (emphasis added).
415. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
416. Id. at 108. (White, J., concurring) ("I suspect that in the final analysis the majority will
adopt voluntariness as the standard by which to judge the waiver of a right to silence by a properly
informed defendant."). The fifth amendment of course does not give a defendant the "right" to
silence. It only guarantees the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. Because it is
anomalous to suggest that suspects may properly waive their right to be free from compulsion, how-
ever, the phrase "right to silence" has emerged as a substitute and obscured proper analysis. The
import of White's statement, properly understood, is that the Court should return to voluntariness as
the standard for defining compulsion.
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with a vengeance. "417
X. FROM FAILED PRAGMATISM TO PIous FRAUD
"[T]he effective administration of criminal justice
hardly requires disregard of fair procedures."4 '
In his entertaining and insightful analysis of the Burger Court era,
Professor Alschuler observed that while the Burger Court never over-
ruled Miranda, it so abased it that a police training manual could legiti-
mately advise police not to give Miranda warnings.4 19 As a result of the
Rehnquist Court confession decisions, this hypothetical police manual
might now be expanded upon as follows:
If you do not have probable cause to arrest a suspect, do not be deterred. It
is permissible to deceive the suspect and trick him into "voluntarily" com-
ing down to the police station. If he is unsophisticated, uneducated, men-
tally retarded or even a little crazy, so much the better. Because you did
not create that condition you may exploit it. Do not give the suspect any
Miranda warnings. They do not apply. Because you have tricked the sus-
pect into coming "voluntarily" into the interrogation room, he thus is not
in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
417. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, of course,
used the phrase in a different context, to characterize his complaint that Miranda's understanding of
voluntariness meant the negation of virtually all pressure, and thus discouraged the making of any
confessions at all.
418. Justice Frankfurter in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
419. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1436,
1442-43 (1987).
Upon arresting a suspect, do not give him the Miranda warnings. When the public
safety requires it, you may question this suspect without advising him of his rights, and his
answers will be admissible. In the absence of a special public need, however, you should
not question an arrested, unwarned suspect. If the suspect does make a statement, it will
be a "volunteered" statement of the sort that Miranda makes admissible. Moreover, if the
suspect remains silent, his silence may be used to impeach any defense that he offers at
trial.
After an hour or two (during which your suspect will have provided either a statement
or a potentially useful period of silence) you should advise him of his rights. If the suspect
waives these rights, his statement will be admissible. If he indicates that he wishes to
remain silent or to consult a lawyer, however, continue to interrogate him without a law-
yer. Although the prosecutor will be unable to introduce as part of the state's case-in-chief
any statement that the suspect makes, the suspect's statement will become admissible to
impeach his testimony if he later takes the witness stand to say something different from
what he told you. Indeed, if the suspects testimony on direct examination fails to contra-
dict his earlier statement, the prosecutor may cross-examine him about facts reported in
the earlier statement and may introduce the statement if the suspect fails to confirm what
he said to you.
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Once you have the suspect in your environment, do not tell him the real
reason you wish to interrogate him or indicate the seriousness of the offense
for which he is suspect. Only when you have gained enough admissions so
that the cat is out of the bag should you turn on the tape recorder, advise
the suspect of his rights and take his full confession. He will probably re-
peat what he has just told you. If you have any reason to believe that the
suspect is mentally deficient or insane, however, come back later for a third
round of interrogation and press him in such a manner that he will refuse to
talk further and ask for a lawyer. Impressing upon him the seriousness of
the charge is a good way to engender such a response. This invocation can
then be used to show that he was cognitively aware of his Miranda rights
and made a valid waiver when he made his earlier confession.
The forgoing scenario is not fantasy. It is taken from State v. Carrillo,420
a 1988 decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona, which, in upholding
the confession taken there, demonstrates the consequences of coupling
the Connelly voluntariness test with Colorado v. Spring421 and previous
Burger Court decisions undermining Miranda's definition of custody.4 22
Hector Carrillo was mentally retarded. The only apparent ground for
police suspicion that he was involved in a murder was the fact that he
was a gardener for the deceased and it was possible he had been at the
deceased's home on the day of the killing. The police were aware, from
their own records, of Hector's "severely mentally retarded" condition.
In order to interrogate Hector, the police used a misdemeanor traffic
warrant as a pretext to visit him, and persuaded him to come down to the
police station to clear up this matter.42 The detective in charge of the
case testified that, "I felt that by taking him from his house to the police
department.., by taking him from there into my environment it helped
my advantage out a little bit."42 4
Upon arrival Hector was finger printed and photographed like any ar-
restee. No request for permission to do this was made. Police then
placed Hector in a small interrogation room and began questioning him.
They did not advise Hector of his Miranda rights or tape record the ini-
tial interrogation. The interrogating officer later admitted, however,
that it was "independently obvious to him at that point that Hector was
420, 156 Ariz. 125, 750 P.2d 883 (1988).
421. 479 U.S. 564. See supra note 17 for a discussion of Spring.
422, See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
423, The Tucson Police Department policy was not to arrest on a misdemeanor warrant in this
type of situation. 156 Ariz. at 127, 750 P.2d at 885.
424. Id. at 132, 750 P.2d at 890.
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indeed mentally deficient."425 Although the interrogation lasted ninety
minutes, there is no way to reconstruct with certainty what actually oc-
curred during most of that time because the tape recorder was turned off.
According to the interrogator, after fencing around with Hector on a
number of topics he eventually "dropped it on him" that they were inves-
tigating a murder and asked if he had killed the deceased. Hector then
admitted that he had stabbed the deceased but did not mean to. Only
after this admission did the officer turn on the tape recorder and carefully
advise Hector of his Miranda rights "in simplified form to ensure that he
understood them."426 Hector then dutifully gave a tape recorded confes-
sion. A short time thereafter a different detective came in for a third
round of questioning and apparently told Hector to take off his pants.427
Hector, however, stated that he would not remove his underwear, asked
"where is my lawyer" and refused to speak further.428
Two mental health experts found Hector Carlo incompetent to stand
trial. Two other experts, however, found him competent, and the trial
court sided with these two prosecution witnesses. Carillo was convicted
of second degree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court held that because
Carillo was expressly told that he was not under arrest, he was not in
custody for the purposes of the Miranda warning requirement. 429 There-
fore the officer's calculated refusal to give Miranda warnings at the be-
ginning of the interrogation session did not taint the subsequent taped
confession. The court then turned to the issue of voluntariness and, rely-
ing upon Connelly, observed: "[T]he question of voluntariness is to be
determined by an objective evaluation of police conduct and not by de-
fendant's subjective perception of reality."430 Discovering no objective
evidence that the conduct of the police was either intimidating or coer-
cive, the court could find no "legal grounds" for concluding that either
the confession or the waiver of Miranda rights were involuntary. Fi-
nally, the court ruled that Carillo made a knowing waiver despite his
425. Id. at 127, 750 P.2d at 885.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 130, 750 P.2d at 888. Apparently the pants were wanted for examination.
428. Id. at 129, 750 P.2d at 887-88.
429. The test is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situa-
tion. Berkemer v. McCarty 468 U.S. 420, 436-38 (1984). The court admitted that given Carrillo's
diminished mental capacity he may have thought that he was in custody, but stated: "we deal with
objective criteria only in determining whether the interrogation was custodial." 156 Ariz. at 133, 750
P.2d at 892 (emphasis added).
430. 156 Ariz. at 135, 750 P.2d at 895.
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mentally retarded condition. In an ironic twist, the court used Carillo's
belated exercise of his Miranda rights as evidence against him. Accord-
ing to the court, Carillo's request for a lawyer and refusal to speak after
being told to remove his pants, was "persuasive evidence" which demon-
strated that he understood his rights under Miranda.431
What has been vividly demonstrated, however, is the tragic irony of
Miranda's failure to protect the "privilege" against self-incrimination
and the cluster of rights that historically surrounded it. Historically, the
"privilege" protected a criminally suspect person from interrogation by
one in authority in the absence of a substantiated formal accusation. Our
English ancestors considered this the essence of fair procedure, and
whenever it was disregarded it was just as stubbornly reasserted as the
law of the land. For Hector Carrillo, however, such a privilege did not
exist. He was interrogated without probable cause, without notice of the
charge against him, and in an environment that was calculatedly
designed to make him feel obligated to respond.
In his dissenting opinion in Miranda, Justice Harlan focused precisely
upon the Achilles heel of the Miranda opinion, when he observed that in
holding that a presumption of compulsion arises from custodial interro-
gation, the Court "failed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits
that relatively mild pressure the Due Process Clause permits." '432 As
cases like Carrillo demonstrate, the failure to resolve that contradiction
has been the fatal flaw that has led to the unraveling of the Miranda
doctrine. The Miranda Court's fundamental error, however, was in fail-
ing to understand the true nature of the privilege-both historically and
analytically. As a result it perceived the issue in terms of "compulsion"
and attempted to preserve the values protected by the historical privilege
by redefining that term, much as the Court in Brain had done three-
quarters of a century earlier. Like Brain, the effort has again failed for
want of a solid theoretical foundation.
In reflecting upon the treatment of Miranda by the Burger Court Pro-
fessor Jerold H. Israel suggested more than a decade ago that at least
Miranda still served as a symbol of respect for the privilege against self-
incrimination.433 When the Miranda doctrine becomes so distorted,
however, that the invocation of its protection can become a weapon in
431. Id. at 135, 750 P.2d at 889.
432. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 513 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
433. See Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1319 (1977). Professor Israel asserted that "what may be the most significant feature
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the hands of the state to be used against the accused, it is time to recog-
nize that Miranda has ceased to serve even a symbolic function and has
become instead a pious fraud.434
XI. CONCLUSION
Although its origins can be traced to Biblical scripture, freedom from
self-incrimination, as received in America, arose out of the English com-
mon law development of our accusatory system of criminal justice. Part
II of this Article demonstrated that during the first stage of development
of the "privilege" against self-incrimination, the suspect was not obli-
gated to answer questions posed by those in authority absent fair notice
and justified suspicion regarding the alleged offense. These twin rights
defined the parameters of the "privilege" in its Hohfeldian sense4 35 and
protected one against being subjected to interrogation in the absence of a
formal charge substantiated by a sworn complaint or indictment. Once
these rights were observed, however, the "privilege" came to an end and
the defendant could be compelled to truthfully answer the allegations
against him under oath. With the introduction of the hated oath ex of-
ficio and the use of torture during the religious persecutions of the six-
teenth century, the privilege fell into eclipse. It reasserted itself,
however, after the fall of Star Chamber in 1641 and entered a second
stage of development which recognized the corollary right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination.
In drafting the Bill of Rights, it was inevitable that the fabric of the
common law would be torn apart by the effort to catalogue particular
rights. This caused the twin rights of fair notice and justified suspicion to
be treated as discrete concepts. As a consequence of the ambiguous
phrasing of the fifth amendment, the intimate connection between these
rights and the "privilege" against self-incrimination was obscured. Thus,
the fifth amendment came to be viewed as simply expressing a right
against compelled self-incrimination. In addition, this truncated right
became entwined with the common law rule of evidence known as the
of Miranda from a civil libertarian viewpoint [is] the symbolic impact of the Miranda warnings as a
formal recognition of the self-incrimination privilege of the interrogated suspect." Id. at 1387.
434. "Unless Miranda produces lawyers in the station house instead of waivers, Miranda may
turn out in practice to be a pious fraud." Hon. J. Skelly Wright, A Fresh Approach to the Law, in A
NEw LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: EsCOaaDo- THE SECOND ROUND 250, (Institute of Continuing Legal
Education Specialty Handbook No. 20, (B. James George, Jr. ed. 1967)).
435. See supra note 7.
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voluntariness doctrine, which emerged to dominate the jurisprudence of
confessions.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the same concern for
fairness toward the individual which gave rise to the ancient privilege
also caused the voluntariness doctrine to evolve into a rule virtually bar-
ring any interrogation of a prisoner. Subsequent interpretation in the
early twentieth century, however resurrected the trustworthiness ration-
ale (which had been the underlying justification for the common law evi-
dence rule) to limit the scope of protection. By the Prohibition era, the
privilege had yielded to the perceived necessities of law enforcement to
such an extent that a confession was considered involuntary only if the
pressure exerted was so great that it created a fair risk that the confession
was false.436
By the 1940's, concern with the abuses that had developed under such
a lax standard" 7 led the Court to severely restrict interrogation by fed-
eral law enforcement under the McNabb-Mallory rule.438 At the same
time the Court acted to enforce fundamental fairness in state interroga-
tions by means of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
When the due process "voluntariness" approach proved incapable of pro-
viding a workable solution, the Court moved toward a bright line solu-
tion under the sixth amendment, establishing an accused's right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation in Escobedo v. Illinois.439
Guided by standards recommended by the American Bar Association
436. See supra Part V(D); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 824 at 252 (3d ed. 1940).
437. See IV National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement (Wickersham Report) (1931); Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contempo-
rary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. R v. 345 (1936).
438. See text at note 228.
439. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo was premised upon the conclusion that our adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice commenced once the investigatory process had focused upon an accused with
the purpose to obtain a confession. The right to counsel was therefore grounded upon traditional
sixth amendment doctrine that required "the guiding hand of counsel" at every critical stage of the
adversarial process. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). Miranda later re-affirmed
this holding, but clarified the concept of "focus," by limiting the right to counsel to custodial interro-
gation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4. (1966). In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) the Court acknowledged that Escobedo had been decided as a sixth amendment case, but
refused to follow its holding, choosing instead to follow Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Kirby had developed the idea that the sixth amendment right to
counsel did not "attach" until adversarial judicial criminal proceedings had been initiated by way of
indictment or formal charge. Id. at 689. The Burbine Court thus found that no sixth amendment
violation had occurred where, prior to formal charges being filed, police interrogated the defendant
over a period of 21 hours, despite telling his attorney that no interrogation would take place.
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for the fair administration of criminal justice, the Court could have de-
veloped Escobedo into a doctrine consistent with the historical under-
standing of the "privilege" against self-incrimination by mandating that
no waiver of rights would be accepted unless the accused had first con-
sulted with counsel." 0 Counsel's role under such a doctrine would have
envisioned three major functions. First, the provision of counsel would
have ensured that probable cause existed to detain the suspect regarding
the offense for which interrogation was sought. The ancient right not to
be subjected to interrogation without justified suspicion could thus have
been protected and enforced by means of the writ of habeas corpus where
appropriate." 1 Second, as a necessary consequence of performing the
first function, counsel would have discovered and communicated to the
accused the nature of the accusation against her, thus implementing the
accused's right to fair notice. Finally, counsel would have been present
at any interrogation session to provide advice, ensure fairness and protect
against overbearing. Such a doctrine arguably would have been compati-
ble with permitting the police or prosecutor to put questions to an ac-
cused, even though the accused indicated that he desired to remain silent.
Indeed, Miranda left the door open to this possibility, noting:
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney
present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning
would be permissible. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements
then made in the presence of counsel might be free of the compelling influ-
ence of the interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a waiver
of the privilege for purposes of these statements.442
More accurately there simply would be no "privilege" to waive, since the
protection afforded by the historical "privilege" against self-incrimina-
tion came to an end once the accused received fair notice by a formal
charge based upon probable cause. While the corollary right to be free
440. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, 7.3 (Acceptance of Waiver) (1974) which provides: "If a
person who has not seen a lawyer indicates his intention to waive the assistance of counsel, a lawyer
should be provided to consult with him. No waiver should be accepted unless he has at least once
conferred with a lawyer." Id. at 153-54. The Advisory Committee which drafted this standard was
chaired by then circuit judge Warren E. Burger, who served from the committee's inception in 1964
until his appointment as Chief Justice in 1969. Id. at Appendix F. The standard was widely circu-
lated in tentative draft form and ultimately was approved by the House of Delegates in February,
1968.
441. Indeed, Escobedo's lawyer had fied such a writ and had initially obtained his client's re-
lease when police attempted to interrogate him without probable cause. See 378 U.S. at 479.
442. 384 U.S. at 474 n.44.
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from "coercion" would continue, the presence of counsel, as Miranda
suggested, would serve to negate any per se compelling influence arising
from custodial interrogation. Therefore, further development of Esco-
bedo could have fostered a practice of routine questioning of a repre-
sented accused which would have been entirely consistent with the
historical understanding of the privilege against self-incrimination. 3
The Court did not develop such an Escobedo doctrine, however. Con-
fronted with the storm of controversy that the decision created, the
Court retreated in Miranda, and struck a compromise. This compromise
permitted police to obtain uncounseled waivers of both the right to have
counsel's advice and assistance, and the right to be free from the compel-
ling influence of custodial interrogation. The Miranda retreat therefore
transformed the debate about self-incrimination into a debate about
waiver. Instead of grappling with the fundamental question of what the
proper ethical relationship between state and citizen should be, the Bur-
443. Obviously, the traditional Miranda warning that the accused has a "right" to silence would
not be given under this view of the "privilege," and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prohibiting
on due process grounds the prosecution's use of an accused's silence as evidence after accused re-
ceived warnings) would be inapplicable.
Some nevertheless may object that any lawyer worth her salt would advise the accused not to
answer any questions posed by the police and that the doctrine therefore would have resulted in
making any interrogation futile. This would be true, however, only if there was no cost associated
with the refusal to answer. The admission into evidence of the accused's refusal to answer, or alter-
natively, giving the trial judge discretion to comment unfavorably upon such refusal, could have
provided an appropriate countervailing incentive. Under both an historical and a Hohfeldian analy-
sis, the "privilege" against self-incrimination would not bar the use of an accused's silence where
there was a deliberate refusal to answer after an accused had been formally charged on the basis of
probable cause. Whether the accused's silence in the face of such questioning could be admitted,
where relevant, as evidence against him would, of coursc, have remained problematic in light of
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). However, because Griffin dealt only with a prosecutor's
comment on a defendant's silence at trial, the Court could have conceivably distinguished Griffin.
See United States v. Robinson, 108 S. Ct. 864 (1988) (indicating that Griffin is no longer sacred and
can be quite narrowly construed). Therefore, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that Escobedo
would have developed into a dead end in which counsel would routinely advise defendants not to
answer any questions. Whatever problems may have attended such an approach, at least their reso-
lution would have been undertaken by addressing the "privilege" on its merits. Most importantly,
the presence of counsel would have eliminated the bag of dirty trick from the policeman's repertoire
and fostered an ethical system of interrogation.
A similar proposal was in fact previously put forward over half a century ago by the Wickersham
Commission. Concerned with police abuses in the 1930s, the Commission's proposed remedy con-
templated judicial interrogation of an accused who had first been provided with counsel and advised
of the charge against him. See Wickersham Commission Report, supra note 234, at 5. See also
Kamisar, supra note 266, at 84-90 (proposing that police or prosecutors be allowed to question an
accused in the presence of judicial officer, once that officer has determined that probable cause exists
for the detention and had made counsel available to the accused).
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ger Court substituted the deterrence rationale for constitutional theory
and channeled the debate into a one-sided utilitarian discussion concern-
ing whether policemen, in particular circumstances, should be "pun-
ished" for violating the nonconstitutional "rules" by which the waiver
game was played. In this manner, the Burger Court continued the re-
treat, gradually cutting back the Miranda doctrine and at the same time
reducing the concept of waiver to a formalistic ritual.
In Colorado v. Connelly the Rehnquist Court continued this assault by
transforming the voluntariness test into a monolith, eliminating the
"complex of values" which once guided the determination of due process
in criminal interrogations. In its continuing passion to reduce the scope
of the federal exclusionary rule, the Court once again substituted the
logic of deterrence for theoretical analysis and provided convenient, sim-
plistic answers to questions that present difficult underlying problems of
constitutional theory. As a result of this deterrence-based approach, an a
historical, myopic view of voluntariness as simply the absence of coercion
has emerged. Limited solely to the Court's subjective assessment of what
constitutes "coercive" police conduct, this monochromatic voluntariness
test now controls both the meaning of due process and the validity of
waivers of fifth amendment rights under Miranda. Connelly reflects the
shallowness of current fifth amendment jurisprudence and demonstrates
a profound ignorance of history. More importantly, however, Connelly
has abrogated Miranda's definition of compulsion and opened the door
to a broad spectrum of deceptive and unethical police practices which
threaten to nullify the premise of fundamental fairness upon which the
privilege against self-incrimination was founded. If, to convict the sus-
pected criminal, we permit the police to sink to a "lower moral plane
than that upon which ethical, law-abiding citizens are expected to con-
duct their everyday affairs" we also subject our own liberty and personal
security to that mentality. 4 Yet, if the history of the embattled privi-
lege against self-incrimination has demonstrated anything, it has shown
that whenever restrictions on the power to extract answers to questions
444. F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 255. These authors maintain that necessity
dictates that the police lower themselves to the moral plane of the criminal. Therefore "both fair
and unfair interrogation practices are permissible [so long as] nothing shall be done or said to the
suspect that will be apt to make an innocent person confess." Id. Apart from the practical difficul-
ties inherent in this approach, which requires a court to play psychologist, it would also appear to
condone the practice of policemen disguising themselves as a priests or even lawyers in order to
deceive alleged criminals into making admissions. Such deception clearly would not make an inno-
cent person confess. If one finds such practices unacceptable, however, how does one draw the line?
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posed by those in positions of authority have been relaxed, such license
has been abused." 5 The Court has offered no principled basis for draw-
ing the clear lines necessary to guard against abuse and thus has failed to
provide uniform guidelines for the police. This in turn poses what per-
haps may be the greatest danger-the loss of respect for the law which
inevitably follows a loss of confidence in the even-handed fairness and
integrity of law enforcement. While it is in no way suggested that the
Court in Connelly condoned or contemplated the potential for abuse, as
Justice Frankfurter once observed, it would "not be the first time that
results neither desired nor foreseen by an opinion have followed."" 6 We
must now recognize that Miranda has been silently buried, pay our re-
spects, and in the spirit that Miranda envisioned, begin to rethink the
privilege against self-incrimination anew.
445. Indeed, perhaps the most telling example of abuse of power has come from those thought
least likely to abuse it-the judiciary. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101 (discussing the
practice of judicial examination of an accused under the Marian statutes).
446. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 203 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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